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This study of the tobacco trade between Turkey and the 
United States provides new perspectives on two major themes 
in Turkish-American relations between 1923 and 1929: the 
effect of Turkish nationalism on American interests in 
Ataturk's Turkey, and the effort to restore Turkish-
American diplomatic ties broken during World War I. The 
marked rise in American cigarette consumption after World 
War I made the tobacco trade a crucial link between Turkey 
and America because it required the importation of aromatic 
tobacco. During the Turkish Republic's first decades, the 
value of American tobacco imports from Turkey exceeded the 
value of all American exports to that country. The tobacco 
trade survived Turkish nationalism and unsatisfactory 
diplomatic relations because of the financial benefits it 
brought to both states. This analysis of the events 
affecting the Turkish-American tobacco trade between 1923 
and 1929 is an inquiry into the interplay of commerce and 
diplomacy. The study reveals the neglected importance of 
economic factors in Turkish-American relations. 
THE ROLE OF THE TOBACCO TRADE 
IN TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 
1923-29 
By 
Robert Carey Goodman III 
Approved 
Associate c. Bogle 
John L. Gordon 
THE ROLE OF THE TOBACCO TRADE 
IN TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 
1923-29 
By 
ROBERT CAREY GOODMAN III 
B.A., Davidson College, 1980 
A Thesis 
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty 
of the University of Richmond 
in Candidacy 
for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS 
in 
History 
December, 1987 
Richmond, Virginia 
·Preface 
This study examines the role of the tobacco trade in 
Turkish-American relations during the six years after the 
Turkish Republic's establishment in 1923. The significance 
of the years 1923-29 lies in the rapprochement achieved 
between the Turkey and the United States despite the 
revolutionary changes in Turkey; diplomatic relations were 
restored in 1927 and the first treaty between the two 
states--a commercial treaty--was signed in October 1929. A 
study of the tobacco trade illuminates the interplay of 
commerce and diplomacy in Turkish-American relations for 
two reasons. First, the effect of Kemal Ataturk's reforms 
on America's chief economic interest in Turkey was of 
considerable diplomatic import. Second, a study of 
America's foreign commerce in this period is necessarily a 
study of American diplomacy, due to the controversy 
surrounding America's role in the international community. 
The basis of the Turkish-American tobacco trade was 
American importation of aromatic tobacco. Aromatic tobacco 
is a relative of the plant native to the Americas, and its 
rich flavor makes it ideal for blending with other tobaccos 
in cigarettes. At one time, the modifier "Turkish" generi-
cally described aromatic tobacco. This designation derived 
ii 
from the leaf's place of cultivation: the formerly Ottoman 
Turkish lands of Greece, Macedonia, Bulgaria and modern 
Turkey. In this study, "Turkish tobacco" denotes the 
tobacco produced in Turkey, while "aromatic" refers to a 
type of tobacco. 
The growing popularity of cigarettes made from blends 
including aromatic leaf markedly increased American 
importation of aromatic tobacco in the twentieth century. 
As a result of the spectacular rise in cigarette consump-
tion, especially after World War I, aromatic tobacco came 
to comprise more than half of all American imports from 
Turkey during the interwar period; the value of Turkish 
tobacco exports to the United states exceeded the value of 
all American exports to Turkey. To purchase Turkish 
tobacco, American companies developed extensive organi-
zations in Turkey, points of direct contact between Turks 
and Americans. 
Purchasing aromatic tobacco, however, was not the only 
important aspect of this trade; Americans also directed the 
preparation of this tobacco in Turkey. Aromatic tobacco 
needed to be "manipulated" before use, a process that 
included sorting, cleaning, grading, and baling. Manip-
ulation required considerable manual labor and companies 
employed thousands of workers, especially women, to prepare 
their tobacco. To reduce costs, companies usually 
iii 
preferred to manipulate the tobacco in its country of 
origin; Turks preferred to manipulate this tobacco as well, 
because of the many jobs the industry created. Thus, 
manipulation represented a separate, but related, American 
interest in the Turkish-American tobacco trade. 
A third aspect of the trade lay in its potential to 
attract American capital to Turkey. A monopoly designated 
by the Turkish government regulated the tobacco trade in 
Turkey. For the fifty years prior to the Turkish 
Republic's creation, the Turks had granted this monopoly as 
a concession to foreign investors. Not only had the 
exploitation of this monopoly proven profitable to the 
concessionaire--one attraction to American investors--but 
the possibility of controlling one of the major sources of 
a valuable raw material through the acquisition of the 
monopoly concession also provided incentive for American 
capital investment in Turkey. 
Thus, the three aspects of the tobacco trade were of 
great importance both to Turks and to Americans, and conse-
quently, to the Turkish-American relationship. Yet the 
American commercial presence in Turkey was both wanted and 
not wanted. On the one hand, the high economic stakes 
ensured that the new regime in Turkey would want to exploit 
fully the tobacco trade; the American presence in Turkey 
helped make this possible. On the other hand, the 
iv 
nationalistic philosophy of Ataturk's government supported 
the anti-foreign sentiments in Turkey that posed potential 
threats to the tobacco companies. The tobacco trade, 
therefore, was a subject of diplomatic as well as economic 
concern, as the United States government, in its efforts to 
protect the American commercial interests, had to cope with 
this nationalist challenge. 
Though the tobacco trade was statistically quite 
significant, its role in the broader Turkish-American 
relationship has received scant attention in the historical 
literature--a fact that initially piqued my curiousity and 
prompted this study. My objectives are threefold: to 
examine the effects of revolutionary changes within Turkey 
on the Turkish-American tobacco trade; to determine how 
trade affected--and was affected by--diplomatic relations 
between the two states; and thus, to provide a more 
thorough evaluation of the tobacco trade's economic and 
political significance in Turkish-American relations. 
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Chapter One 
Historical Background 
Despite its tremendous economic significance for 
Turkey in modern times, tobacco was not always welcome in 
Turkey. At the end of the sixteenth century, shortly after 
its introduction by traders into the Ottoman Empire, the 
Turkish sultans declared tobacco illegal. Smokers of the 
illicit leaf were not coddled: 
The method of punishment was to force the stem of 
a pipe through the cartilage of the nose, seat 
the victim backwards upon a mule and have him led 
through the streets. It was Murat IV, however, 
who, by his insane cruelties, became the terror 
of smokers, having ordered several seized 
"flagrante delicto" to be summarily beheaded, and 
others to be hanged with a pipe thrust through 
their noses.l 
Customs changed and the prohibition on tobacco 
consumption ended about 1656 during the reign of Mehmet 
IV. In the eighteenth century, Turkish tobacco was shipped 
around the Mediterranean, into Russia, and beyond. In 
1765, Frederick the Great of Prussia delivered an edict 
requiring "sultanische" tobacco from the Ottoman Empire to 
lJerome E. Brooks, Tobacco: Its History Illustrated by 
the Books. Manuscripts and Engravings in the Library of 
George Arents, Jr., 5 vols. (New York: Rosenbach Company, 
1937-52), 1, 73-74. 
1 
2 
be imported into his northern European state and mixed with 
the domestic weed to improve its smoking qualities.2 
Cigarette smoking became popular in Europe following 
the Crimean War (1853-56). Returning English and French 
soldiers who adopted this Near Eastern custom were aped by 
their countrymen in increasing numbers. The cigarette of 
choice was made entirely of aromatic tobacco.3 
The same Crimean War that led to increased popularity 
of aromatic cigarettes also led to increasing Ottoman 
debts, and following the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 the 
Ottoman Empire was virtually bankrupt.4 This indebtedness 
culminated in the Decree of Muharrem of 1881 in which the 
Sultan Abdulhamit II (1876-1909) consolidated the ottoman 
public debt and established the Public Debt Commission to 
service the debt for the holders of Turkish bonds. Accord-
ing to the decree, all revenues from tobacco and five other 
2Brooks, Tobacco, 1, 208, 138; 3, 425-26. 
3Jerome E. Brooks, The Mighty Leaf: Tobacco Through the 
Centuries (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1952), pp. 233-
34; Nannie May Tilley, The Bright-Tobacco Industry 1860-1929 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1948), pp. 
505-06. 
4stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, Reform, Revolu-
tion and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975, 
vol. 2 of History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 155-56; 
Richard D. Robinson, The First Turkish Republic: A Case 
study in National Development, Harvard Middle Eastern Stud-
ies, no. 9 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 
97. 
3 
sources would be paid to the commission.5 Ever since the 
government had legalized tobacco, various forms of state 
monopoly had collected revenue from the tobacco trade,6 but 
in May 1883 a predominantly French organization, the 
Societe de la Regie Cointeresse des tabacs de !'Empire 
Ottoman (the Regie), received the concession for the 
tobacco monopoly in Turkey. In exchange for regulating 
all tobacco production, manufacture, and sale, the Regie 
paid $3.3 million annually to the Public Debt Commission. 
The ottoman government granted the concession for a period 
of thirty years, beginning in 1884.7 
5Text of the Decree of Muharrem may be found in z. Y. 
Hershlag, Introduction to the Modern Economic History of the 
Middle East, 2nd ed. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1980), pp. 320-32. 
6Leland James Gordon, American Relations with Turkey, 
1830-1930; An Economic Interpretation (Philadelphia: Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Press, 1932), p. 84. 
7oonald c. Blaisdell, European Financial Control in the 
Ottoman Empire (New York: AMS Press, 1966), pp. 113-14; G. 
Bie Ravndal (Consul General, Istanbul) to Secretary of 
State (William Jennings Bryan), 5 May 1913, Department of 
state Archives, Record Group 59, National Archives Building, 
Washington, file 165.082/19, Microfilm Publication M353, 
Internal Affairs of Turkey, Roll 66, frames 1167-87 (State 
Deparment Records hereafter cited as DS followed by file 
number; National Archives Building, Washington cited as NA; 
and similar microfilm records abbreviated following this 
example: M353, 66/1167-87); Shaw, "Reform," pp. 223-24; 
United states Department of commerce, "Turkey: A Commercial 
and Industrial Handbook," prepared by G. Bie Ravndal, Trade 
Promotion series No. 28 (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1926), pp. 96-97. 
4 
Although the Regie was a profitable enterprise, it did 
not have the economic vitality of the unregulated American 
tobacco industry. At this time, America's tobacco industry 
was already well developed, yet still flexible. As leaders 
in marketing and adv~rtising tobacco manufacturers created 
new products that pleased consumers, then sold them all 
they desired. In 1883 average tobacco consumption for each 
American over fourteen years old was 6.59 pounds. Cigaret-
tes, however, accounted for only 1% of the tobacco used.a 
Though not as aggressive as the American industry, the 
Turkish industry was not entirely static. Better cultural 
techniques and seed selection had improved quality. A 
Russian emigre named Penick was credited with bringing 
seeds of high-quality Macedonian tobacco to Izmir in 1880. 
Prior to 1880, the entire Aegean region of Anatolia pro-
duced only about 850,000 pounds of tobacco, but by 1884 
over 1,000,000 pounds were produced in the Ephesus district 
alone. The volume of production increased because the 
Ottoman Empire's tobacco was in demand in Europe, and 
increasingly, in America.9 
8Benno K. Milmore and Arthur G. Conover, "Tobacco 
Consumption in the United States 1880 to 1954," Agricultural 
Economics Research 8 (1956): 9-12. 
9John Corrigan, Jr. (Consul, Izmir), "Tobacco Industry 
of Smyrna," Report No. 34, 1 June 1927, RG 84, Consular Post 
Records Smyrna, NA, file 861.33 Field Crops-Tobacco, p. 21 
(Record Group hereafter cited as RG; Consular Post Records 
At the end of the nineteenth century, both aromatic-
tobacco cigarettes and domestic-tobacco cigarettes were 
available in the United States and becoming more popular. 
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Acceptance of these new products, though, was hard-won. In 
1900, Americans over fourteen chewed an average of 3.56 
pounds of tobacco, chomped on 1.99 pounds of cigars, loaded 
1.42 pounds into their pipe bowls, and snuffed .3 pounds in 
case the other modes did not suffice. Per person consump-
tion of cigarettes had doubled, reaching .16 pounds, but 
this still represented only 2% of the total.lo 
Even this small percentage of the American market 
represented a large investment in aromatic tobacco. So 
great was the demand that in 1902 the American Tobacco 
Company, a giant tobacco trust, reportedly tried to gain 
control of the Near Eastern supply market. This effort 
caused aromatic tobacco prices to soar and led to a tremen-
dous surplus in 1903, which then seriously deflated the 
market for the following three years. 11 But this inability 
to control the supply of aromatic tobacco did not diminish 
cited as CPR). 
lOsubsequent references to average tobacco consumption 
in the United states will also refer to Americans over four-
teen years of age. Milmore, "Tobacco Consumption," 10. 
llc. c. constantinides, Turkish Tobacco, A Manual for 
Planters, Dealers. and Manufacturers (London: W. and J. 
Rounce, 1912), p. 91. 
American manufacturers' interest in Near Eastern leaf. 
Before 1900, the Turkish-American tobacco trade was of no 
consequence; after 1903, tobacco was the most valuable 
American import from Turkey and remained so for decades.12 
In the early twentieth century, innovative product 
development in the United States created a demand for 
larger amounts of aromatic tobacco. In 1905 the Liggett & 
Myers Tobacco Company introduced Fatima cigarettes, one of 
the first "Turkish blend" cigarettes. Fatimas contained 
aromatic and domestic tobaccos in equal measure, a mixture 
6 
which "toned down" the perfumy aromatic tobacco. According 
to the company's advertising, 3.5 billion Fatima cigarettes 
were sold during its first year alone. By 1910 sales had 
reportedly reached 10 billion.13 In the same year, 
however, cigarettes accounted for only .41 pounds of the 
8.59 pounds of tobacco consumed by the average American. 
Though this represented a quantitative tripling per person 
12Gordon, "American Relations," pp. 83-84; John A. 
DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 
1900-1939 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1963), p. 38. 
13Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company, Fatima cigarette 
advertisement, United States Tobacco Journal, vol. 98, no. 
2 (1922): 52 (United states Tobacco Journal hereafter cited 
as USTJ) . 
since 1900, cigarettes remained the least popular means of 
taking tobacco.14 
7 
The year 1911 witnessed the destruction of the goliath 
tobacco trust that had controlled 90% of the American 
trade. The court case that busted the American Tobacco 
Company for violating the Sherman Anti-Trust Act created a 
supposedly independent Big Four: American Tobacco Company, 
R. J. Reynolds, Liggett & Myers, and P. Lorillard.15 The 
dispersal of economic power invoked the marketplace's 
master motivater: competition. 
In this new competitive struggle, the R. J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Company struck boldly by bringing Camel cigarettes 
onto the market. Introduced in 1913, Camels were the first 
"American blend" cigarette, a combination of bright, 
burley, Maryland, and aromatic tobaccos. Though detailed 
cigarette recipes remain highly guarded secrets,16 this new 
type of blend generally contained about 10% aromatic 
14Milmore, "Tobacco Consumption," 10. 
15Joseph c. Robert, The Story of Tobacco in America 
(New York: A.A. Knopf, 1952), pp. 165-67; Richard B. Tennant, 
The American Cigarette Industry: A Study in Economic Analysis 
and Public Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950) , 
pp. 297-302; Nannie M. Tilley, The R. J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Company (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1985), p. 190. 
16Tilley, Bright-Tobacco, p. 612. 
tobacco. 17 Reynolds's success was imitated by American 
Tobacco's Lucky Strikes and Liggett & Myers•s Chester-
fields.18 
R. J. Reynolds bought most of its aromatic tobacco 
through the Standard Commercial Tobacco Company, estab-
lished in 1910. Headquartered in New York City, Standard 
Commercial claimed to be the· 11world 1 s largest dealer in 
Turkish leaf," and served Reynolds and other companies' 
aromatic needs for over a decade. The company's Greek 
president, Ery Euripides Kehaya, maintained offices and 
8 
warehouses in several cities in Greece; in Sofia, Bulgaria; 
and in Izmir, Turkey.19 Reynolds, however, was not the 
only American manufacturer in need of aromatic tobacco. 
Through various agents American Tobacco Company spent $10 
17united States Tariff Commission, "Trade Agreements 
Between the United states and the Republic of Turkey: 
Digests of Trade Data with Respect to Products on Which 
Concessions Were Granted by the United States (Washington, 
1939), p. 36 (hereinafter cited as U.S. Tariff Commission, 
"Trade Agreement Digest"). 
18Lucky strikes came out in 1916 and Chesterfields, 
which actually had appeared in 1912, were redesigned in the 
hope of imitating camels' success. Tilley, Bright-Tobacco, 
pp. 609-10; Robert, story of Tobacco, pp. 230-34. 
19charles D. Barney & co., "The Tobacco Industry" (New 
York, Philadelphia, and Winston-Salem, NC, 1924), p. 78; 
Tilley, Reynolds, pp. 234-35. 
million in the Ottoman Empire to purchase and process 
aromatic leaf during 1912 alone.20 
9 
Maintaining a steady supply of aromatic tobacco was 
not always easy. The Young Turk revolution of 1908-09 in 
the Ottoman Empire gave foreign powers new opportunities to 
prey on the fragile giant. In 1908, Austria annexed 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Bulgaria declared its formal 
independence. 1911-12 brought war with Italy. The two 
Balkan Wars of 1912-13 placed most of the Ottoman's 
European territories in the hands of quarrelsome Balkan 
states. As far as the tobacco industry was concerned, 
Turkey's loss of Macedonia was the most serious blow. The 
Kavalla, Xanthe, and Salonika districts of Macedonia 
produced about 24 million pounds of high quality tobacco in 
a good growing year,21 almost as much as the annual 
production average of 25 million pounds for all of the 
Ottoman Empire's Asiatic provinces between 1909 and 1913.22 
In light of these many wounds, the ottoman government 
was fortunate to be able to renegotiate the concession of 
20oeNovo, American Interests, p. 39. 
21Ravndal to Secretary of State (Bryan), 5 May 1913, DS 
165.082/19, M353, 66/1183. 
22united states Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Foreign and Domestic Commerce, "International Trade in Leaf 
and Manufactured Tobacco," prepared by T. L. Hughes (Washing-
ton: Government Printing Office, 1925), p. 3. 
10 
the tobacco monopoly, which was due to expire on 15 April 
1914. The Ottoman debt of almost $550 million provided an 
added incentive to squeeze more funds from one of the few 
profitable enterprises in Turkey.23 In 1913 the government 
invited competitive bids in hopes of winning a more 
favorable contract with the Regie. Among the bidders were 
Americans, whose identities and aims remain obscure. They 
may have been simply investors, but it is likely that the 
large American tobacco companies were involved. Perhaps 
these bidders only wished to make a profit by efficiently 
managing the Turkish monopoly, but the ability to control a 
large portion of the aromatic tobacco supply was also a 
tempting opportunity. Despite these uncertainities, events 
convinced Hoffman Philip, the American charge d'affaires in 
Istanbul, that American acquisition of the Turkish tobacco 
monopoly was a very real possibility. Philip wrote in July 
1913: 
Some two weeks ago I was informed by Talaat Bey, 
Minister of the Interior, that American offers 
for the tobacco concession were more advantageous 
than any others and that the Government would 
adopt them if a loan could be negotiated in the 
United States.24 
23Mustafa N. Kazdal, "Trade Relations Between the 
United states and Turkey, 1919-1944" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana 
University, 1946), p. 41. 
24Hoffman Philip (Charge d'Affaires, Istanbul) to 
Secretary of state (Bryan), 22 July 1913, DS file 
867.61331/1, M353, 66/1156-57. 
11 
Philip attempted to bring attention to and gain support for 
what he considered to be "one of the most desirable under-
takings for American capital" in the ottoman Empire, 
despite his beliefs that the controlling French interests 
would not allow the monopoly to change hands.25 Despite 
the paucity of information, it is clear that closer 
involvement in the Turkish tobacco industry, and even 
control of this industry, interested certain Americans. 
Philip's hopes did not come true. In August 1913 the 
Sultan issued a decree extending the concession to the 
Regie for fifteen years, in exchange for an advance of $6.6 
million.26 Americans did not gain control of the monopoly 
in 1913, but the Turkish tobacco industry remained 
attractive to foreign investors, for its profitability if 
nothing else. Under the terms of the 1913 agreement, the 
25rbid. 
26The poor reception accorded Philip's calls by the 
American government can partially be understood given the 
fate of an even grander American investment scheme in the 
Ottoman Empire, the Chester Project. From 1908 to 1913, 
Admiral Colby M. Chester obtained the official support of 
the Taft Administration for a grandiose railroad and mining 
project in the empire. The highest American officials 
supported the plan "because the administration wished to 
employ the engines of diplomacy to promote American business 
activity abroad as part of its policy of Dollar Diplomacy." 
This break from traditional diplomatic non-involvement 
ended as a fiasco; Chester's plans proved ill-conceived and 
underfunded. President Taft withdrew all support and the 
new Wilson Administration would not touch the program. 
DeNovo, American Interests, pp. 58-87. 
Regie paid the Public Debt Commission $3.52 million 
annually. Surpluses earned above this amount and the 
monopoly's administrative costs were divided among the 
Ottoman government, the public debt, and the Regie. For 
its efforts, the Regie reportedly made a profit of $1.54 
million in 1913.27 
Failure to obtain the concession may have irked some 
12 
in the Turkish-American tobacco trade, but the failed 
negotiations of 1913 and even the years of Balkan troubles 
paled in comparison to the struggles ahead. Many factors 
led Turkey into the growing world conflict, German 
political influence in Turkey being only one among them. 
Hereditary hostility towards Russia, growing friction with 
Britain and France, and the political opportunism of Young 
Turk leaders, led the ottoman government to abandon its 
neutral stance and bombard Russian ports in the Black Sea 
on 28 October 1914. Thus, Turkey entered the "Great War." 
During World War I, the blockade of Turkish ports on 
the Aegean and Mediterranean effectively curtailed 
27G. Bie Ravndal to Secretary of State (Bryan), 7 August 
1913, DS 867.61331/3, M353, 66/1164-66. For the entire 
convention see G. Bie Ravndal to Secretary of State (Bryan), 
12 September 1913 DS 867.61331/5, M353, 66/1216-32. Even 
after the regrantlng of the concession to the Regie, Philip 
called for renewed American bids before the agreement was 
ratified by the ottoman General Assembly. Hoffman Philip 
to Secretary of state (Bryan), 3 September 1913, DS 
867.61331/4, M353, 66/1210-14. 
13 
Americans imports from Turkey.28 By 1918, these imports 
had declined 99.9% from their 1910-14 average, to a modest 
$222,039. 29 This blow to trade relations came about 
despite the fact that America and Turkey never formally 
exchanged declarations of war. On 8 April 1917, however, 
two days after the United States declared war on Germany, 
the United States severed diplomatic relations with Turkey; 
on 20 April the Turks reciprocated.30 
Despite the lack of official diplomatic relations, a 
number of factors favored increased Turkish-American trade 
after the Turks surrendered unconditionally to the Allies 
on 30 October 1918 (Armistice of Mudros). In December 
1918, the United States sent a diplomatic mission, known as 
the High Commission, to Turkey. This did not constitute a 
formal restoration of relations, but it did renew official 
representation of American interests in Turkey. Turks 
28The resulting scarcity of aromatic tobaccos actually 
promoted the production of the "domestic blend" with its 
lower aromatic content. Tilley, Bright-Tobacco, p. 611. 
29Roger R. Trask, The United States Response to Turkish 
Nationalism and Reform, 1914-1938 (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1971), p. 105. 
30Kazdal, "Trade Relations," pp. 5-6. The Treaty of 
1830 originally established diplomatic relations. The text 
of this treaty may be found in Hershlag, Economic History, 
pp. 306-07. DeNovo describes Turkish-American wartime rela-
tions and the war's effect on American colleges, missions, 
and relief efforts. He omits, however, a discussion of 
business interests during the war. DeNovo, American Inter-
ests, pp. 88-108. 
14 
distinguished between America and other Great Powers: 
Americans were not interested in controlling Turkish lands 
and had no political aspirations in the region.31 Indeed, 
Point Twelve of President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points 
stated that the Turkish portions of the ottoman Empire 
should be assured a secure sovereignty.32 This positive 
perception of Americans opened doors for American 
businessmen in Turkey. 
Other factors increased American trading potential as 
well. The American merchant fleet was in a position to 
handle more of the trade between the states; shipping was 
not controlled by a third party, as it had been in the late 
nineteenth century by an English shipping monopoly, the 
Levant Company.33 The United States had relatively more 
capital available than war-ravaged European states. Most 
important, though, was a 70% decrease in the value of the 
Turkish lira between 1915 and 1919.34 For political, 
31Edward Mead Earle, Turkey. The Great Powers, and the 
Bagdad Railway; A Study in Imperialism (New York: MacMillan, 
1923), pp. 336-37. 
32Thomas H. Galbraith, "The Smyrna Disaster of 1922 and 
its Effects on Turkish-American Relations" (Master's thesis, 
Pennsylvania state University, 1960), p. 8; Trask, U.S. 
Response, pp. 240-41; DeNovo, American Interests, pp. 110-11. 
33Gordon, American Relations, p. 57; Kazdal, "Trade 
Relations," p. 76. 
34Kazdal, "Trade Relations," p. 109. 
logistic, and economic reasons, Americans could enter the 
Turkish market-place more effectively than ever before. 
American's desire to expand trade with Turkey grew 
just as much as their capability to trade did. In the 
years immediately after World War I, cigarettes became as 
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popular as other forms of tobacco; consumption of cigaret-
tes reached almost two pounds per person.35 As w. A. 
Whitaker, Vice-President of Standard Commercial, wrote: 
"it was the introduction of Turkish tobacco into the 
American blend which more than any other factor started 
the American cigarette on the upward stride. 11 36 
Some in the trade said that aromatic tobacco was to 
cigarettes what salt and pepper were to food, but the 
causes for cigarettes' growing popularity were more complex 
than aromatic•s inclusion. Once again war played a role as 
American soldiers returned with a cigarette-smoking habit 
acquired from Europeans. Cigarettes were less expensive 
than cigars and the quick smoke they provided was popular. 
35Milmore, "Tobacco Consumption," 10. 
36w. A. Whitaker, "The Culture of Turkish Tobacco As 
Exemplified in the Smyrna Type" (reprinted from Tobacco, 26 
April 1923). I would like to thank w. K. Greer, the director 
of Oriental Leaf Purchasing of R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Com-
pany, for kindly making a copy of this article available to 
me. 
The growing number of women smokers37 and the increasing 
income of Americans contributed as well,38 not to mention 
the addictive power of nicotine. 
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To keep up with this expanding demand Liggett & Myers 
established its own company to buy aromatic tobacco. On 13 
May 1915 the Gary Tobacco Company was formed as a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Liggett and Myers. The president of 
the company, I. c. Gary, had his home office in New York 
City; the Turkish headquarters were in Istanbul. The 
function of this subsidiary was to purchase, process, and 
resell aromatic leaf for the parent company, but it also 
sold tobacco to other companies, including British and 
Egyptian.39 The need for a consistent supply of aromatic 
tobacco was obvious: in 1910 Liggett & Myers sold 10 
37u.s. Department of Commerce, "International Trade," 
p. 4. 
38Kazdal, "Trade Relations," p. 71. 
39Gary also purchased tobacco in countries other than 
Turkey; it purchased heavily in Greece and, to a lesser 
extent, in Bulgaria and Russia (the Soviet Union). F.W. 
Bell (Gary Tobacco) to Robert P. Skinner (Ambassador to 
Turkey, 27 September 1933, RG 84, Embassy Records Constan-
tinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation (hereafter Embassy Records 
cited as ER) ; Randolph Currin to Ambassador (John Van Antwerp 
MacMurray), 9 March 1936, RG 84, ER Istanbul, NA, file 610.1 
survey of American Interests; Moody's Manual of Investments, 
1941, p. 2629. 
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billion Fatima cigarettes; in 1920, 45 billion were sold.40 
Gary Tobacco was created to satisfy this need. 
Thus, immediately after the war, potential and desire 
combined to make the United States the largest importer of 
all Turkish goods and of Turkish tobacco, replacing 
Austria-Hungary, which had imported the most Turkish 
tobacco before the war.41 Tobacco imports from Turkey 
reached $19.5 million in 1920, greater than the annual 
average of all imports from Turkey between 1910-14.42 This 
tobacco was exported despite the renewed turmoil in the 
Near East. 
The 1918 Armistice of Mudros had proven an uneasy one, 
as Allied forces occupied the Straits and Istanbul--a 
humiliation for the Turks--and Allied troops moved into the 
portions of Anatolia allotted to the various victorious 
powers by wartime agreements.43 Hostilities resumed after 
the landing of a Greek army in Izmir on 15 May 1919. 
40Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company, Fatima cigarette 
advertisement, USTJ~ vol. 98, no. 2 (1922): 52. 
41Ravndal to Secretary of State (Bryan), 5 May 1913, DS 
165.082/19, M353, 66/1185; Charles E. Allen (Consul in 
Charge, Istanbul), "The Turkish Regie," 13 November 1925, DS 
867.61331/9, M353, 66/1283-84; Kazdal, "Trade Relations," 
p. 108. 
42see Table 2. 1920 figure includes Greece-in-Asia. 
43Rene Albrecht-Carrie, A Diplomatic History of Europe 
Since the Congress of Vienna, rev. ed. (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1973), pp. 334-39. 
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British and French arms and supplies encouraged Greek Prime 
Minister Eleutherios Venizelos's dreams of glory through 
expansion and Aegean empire.44 The Sublime Porte's submis-
sive acceptance of foreign control alienated the national 
movement which had come to life following the Greek inva-
sion. Thus, this Greco-Turkish War (Turkish War of 
Independence) had a dual character: Kemal Ataturk led the 
re-inspired Turkish forces in a war of liberation which was 
simultaneously a war of revolution.45 
Americans played a negligible role in the Greco-
Turkish War. President Woodrow Wilson had called for 
Turkish sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference, but 
Britain's David Lloyd George persuaded him to acquiesce in 
the British-supported Greek invasion. When the Greek 
troops disembarked at Izmir, the battleship u.s.s. Arizona 
and five American destroyers were in the harbor, but the 
American military forces took no part in the subsequent 
fighting.46 In 1919 the United States had little to gain 
or lose militarily in Turkey. There were, though, 
44Ibid., p. 401; Arnold J. Toynbee and Kenneth P. 
Kirkwood, Turkey (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927), 
pp. 92-6. 
45Mustafa Kemal Pasha received the name "Ataturk," 
meaning "Father of the Turk" or "first and foremost Turk," 
in 1934. Trask, American Response, p. 69. 
46Galbraith, "Smyrna Disaster," p. 13. 
commercial risks from both the war and rising Turkish 
nationalism. 
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In April 1920 Ataturk directed the formation of a new 
Turkish government in Ankara. The foremost goals of this 
new government were resistance to foreign aggression and 
the revocation of the Treaty of Sevres of 10 August 1920--
the Paris Peace Conference's solution to the Eastern 
Question.47 In many respects the Treaty of sevres dealt 
even more harshly with Turkey than the Treaty of Versailles 
did with Germany. The treaty demanded, in essence, the end 
of an independent Turkish state. Turkey would consist of 
Ankara and its immediate surroundings, but would be subject 
to "economic, judicial, and financial bondage to the . . . 
Powers. 11 48 Ataturk intended to terminate this subjugation. 
Turkish revisionism demanded an American response. 
American interests in Turkey at this time were largely 
47The so-called National Pact outlined the nationalists' 
aims. The text of the National Pact may be found in J. c. 
Hurewitz, British-French Supremacy, 1914-1945, vol. 2 of The 
Middle East and North Africa in World Politics, A Documen-
tary Record, 2nd ed. (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1979), 209-211. 
48Harry N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic 
History, 1913-1923 (New York: Howard Fertig, 1966), pp. 242-
49. The Treaty of sevres 1) left Istanbul under Allied 
occupation, as it had been since 20 March 1920; 2) imposed 
international control on the Straits; 3) gave the region 
around Izmir to Greece; 4) included the Mediterranean areas 
of Anatolia in the French and Italian spheres; and 5) created 
an independent Armenia to be under British and American 
supervision. 
20 
commercial. Admiral Mark L. Bristol, the American high 
commissioner in Turkey (1919-27), believed that only 
through representation to Ataturk's new government could 
American economic interests in Turkey be protected.49 With 
this in mind Bristol ordered Julian E. Gillespie, the 
assistant trade commissioner, from Istanbul to Ankara.SO 
Gillespie made an "unofficial" trip, a ploy enabling the 
United States to deny that it recognized the Ankara 
government, while at the same time providing some sort of 
representation. Gillespie's journey from December 1921 to 
February 1922 focused on "questions relating to general 
economic prospects in Turkey and to particular conditions 
that might affect American trade and business." The 
satisfactory responses Gillespie received prompted the 
State Department to send an official representative, Robert 
Imbrie, to Ankara in 1922, presumably to protect American 
commerce. According to Imbrie, however, "American 
49Laurence Evans, United states Policy and the Partition 
of Turkey, 1914-1924 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), 
pp. 330-6; Peter H. Buckingham, International Normalcy, The 
Open Door Peace with the Former Central Powers, 1921-29 
(Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1983), pp. 75-6. 
50Gillespie was an influential figure in Turkey. As 
DeNovo notes: "From 1920 until his death in 1939, Gillespie 
served as trade commissioner and then as commercial attache 
at Istanbul, where he became intimately associated with 
Turkish businesmen and political leaders. DeNovo, American 
Interests, p. 253. 
commercial interests, except for tobacco, were negli-
gible.1151 
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The concerns of this only significant American 
interest in Turkey took two forms. First, American 
companies worried that the nationalist regime would try to 
finance its efforts with the companies' stocks of tobacco. 
In 1922 the London Times reported that the Turkish 
nationalist government had ordered the confiscation of all 
abandoned stocks of tobacco and the requisition of 15% of 
all other tobacco holdings.52 on 25 July 1922 the United 
States Commerce Department notified the major American 
tobacco companies of a nationalist decree to this effect.53 
The Commerce Department's communication caused consi-
derable anxiety within American Tobacco Company's manage-
ment in the United States, because Ataturk's forces 
already occupied Samsun, the center of an important 
tobacco growing region in on the Black Sea. Jonathan H. 
Holmes of American Tobacco expressed the concern to 
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes that the Turks 
51Evans, U.S. Policy, p. 338. Emphasis added. 
52 11Tobacco Requisitions," Times [London), 28 June 1922, 
p. 7, col. f {London Times hereafter cited as Times). 
53cpG {District Manager, Commerce Department) to Ameri-
can Tobacco Company, 25 July 1922, RG 151, Records of the 
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, NA, file 303 
Turkey, {Records of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic 
Commerce hereafter cited as·FDC Records). 
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would requisition a million pounds of tobacco stored by the 
company in the Samsun region.S4 Admiral Bristol tried to 
dispel the fears of American cigarette manufacturers. He 
cited the assurances of an American tobacco buyer in Turkey 
that no tobacco had been requisitioned in Samsun, despite a 
threat of such action in 1921, and that no grounds for 
continued concern existed.SS such assurances, however, did 
little to console the men who feared the steps Ataturk's 
militaristic, nationalistic government might take to 
finance its war and secure its rule. 
The war itself also caused concern among American 
tobacco buyers as the Greek effort faltered. In August 
1921 the sound of Greek artillery could be heard in Ankara 
as the invaders pushed towards the nationalists' capital. 
By Sep-tember 1922 the Greeks were fleeing towards the 
Aegean, carrying out a devasting scorched-earth policy as 
they fell back on Izmir--the second-most important inter-
national trading center in Turkey and a major tobacco-
producing region. As General Ismet Inonu led the Turkish 
S4Jonathan H. Holmes (American Tobacco) to Charles 
Evan Hughes (Secretary of State), 2 August 1922, RG 84, ER 
Constantinople, NA, file 3SO Claims. 
SSMark L. Bristol (High Commissioner to Turkey) to 
Secretary Hughes, 24 October 1922, RG 84, ER Constantinople, 
NA, file 3SO Claims. 
forces westward in 1922, tobacco traders' concern grew.56 
Purchases of war insurance for merchandise held in Izmir 
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evinced this fear. Insurance rates had jumped from 3% of 
the good's value per month in early September to 5% (and to 
7.5% for some materials) by mid-September.57 The 
underwriters obviously considered the threats to tobacco 
interests to be real. 
Unrelated events intensified the concerns of Alston 
Tobacco58 and Standard Commercial's managements. In late 
August 1922, a fire in Salonika, Greece, destroyed 
56Arnold J. Toynbee, an eye-witness to the fighting 
provides an interesting account of the war. Toynbee, 
Turkey, pp. 92-110; Shaw, Reform, pp. 340-69. 
57 11war Risks at Smyrna," Times, 8 September 1922, p. 
15, col. b; "Insurance in Germany and Smyrna," Times, 11 
September 1922, p. 17, col. c; "Insuring Merchandise in 
Smyrna," Times, 12 September 1922, p. 16, col. c; "Insurance 
and the Smyrna Fire," Times, 16 September 1922, p. 13, col. 
b; "Near East Insurance Developments," Times, 19 September 
1922, p. 17 col. c. 
58The Alston Tobacco Company, named after William H. 
Alston, was a subsidiary of P. Lorillard Tobacco Company of 
New Jersey. At various times Alston served as a buyer for 
a number of American manufacturers, besides its parent com-
pany, e.g., American Tobacco, R. J. Reynolds, and Philip 
Morris. Like Gary, Alston had branch offices around Turkey: 
in Samsun, Izmir, and on some Aegean islands, as well as 
extensive operations in Greece. Frederick o. Byrd (American 
Delegate, Izmir) to J. English (American Tobacco), 30 
October 1924, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, Supplement, NA, file 300 
Protection of Interests; P. E. King (Alston Tobacco) to 
Consul General, 6 September 1924, RG 84, Consulate General 
Records Constantinople, NA, file 861.3 Tobacco (Consulate 
General Records hereafter cited as CGR); Tilley, Reynolds, 
p. 235. 
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warehouses of tobacco owned by Alston and seriously damaged 
Standard Commercial's holdings, eliminating a considerable 
portion of both companies' aromatic tobacco stocks. 
Although insurance payments probably compensated for the 
$1,625,000 in losses, the two companies became even more 
dependent on their Turkish holdings.59 The Salonika fire 
was not war-related, but it was a harsh reminder of Near 
Easter~ cities' susceptibility to devasting conflagrations. 
The American tobacco companies had even more to fear 
in Izmir, as the fighting approached the city at an awkward 
time: by September the majority of the tobacco had been 
harvested and was already in warehouses. Alston Tobacco 
alone reported storing 2,577,824 pounds of tobacco valued 
at $1,239,682.60 
The American tobacco men's worst fears were realized. 
on 9 September, Turkish troops entered Izmir. Then, on 13 
September, fires broke out which destroyed half of the 
city.61 Among the ashes were American losses, including 
59 11American Plant Ruined in Fire at Saloniki," USTJ, 
vol. 98, no. 10 (1922): 3. 
60william [Fingelly] (illegible) (Alston Tobacco) to 
Consulate General in Izmir, 4 September 1922, RG 84, CPR 
Smyrna, Supplement, NA, file 300 Protection of Interests. 
6lshaw, Reform, p. 363. 
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tobacco warehouses and stocks of leaf worth millions of 
dollars.62 
The capture of Izmir was the climax of the Greco-
Turkish war. In early October 1922 Ismet Inonu met British 
and Greek representatives in the Marmara Sea resort town of 
Mudania to arrange an armistice. The agreement signed 
there on 11 October satisfied almost all of the National 
Pact's territorial demands. The Lausanne Conference began 
on 21 November 1922 to formulate a new peace. The Turkish 
victory had ended the war, one of the greatest obstacles to 
Turkish-American trade. Other obstacles remained, includ-
ing political battles in the United states. 
In 1921 growers and dealers of bright tobacco in 
Virginia and North Carolina began to call for protectionist 
measures. They argued that the large and increasing 
imports of aromatic tobacco hurt sales of bright tobacco.63 
The prevailing tariff of $.35 per pound was ineffective in 
hindering imports of Turkish aromatic. Although the 
62Galbraith, "Smyrna Disaster," passim. It is note-
worthy, though, that the Greco-Turkish War had not stopped 
the tobacco trade. In 1921, 9.5 million pounds of tobacco 
were imported into the United States from Izmir, and in 1922, 
13.3 million pounds came from Izmir. "Annual Declared 
Export Return," n.d., 1923, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 600 
Commercial Relations. 
63Bright tobacco is a mild, fragrant, low-nicotine leaf 
grown in Virginia and North Carolina. Its distinctive golden 
color gives it its name. Tilley, Bright-Tobacco, p. vii. 
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southern Democratic Senators who represented these tobacco 
men would ordinarily have opposed protectionist legislation 
of any sort,64 the growers were able to rally support in 
the "interest of the farmer. 11 65 In June 1922, a provision 
in the Senate's version of the tariff bill requested a duty 
of $1.00 per pound on "filler tobacco of the kind known as 
Turkish. 11 66 The Senate version had to go to conference 
committee, but "as the weight of opinion in the trade 
favored the Senate provisions," it was expected that the 
bill would pass.67 
In the fall of 1922, however, the conference committee 
approved the tobacco tariff schedule, but struck the provi-
sion which would have raised the duty on aromatic leaf. 68 
The growers and dealers lost, but curiously, they also 
gained something by losing. Aromatic tobacco did not 
64According to Democratic Party policy of the day, 
tariffs should only have been enacted for revenue purposes, 
while the Republican Party was the traditional protariff 
party. Stefanie Ann Lenway, The Politics of U.S. Interna-
tional Trade, Protection, Expansion and Escape (Boston, 
London, Melbourne, and Toronto: Pitman, 1985), p. 61. 
65 11virginians Want High Tariff on Turkish Tobacco," 
USTJ, vol. 97, no. 6 {1922): 36. 
66 11 senate Adopts $2.10 Duty on Wrapper," USTJ, vol. 98, 
no. 1 {1922): 10. 
67 rbid. 
68 11Tariff Bill is Finally Settled," USTJ, vol. 98, no. 
12 (1922): 7. 
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compete with bright tobacco: to the contrary, the 
inclusion of the leaf in tobacco blends actually increased 
total tobacco consumption in the United states. A $1.00 
per pound duty probably would have provided an effective 
barrier to the leaf's importation, with a consequent loss 
to the industry as a whole. Approval of the final tariff 
bill removed another obstacle to the Turkish-American 
tobacco trade. 
In sum, the economic importance of aromatic tobacco in 
both Turkey and America, and in Turkish-American relations 
increased steadily over the half-century preceeding the 
Turkish Republic's establishment, especially during the 
period after World War I. According to a leading tobacco 
trade journal, "tobacco in the Near East bears about the 
same relation to its prosperity that cotton bears to the 
prosperity of the southern states in the United States. 11 69 
The American cigarette industry, which depended increasing-
ly on aromatic tobacco, was not only essential to the 
prosperity of certain regions of America, but it also 
produced over $150 million in federal revenues from the 
excise tax on sales in 1922 alone.70 The inability to 
69 11Turkish Leaf Gluts Near East Markets," USJT, vol. 
101, no. 5 (1924): 49. 
70chas. o. Barney & co., "The Tobacco Industry; consoli-
dated Annual Reviews 1932 and 1933," p. 24. 
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grow aromatic tobacco in America maintained manufacturers' 
dependence on Near Eastern tobacco supplies. This is in 
contrast to the role of other Turkish commodities, such as 
dried figs and raisins. Previously, these two had been 
America's most valuable imports from Turkey, but imports 
declined as their cultivation in California developed.71 
Thus, unique conditions in both countries made the tobacco 
trade one of the fundamental points of contact between 
Turkey and America. 
This historical survey demonstrates the tenacity of 
the demand for Turkey's tobacco, despite the numerous 
obstacles encountered in obtaining it. Equally important 
to an understanding of the Turkish-American tobacco trade, 
however, is recognition of the agricultural and economic 
forces that shaped the supply of and market organization 
for the aromatic leaf. 
71Kazdal, "Trade Relations," pp. 64-66. 
Chapter Two 
The Crop and the Market 
International trade hangs on customs duties and world 
markets, consumption trends and political predilections. 
International trade in tobacco, however, is also dependent 
on an obvious but forgettable truth: tobacco is an 
agricultural crop. The raw materials for this twentieth-
century industry were just as susceptible to harvest 
failures, droughts, and diseases as were the potato crops 
of nineteenth-century Irish farmers. Simply put, the 
foremost elements determining supply were growing 
conditions. Equally important to the Turkish-American 
tobacco trade was the way in which tobacco was cultivated 
in Turkey, a factor which conditioned American participa-
tion in the Turkish tobacco market. 
Aromatic tobacco was grown in many places in postwar 
Turkey: along the Black Sea coast from the border with the 
Soviet Union to Sinop, on both the European and Anatolian 
sides of the Sea of Marmara, and along the Aegean coast and 
Aegean islands. For the American trade, three areas in 
Turkey were significant. The region around Samsun and 
Bafra on the Black Sea had the reputation for producing a 
high-quality tobacco desirable to Americans cigarette 
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manufacturers. A less important, though active, market 
from which the Americans bought was around Bursa. The 
center of the trade, though, was Izmir,l the focal point of 
a large tobacco-growing hinterland. 
Tobacco growing in Turkey was not only geographically 
dispersed, but growers produced numerous types of aromatic 
leaf as well. Different purchasers prized varying charac-
teristics in the aromatic tobacco. Americans had the repu-
tation of buying the highest quality tobacco. Egyptians, 
on the other hand, preferred a strong dark leave from the 
Trebizon region, while the central European tobacco monopo-
lies bought poorer grades at low prices. Despite these 
differences of location and type, tobacco growing methods 
all over Anatolia were similar. 
Tobacco growing was overwhelmingly a family affair in 
Turkey. As one commentator put it, perhaps with slight 
exaggeration: 
High-grade Turkish tobacco owes its worldwide 
reputation to the fact that the production of 
tobacco in Turkey is in fact a tradition carried 
on by families and that the quality of the 
lwhat was referred to as the "Izmir district" actually 
included several "vilayets" besides Izmir, including Aydin, 
Balikesir, Manisa, Mugla. J. M. English to J. v. A. Mac-
Murray (Ambassador), 4 April 1936, RG 84, ER Istanbul, 
General Archives Division, Washington National Records 
Center, Suitland, Md., file 610.1 Survey of American Inter-
ests (Washington National Records Center hereafter cited 
as WNRC). 
tobacco constitutes the pride of each one of 
those families.2 
These families worked small farms. "Small" meant an 
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average of 1.1 acres of tobacco per grower, with production 
averaging 782 pounds per grower for the years 1923-30 (see 
Table l}. Before any harvest, however, almost a full year 
of manual labor went into growing tobacco according to 
long-held traditions. In late winter seeds were sown in 
specially prepared beds. Growers transplanted the 
seedlings to fields about six to eight weeks after sowing. 
The dates for these operations varied in accordance with 
the location, the altitude, and the weather. As a rule of 
thumb, though, transplanting around Izmir needed to be 
completed by early May. In the Marmara and Black Sea 
regions a month's delay was common. 
Weather conditions were supremely important. Trans-
planting required dry ground, but the seedlings needed 
spring rains. During late spring and summer, near-
continuous sunshine needed to be interspersed with timely, 
but limited, rainfall. Insufficient rain reduced the size 
of the crop, but paradoxically improved the quality--if the 
2Quote from "Turkish Tobacco," Asian Review, no. 198 
(1958): 152. Whitaker, "Culture of Turkish Tobacco;" U.S. 
Department of Commerce, "Turkey: A Handbook," pp. 95-97; 
John Corrigan, Jr., "Tobacco Industry of Smyrna," Report 
No. 34, 1 June 1927, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 861.33 
Field Crops-Tobacco, pp. 8-9. 
crop survived. Too much moisture, on the other hand, 
created coarse-leaved, inferior tobacco. Thus, quantity 
and quality depended largely on unpredictable and uncon-
trollable elements. 
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Hand cultivation of the closely-spaced plants went on 
through the summer. Tobacco slips were planted five to six 
inches apart to encourage the development of small leaves. 
Around Izmir, harvesting began about the end of June. 
Individual_ leaves were picked as they matured, from the 
bottom of the plant upward. Each leaf fell into a category 
according to its position on the stalk and its size. The 
top three leaves were the most desirable as they contained 
the most body and aroma. As no more than four leaves were 
picked from a plant at one time, harvesting extended over a 
long period, sometimes from the end of June through Septem-
ber. 
Each leaf was threaded onto strings that were hung in 
the sun to dry. The weather again had to cooperate: rain 
would spoil the tobacco. The leaves were even brought 
under cover at night to protect them from dew. After three 
to four weeks of this curing process, the grower baled the 
strings of tobacco. The growers, however, were not known 
to be exacting in their grading and baling. Short of funds 
or time, they carelessly packed bales which were sold 
quickly, generally with as much scrap material or excess 
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weight concealed in them as possible.3 
No fewer than so,ooo or more than 180,000 growers were 
reported to have planted tobacco during any year of the 
interwar period (see Table 1), but these figures include 
neither the labor of the grower's family members--an 
average of five per household4--who also worked in the 
fields, nor any hired help which was required. The fact 
that hillsides were favored over flatlands for growing did 
not make these workers' chores any easier. Thousands of 
hands produced millions of pounds of tobacco each year in 
this back-breaking, unmechanized ritual of tobacco 
growing. 
Tobacco growers were not only subject to these fixed 
seasonal ceremonies, but also to the rules of the tobacco 
monopoly.s According to the original 1883 convention, the 
Regie was to lend growers money to plant their crop and 
then to purchase all of the tobacco produced in the empire. 
3Whitaker, "Culture of Turkish Tobacco;" U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, "Turkey: A Commercial and Industrial 
Handbook," p. 96; James F. Hodgson, Gardner Richardson and 
Julian E. Gillespie, "Trade Financing and Exchange in 
Egypt, Greece and Turkey," Trade Information Bulletin No. 
506 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1927), pp. 
19-21. 
4Ahmed Armud, "Turkey, Carrying Eight Million Bales 
per Season," Tobacco: Generator of Wealth (London and New 
York: World Tobacco, 1983), p. 87. 
Sshaw, Reform, p. 233. 
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Such total control was immediately abandoned as the Regie 
chose not to buy all the tobacco grown in the first year of 
its operation. 6 Officially this control was ended by the 
renewed charter of 1914, in which the monopoly was required 
to buy only the tobacco it needed, 7 but the monopoly 
continued to regulate all aspects of the trade. 
Every grower had to obtain permisson--a certificate 
known as a "koc;an"--from the Regie to plant a crop. 8 By 
presenting proof of ownership or a lease of the property 
where the tobacco was to be planted, this permission was 
granted automatically and free of charge. Only extremely 
small plantings, one-eighth of an acre or less, could be 
denied permission.9 During the growing season, representa-
6corrigan, "Tobacco Industry of Smyrna," Report No. 34, 
1 June 1927, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 861.33 Field Crops-
Tobacco, p. 22. 
7see Article II of the renewed convention of the tobacco 
monopoly found in Philip to Secretary of State (Bryan), 12 
September 1913, OS 867.61331/5, M353, 66/1215-32. 
Bseveral participants in the aromatic tobacco trade 
were kind enough to discuss with me many details of the 
trade which included here. Richard English, interview with 
author, Richmond, VA, October-November 1985 (English's 
insights are all the more valuable because his father, 
Joseph M. English, was the manager of American Tobacco's 
buying organization in Turkey for decades, beginning in 
about 1924); Irving Finold, interview with author, Richmond, 
VA, November 1985; H. K. Greer, interview with author, 
Winston-Salem, NC, November 1985; Ed Leight, interview with 
author, Walkertown, NC, November 1985; 
9Ravndal to Secretary of State (Bryan), 5 May 1913, DS 
165.082/19, M353 66/1170. 
tives of the Regie inspected every stand of tobacco and 
estimated the expected harvest. The Regie calculated the 
traditional Turkish agricultural tithe on the basis of 
these estimates.lo 
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Upon selling the tobacco, which usually took place on 
the farm or in a nearby village, the farmer had to 
transport the tobacco to the nearest warehouse of the 
Regie. This required a transfer permit known as a "pafta." 
At the Regie station, the tobacco was weighed and an 
official certificate of change of ownership, a "nadea," was 
issued. The Regie was required to ensure that no grower 
had to transport his tobacco for more than a ten-hour 
journey, a journey usually made by camel, donkey or cart.11 
Thus, the network of Regie facilities was extensive. Based 
on the location of these stations, the tobacco-growing 
regions were divided into administrative districts, the 
lOone source states that Regie demanded 12.5% of a 
grower's tobacco harvest. U.S. Department of Commerce, 
"Turkey, A Commercial and Industrial Handbook," p. 97. 
Another sources state that the tithe was 12%. Corrigan, 
"Tobacco Industry of Smyrna," Report No. 34, 1 June 1927, 
RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 861.33 Field Crops-Tobacco, p. 
22. 
llRavndal to Secretary of State (Bryan), 5 May 1913, DS 
165.082/19, M353 66/1171; Corrigan, "Tobacco Industry of 
Smyrna," Report No. 34, 1 June 1927, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, 
file 861.33 Field Crops-Tobacco, p. 22. 
name for which often derived from the village where the 
Regie warehouse was located.12 
The "nadea" also served as permission for the 
purchaser to transfer the tobacco. In other words, every 
pound of tobacco was to be accompanied by an official 
permit at all times: in the field, at a warehouse or on 
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the road. Despite all this supervision, smuggling remained 
a formidable problem. The Regie was reported to have as 
many as 12,000 armed men working to control the illegal 
trade.13 
So tobacco traders in Turkey were subject to the laws 
of nature and of man, if not always willingly. The trade 
had to work within the framework of economic laws as well. 
The availability of financing was almost as significant a 
factor as growing conditions and was more important than 
the monopoly's regulation in influencing the supply of aro-
matic tobacco. As mentioned above, in the Regie's original 
concession, growers were to be financed by the monopoly. 
These no-interest loans were theoretically to be repaid 
from the sale of tobacco to the monopoly, but there is no 
evidence of such a system in operation during the twentieth 
12Whitaker, "Culture of Turkish Tobacco." 
13Ravndal to Secretary of State (Bryan), 5 May 1913, 
DS 165.082/19, M353 66/1171; Corrigan, "Tobacco Industry of 
Smyrna," Report No. 34, l.June 1927, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, 
file 861.33 Field Crops-Tobacco, p. 22. 
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century. In reality, obtaining funds for planting and 
caring for a tobacco crop was a persistent problem. 
There was no effective financial institution to make 
loans to tobacco growers; in general the farmers had to 
finance their crops themselves. Some funding came from 
local merchants or tobacco buyers, but this was usually in 
the form either of advances for a crop that then could be 
bought at a reduced rate, or of a loan at an usurious rate, 
up to 80%, with the crop as a guarantee. This loan 
information was frequently written on the back of the 
"koc;an" so that any potential purchaser would be aware of a 
lien on the crop. American purchasers were occasionally 
known to provide loans to dependable growers at legal rates 
of interest--9% plus a 6% banking commission--or to give 
advances to procure an option on a crop, but these methods 
were neither widespread nor permanent.14 
This lack of regular, reasonable financing made the 
growers' future output heavily dependent on tobacco prices. 
If a grower could cover current expenses and have funds 
left over, then he could afford to plant the following 
year. By the same token, if rising prices one year 
indicated that there would be heavy demand for the next 
14Hodgson, "Trade Financing," p. 21; Corrigan, "Tobacco 
Industry of Smyrna," Report No. 34, 1 June 1927, RG 84, CPR 
Smyrna, NA, file 861.33 Field Crops-Tobacco, p. 22. 
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crop, then merchants or buyers were more likely to extend 
loans or make advances. On the other hand, low prices left 
a grower barely able, or perhaps unable, to cover his 
expenses, and the same low prices gave no incentive to 
lenders to speculate. 
With this price dependency in mind, the controlling 
economic laws become obviously apparent. Times of high 
prices brought increased production. Increased production 
eventually brought surpluses. surpluses led to lower 
prices which in turn reduced production. Resulting 
shortages closed the circle by encouraging high prices. 
This theoretical cycle was influenced and distorted by 
numerous other factors, but by and large, such progressions 
held true before the First World War and continued 
afterward.15 Stability was not a characteristic of the 
Turkish tobacco industry and these economic cycles were a 
crucial part of the trade's development. 
Growing conditions, regulations, and economics deter-
mined the supply of aromatic tobacco. In order to under-
stand the Turkish-American trade, though, the overall 
international demand for this tobacco and the nature of the 
Turkish tobacco market must also be considered. The First 
World War disrupted Turkish tobacco's international 
15constantinides, Turkish Tobacco, pp. 90-1. 
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market. Before the war, England had bought about 25% of 
Turkey's tobacco, but after the war bought only about 3%. 
Germany's postwar financial situation temporarily precluded 
heavy involvement in the Turkish tobacco market. The 
destruction of Austria-Hungary removed that multinational 
empire from its role as the leading purchaser of Turkish 
tobacco, and the tobacco monopolies in the various Central 
European successor states did not take its place.16 The 
gap left by these disturbances in the international 
aromatic tobaccco trade, combined with the already-cited 
improvements in Turkish-American trading relations (see pp. 
12-13), made American buying one of the most influential 
forces in the Turkish market. 
The American presence was a direct response to 
consumer demand in the United States. American cigarette 
manufacturers wanted the best grades of aromatic tobacco 
for their products and they purchased more Turkish tobacco 
than any other country did during the interwar period. To 
maintain a sure and steady supply of aromatic leaf, these 
manufacturers worked with or established American companies 
in Turkey. The presence of American-run buying organiza-
16Allen, "Turkish Regie," 13 November 1925, OS 
867.61331/9, M353, 66/1282-83. 
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tions in Turkey was another reason for substantial American 
influence in the demand component of the trade.17 
In theory, the operations of these buying agents were 
quite simple. The manufacturing companies in America 
decided upon a strategy of buying and a purchase order for 
an amount of certain grades of aromatic tobacco was 
delivered to the Near Eastern offices. In calculating this 
order, the companies considered existing stocks, needs for 
the future, condition of the present crop, and the fact 
that a crop bought one year would be used in cigarettes 
between one and four years after its purchase. 
The specialized aromatic tobacco-importing companies 
transformed strategy into tactics. A handful of Americans 
working in conjunction with Turkish employees surveyed the 
tobacco crop as it grew and purchased from the different 
growing regions in Turkey. This meant Americans and their 
representatives were in direct contact with thousands of 
growers around Turkey. Tobacco cultivation in Turkey 
demanded this. The large number of small producers called 
for an extensive organization to meet the needs of American 
manufacturers. 
17Ed Leight, interview with author, Walkertown, NC, 
November 1985; Dick English, interviews with author, Rich-
mond, VA, October, November 1985. 
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Whenever necessary, though, American buyers purchased 
tobacco through the same channels as other foreign buyers--
through Turkish merchants--rather than going directly to 
the growers. These native middlemen, serving as one of 
the few sources of financing for tobacco farmers, were 
often able to control large supplies of tobacco by 
exploiting the inveterate indebtedness of the growers. 
After the hefty profits taken by these merchants, though, 
the price of this tobacco for foreign buyers could increase 
by as much as 200%. Circumventing these merchants was one 
of the reasons that cigarette manufacturers created the 
American buying organizations.la 
There were several smaller American firms that bought 
Turkish tobacco, mostly specialty producers of aromatic 
cigarettes. They played only a minor role in the trade, 
and their role continued to diminish as aromatic cigarettes 
declined in relative popularity.19 In the early 1920s, 
three American companies wielded influence in the market: 
Gary Tobacco, Standard Commercial, and Alston Tobacco, the 
18Allen, "Turkish Regie," 13 November 1925, OS 
867.61331/9, M353, 66/1284. 
19 11Hallas & Landau, New Turkish Firm, Have Incorpor-
ated," USTJ, vol. 98, no. 3 (1922): 6; "Anthony Melachrino 
Leaves for the Near East," USTJ, vol. 104, no. 6 (1925): 7; 
Samuel w. Honaker (American Delegate) to Admiral Mark L. 
Bristol, 2 July 1925, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 
851.2 Taxation; Irving Finold, interview with author, 
Richmond, VA, November 1985. 
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companies that bought for the Big Four manufacturers in 
the United States. 
The individual Americans who ran these buying organi-
zations in Turkey were both important and conspicuous. 
They not only actively participated in the Turkish tobacco 
markets, but they also played a role in the larger American 
community in Turkey.20 High Commissioner Bristol consider-
ed American banks to be the most crucial institution for 
the expansion of American trade in Turkey. In the summer 
of 1921, when he called on the tobacco buyers to help save 
the only American bank in Turkey from financial ruin the 
tobacco men responded immediately.21 The American Chamber 
of Commerce for the Levant, established in 1911, was the 
second-oldest organization of its kind, preceeded only by 
the chamber in Paris. In 1923, F. B. Stem of Gary Tobacco 
was on its board of directors.22 Gary's offices served as 
20other long-established and influential American firms 
in Turkey included the licorice producers MacAndrews and 
Forbes, and the vacuum Oil Company, a subsidiary of Standard 
Oil of New York (Socony). DeNovo, American Interests, pp. 
38-40, 264-65. 
2lpeter Michael Buzanski, "Admiral Mark L. Bristol and 
Turkish-American Relations, 1919-1922" (Ph.D. diss, Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley, 1960), pp. 239-42. 
22Letterhead of American Chamber of Commerce for the 
Levant, 2 May 1923, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 610 Trade 
Extension. 
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the chamber's headquarters in Izmir,23 and at the same time 
as an official meeting place for all Americans in that 
city.24 Besides the role the buyers played in the American 
business community in Turkey, they had close ties to 
American diplomats there and they enjoyed access to high 
Turkish government officials. 
The economic gap between the American buying agents 
and the Turkish tobacco growers made the buyers conspic-
uous. The Americans were, by Turkish standards, very 
wealthy. Glenn Tobacco paid a beginning buyer $300 per 
month.25 In comparison, in January 1930 the average 
unskilled laborer in Turkey earned a daily wage of $.5o.26 
The American buyers were also part of a sophisticated and 
efficient international business organization. In 
contrast: 
The vast majority of the small farmers who 
produce the bulk of the tobacco crop of Turkey 
seem continually in financial distress and live 
in a state bordering on wretchedness according to 
23Translation of article appearing in the Izmir news-
paper "Yeni Turan," 8 December 1922, RG 84, ER Constantino-
ple, NA, file 610.23 Chambers of Commerce. 
24Memo, A. Wallace Treat (Consul, Izmir), 4 September 
1923, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 610 Trade Extension. 
25Ed Leight began working for Glenn Tobacco in Turkey 
in 1930. Ed Leight, interview with author, Walkertown, NC, 
November 1985. 
26This was the pay rate for January 1930. Gordon, 
American Relations, p. 299. 
American standards. In addition to the usual 
handicaps of the farmer, they are insufficiently 
supplied with means of communication in Turkey; 
are proverbially ignorant and improvident; have 
no cooperative associations to discuss and en-
courage improved methods of cultivation, packing 
and marketing; are satisfied to sell their crop 
without knowledge of prices prevailing in other 
growing districts; and in many cases have no 
option as the larger part of the crop is pledged 
in advance as security for loans. The marketing 
machinery available to the [American] corn, 
wheat2 and cotton farmer, are undreamed of here. 7 
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The nature of aromatic tobacco's production in Turkey 
caused market instability. As with many agricultural pro-
ducts, the supply fluctuated greatly due to weather and 
market conditions. Governmental regulation, although 
present in theory, scarcely influenced the amount produced, 
nor did it bring stability. And the plethora of small-
scale producers did not contribute to market coordination. 
The resultant swings in the market are a natural focus for 
a study of the trade; one must seek to determine how these 
changes affected the Turkish-American trade. The 
characteristics of this market also determined American 
participation in the Turkish tobacco market. The Turkish 
trade's primitive infrastructure made direct contact with 
thousands of growers and bypassing native merchants both 
desirable and economical, and in turn, this intimate 
27corrigan, "Tobacco Industry of Smyrna," Report No. 
34, 1 June 1927, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 861.33 Field 
Crops-Tobacco, p. 22. 
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American presence influenced the market. such interaction 
is another focal point of this study. 
The presence of American buying organizations in 
Turkey not only emphasized the economic importance of the 
tobacco connection, but it also made these Americans 
immediately available to Turks as pressure points when 
changes in Turkish-American relations--either commercial or 
political--were desired. The relative wealth of these 
representatives and the sharp contrast they presented made 
it all the more likely that they be singled out if pressure 
could be applied correctly. 
The American tobacco men's intimate connection to a 
vital sector of the Turkish economy made these men a steady 
source of information for America's diplomatic representa-
tives. American consular officers in Turkey received 
regular requests for reports on the industries of that 
country. These officers frequently consulted American 
tobacco men in Turkey for assistance in collecting the 
required information, as in the case of an elaborate 
questionnaire prepared by the tobacco section of the Bureau 
of Foreign and Domestic Commerce in 1923 concerning the 
world tobacco trade.28 The participants in the aromatic 
28 11Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce Solicits 
Trade for Full Data on Present Condition in World's Tobacco 
Industry," USTJ, vol. 100, no. 6 (1923): 3, 48; Wilbur J. 
Carr (for the Secretary of State) to "Certain American 
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tobacco trade served as sources of information in a 
different manner as well. The State Department requested 
ten copies of an article written by w. A. Whitaker, vice 
president of Standard Commercial Tobacco Company. The 
State Department then sent Whitaker's article, "The Culture 
of Turkish Tobacco as Exemplified in the Smyrna Type," to 
American missions and consulates, referring to it as a 
well-prepared and valuable source of information.29 
As A. Wallace Treat, the consul in Izmir, noted, 
"while the American colony in Izmir is relatively small in 
numbers, the capital represented by the members thereof is 
enormous," and, therefore, "the office is in constant 
contact with the American colony and the interviews with 
the members thereof, occur too frequently to be 
recorded. 11 30 This intimate contact was evidence of a 
symbiotic relationship. The consulates served to protect 
American interests, but in return the consular officers 
Consular Officers," 15 September 1923, RG 84, CGR Constanti-
nople, NA, file 861.3 Tobacco. 
29Alvey A. Adee (Second Assistant Secretary of State) 
to Standard commercial Tobacco Company, 7 July 1923, DS 
867.61331/6, M353, 66/1260; Whitaker reported sending the 
requested reprints of his article the following week. w. 
A. Whitaker to Secretary of State (Hughes), 13 June 1923, 
DS 867.61331/6, M353, 66/1259. 
JOA. Wallace Treat (Consul, Izmir) to Secretary of State 
(Hughes), "General Activities at Smyrna Consulate General," 
Report No. 128, 24 July 1923, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 
610 Trade Extension. 
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mined the American tobacco men for information concerning 
Turkey's tobacco trade--obvious interplay between commerce 
and diplomacy. 
On the one hand, a lucrative, but volatile, trade pre-
sented opportunity and motive for powerful American indus-
trialists to attempt to influence America's relations with 
Turkey. On the other hand, the trade's value gave Turks 
the incentive to use tobacco as a tool to their national 
economic and political advantage. Both of these positions 
were apparent in late 1922 and 1923 as the diplomats met to 
negotiate in Lausanne and the nationalists extended their 
influence within Turkey. 
Chapter Three 
The Lausanne Conference and its Treaties, 1923 
Since the 1917 break in diplomatic relations between 
Turkey and the United States, American tobacco buyers in 
Turkey had had to endure the insecurity that resulted from 
a lack of formal ties. Late in 1922, a conference met in 
Lausanne, Switzerland, to replace the defunct Treaty of 
Sevres with a new peace for the Near East and to determine 
Turkey's place in the international community. The confer-
ence produced two treaties that are of consequence here: 
the Treaty of Lausanne between Turkey and the Allies, and 
the Turco-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce. The 
latter included provisions for the restoration of Turkish-
American diplomatic relations. 
The August 1923 signing of the Turkish-American treaty 
did not, however, end the American campaign to restore 
diplomatic relations with Turkey. Rather, it signalled the 
beginning of the next phase of the battle, the struggle for 
ratification of the treaty. The Department of State's 
considerable efforts towards this end culminated in failure 
four years later on 18 January 1927 when the United States 
Senate rejected the treaty. In the interim, 1923-1927, 
High Commissioner Bristol continued his work of protecting 
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American interests in Turkey.l This chapter examines the 
interplay of the tobacco trade and diplomacy in the nego-
tiation and ratification process of the Turkish-American 
treaty. 
The Lausanne Conference met in two sessions, from 20 
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November 1922 to 4 February 1923, and from 23 April to 24 
July 1923, and concluded with an Allied-Turkish treaty that 
the United States was not party to. The Treaty of Lausanne 
recognized the legitimacy of Ataturk's nationalist govern-
ment, established boundaries for the new Turkey, and abo-
lished the extraterritorial rights known as capitulations, 
which foreign powers had long enjoyed in the Ottoman 
Empire.2 
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes's desire to 
secure guarantees for American economic interests in Turkey 
overcame his aversion to political entanglements in 
Europe,3 but this reluctance defined the nature of the 
American mis-sion sent to Lausanne. In response to an 
invitation by the conference's sponsors--Britain, France, 
loeNovo, American Interests, p. 153-66; Trask, U.S. 
Response, pp. 37-47. 
2The text of the Lausanne Treaty, slightly abbreviated, 
may be found in Hurewitz, British-French Supremacy, pp. 
325-37. 
3Buckingham, International Normalcy, pp. 182-3. 
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and Italy--Hughes opted to send "observers" to Lausanne. 
The observer status limited the American mission's 
participation in the Lausanne negotiations leading to the 
Allied-Turkish treaty. Thus, the chief American represen-
tatives during the first portion of the conference--Richard 
Washburn Child, ambassador to Italy; Joseph c. Grew, 
ambassador to Switzerland, and Admiral Bristol--were not 
official delegates, but were only present to convey 
American interests to the negotiating parties.4 
Despite their limited role and restriction to observer 
status, the Americans had specific goals in this 
conference. Secretary Hughes defined the areas of American 
interest to be defended at the conference: maintenance of 
the capitulations, claims, commerce, minorities, intern-
ational financial control of Turkey, the Straits, 
educational and missionary activity, and archeological 
research.5 As the first five of these points directly 
affected the tobacco trade, the potential for diplomatic 
and commercial interaction was high. Beginning in June 
1923, Ambassador Grew and Ismet Inonu, the leader of the 
Turkish delegation in Lausanne, hammered out agreements on 
most of these issues in bilateral Turkish-American nego-
4Ibid., pp. 83-97. 
5Hurewitz, British-French Supremacy, pp. 312-8. 
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tiations. On 6 August 1923, two weeks after the signing of 
the Treaty of Lausanne, Grew and Inonu signed the Turco-
American Treaty of Amity and Commerce.6 
Realizing that a treaty would affect the tobacco 
trade, American buyers of Turkish tobacco lobbied their 
diplomatic representatives. Their personal relationships 
with American diplomats aided this effort. Even as Admiral 
Bristol and Julian E. Gillespie travelled to Lausanne in 
November 1922, they were in touch with participants in the 
trade. In Gillespie's chatty description of his and 
Bristol's journey to Switzerland aboard the Orient Express, 
he noted that upon arrival in Trieste, "we all went up to 
the hotel to see some of our Constantinople Gary Tobacco 
friends."' 
6Buckingham, International Normalcy, pp. 97-100; DeNovo, 
American Interests, pp. 150-53; Gordon, American Relations, 
pp. 273-8; Joseph c. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic 
Record of Forty Years. 1909-1945, Walter Johnson, ed. 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), 1, 475-585. For 
the full text of the treaty see Papers Relating to the 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1923 (2 vols., 
Washington, 1938), 2, 1153-71 (hereafter cited as FRUS 
1923). A summary of the treaty may be found in Grew, 
Turbulent Era, 1, 603-5. 
'Julian E. Gillespie to Klein (Director of Bureau of 
Foreign and Domestic Commerce), 9 December 1922, RG 151, 
FDC Records, NA, file 443.3X, p. 2-3. For more on High 
Commissioner Bristol's strong interest in and close connec-
tions to American businesses in Turkey see Buzanski, "Admiral 
Bristol," pp. 211-46. 
Maintenance of the capitulations was of paramount 
concern to both American tobacco men and American 
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diplomats. Since the sixteenth century, the capitulations 
had provided immunity from Ottoman law and taxation to 
westerners in the empire. These extraterrito~ial rights 
represented order and security to foreigners in Turkey. 
Robert Imbrie, the first permanent American delegate to 
Ankara, believed that "the capitulations were absolutely 
necessary to American commercial enterprises in Turkey. 
The courts were venal, bribes were essential, and 
interference by minor officials looking for bribes was 
endemic. 118 
Turkish opinion of the capitulations was quite differ-
ent. Upon entering World War I, the ottoman government 
unilaterally abolished the capitulations on 1 October 1914, 
an act which the Allies had never recognized. 9 At 
Lausanne, Inonu adamantly insisted on acceptance of the 
abrogation of the capitulations. British delegate Lord 
Curzon, equally adamant and with the full backing of the 
American delegation, continued to reject the Turkish 
position.lo 
8Evans, U.S. Policy, p. 338. 
9Geoffrey Lewis, Modern Turkey (London and Toronto: 
Ernest Benn, 1974), p. 88. 
lOBuckingham, International Normalcy, pp. 92-3. 
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American tobacco interests also registered their 
support for the capitulations. In February 1923, w. A. 
Whitaker of Standard Commercial Tobacco Company protested 
to the Near Eastern Division of the State Department about 
nationalist Turkish activities which effectively abolished 
the capitulations. Whitaker proclaimed this to be an 
unacceptable change.11 State Department personnel 
responded supportively, citing several diplomatic efforts 
at the Lausanne Conference to maintain the capitulations in 
lieu of other sufficient guarantees for American interests 
in Turkey.12 
In 1922-23, however, military realities forced the 
Allies to recognize not only Kemal Ataturk's liberation of 
Turkey from foreign military control, but also the 
liberation of Turkey from foreign civil influences.13 On 
30 May the Allies accepted the subordination of foreigners 
in Turkey to Turkish law and courts.14 This Allied 
concession undermined the American position and, despite 
llw. A. Whitaker (Standard Commercial) to the Department 
of State, 17 February 1923, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 
850.3 Capital Corporations. 
12unsigned letter prepared for Secretary of State 
(Hughes) to Standard Commercial Tobacco Company, n.d., RG 
84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 850.3 Capital Corporations. 
13Evans, U.S. Policy, pp. 376-99. 
14Buckingham, International Normalcy, p. 94-5; Shaw, 
Reform, p. 367. 
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further debate in the bilateral negotiations, served as a 
precedent for Article II of the Turkish-American treaty 
which accepted the capitulations' abrogation. Neither 
tobacco men nor diplomats desired this outcome, but without 
recourse to armed intervention it was inevitable. 
Another extremely delicate point in Lausanne was the 
issue of financial claims against Turkey. After heated de-
bate during the Allied-Turkish negotiations, the Allies' 
World War I claims had been balanced against Turkish claims 
resulting from the War for Independence. As a result, all 
of the participants of the conference eventually dropped 
their demands for compensation.15 Grew, however, insisted 
on the legitimacy of American claims and the bilateral 
Turkish-American negotiations almost collapsed around this 
issue. Until almost the very end of the negotiations, 
Inonu steadfastly rejected the legitimacy of American 
claims.16 
American tobacco interests attempted to influence the 
treatment of financial claims during the treaty. In 
February 1923, Franklin w. Bell of Gary Tobacco wrote to 
Admiral Bristol in Lausanne, suggesting that "forgetting 
and forgiving the past" would lead to "mutual succe~s in 
15z. Y. Hershlag, Turkey: An Economy in Transition, 
(The Hague, 1958), p. 25. 
16auckingham, International Normalcy, pp. 98-9. 
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the future." In this spirit, he recommended a bilateral 
cancellation of all past financial obligations, including 
taxes that the nationalist Turkish government was trying to 
collect from the American tobacco companies for the period 
1914-22. Bell also proposed specific dates for this 
nullification of obligations. If the treaty cancelled all 
debts dated prior to the Izmir fire of 1922, then the back 
taxes that the Turks wanted to collect would be disallowed. 
But such timing would still allow the companies to press 
their claims for damages from the fire and their claims for 
confiscation by the Turks of tobacco on which the companies 
had paid advances to the Greeks.17 Bell wrote to Bristol 
again in July 1923 about claims that Gary Tobacco filed 
against the Turkish government for losses resulting from 
the occupation of Izmir. Bell wanted to keep Bristol 
informed because it "occurred to us that it might be well 
for us to advise you (Bristol] of our action for such 
attention at Lausanne as, in your opinion, the occasion may 
suggest. 11 18 
The Turkish-American treaty partially fulfilled Bell's 
requests. Article XXIX of the treaty stated that "no taxes 
17Bell to Bristol, 3 February 1923, RG 84, ER Constan-
tinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation. 
18F. w. Bell to Admiral Mark c. Bristol, 7 July 1923, 
RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 350 Claims. 
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are to be collected from American citizens for any taxable 
periods prior to the fiscal year 1922-1923 which, under the 
laws in force on August 1, 1914, were not applicable to 
them. 11 19 The broader claims problem proved to be 
unsolvable during the negotiations, a problem that the 
Americans felt would hinder the treaty's ratification. 
Grew and Inonu, therefore, agreed that a solution would be 
found outside of the treaty negotiations. Accordingly, in 
December 1923, Admiral Bristol and a Turkish representative 
drew up a separate agreement that called for a mixed 
arbitration tribunal (i.e., with Turkish and American 
representatives) to handle American claims within six 
months of the treaty's ratification.20 Thus, the 
settlement of the claims issue gave the American tobacco 
companies incentive to support Senate ratification of the 
treaty with Turkey. But, as ratification of this treaty 
never came, resolution of the American tobacco companies' 
claims had to wait for more than a decade (see pp. 71-76) . 
Another point in Secretary Hughes's 1922 list of Amer-
ican goals for Lausanne Conference was the preservation of 
19council on Turkish-American Relations, "The Treaty 
With Turkey, Why It Should Be Ratified" (New York, 1926), 
p. 148. 
20Bristol to Adnan (Delegate at Istanbul of the Turkish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 24 December 1923, FRUS 1923, 
2, 1190; Adnan to Bristol, 24 December 1923, FRUS 1923, 2, 
1190-1. 
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American commercial interests in Turkey. More important 
than tobacco in discussions on this issue were the Chester 
Concession and the "Mosul Question. 11 21 More broadly, 
Hughes called for the implementation of Open Door policies 
in Turkey and the cancellation of all pre-war concessions--
such as the Regie--to foreigners.22 Joseph c. Grew, the 
sole leader of the American mission during the second phase 
of the conference, won Allied acceptance of the Open Door 
in the Treaty of Lausanne.23 Grew was unsuccessful, 
however, in his attempt to obtain the cancellation of all 
concessions in Turkey; foreigners retained those granted 
before 1914.24 
2lrn the renewed Chester concession the Ottoman-American 
Development Company attempted to win the concession for 
extensive railroad and mining projects in Anatolia. The 
Turks granted the concession to this group in April 1923, 
but cancelled it later in the year when the company failed 
to raise sufficient capital. DeNovo, American Interests, 
pp. 210-28. The Mosul question involved the boundary 
between Turkey and Iraq, an important international issue 
because of the oil reserves located in this disputed region. 
Ibid., pp. 191-9. 
22Buckingham charges that Hughes's support of the Open 
Door was insincere, as Hughes simultaneously sanctioned 
secret negotiations between American oil companies and the 
Turkish oil monopoly. Buckingham, International Normalcy, 
pp. 78-97. 
23Evans, U.S. Policy, pp. 344-48, 403. 
24william M. Hale, The Political and Economic Develop-
ment of Modern Turkey (New York: St. Martin's, 1981) pp. 
38-9; Hershlag, Turkey, pp. 17-30, 45. 
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The American mission's emphasis on commercial rights 
benefited the tobacco interests, even though debate on this 
issue had not focused on the tobacco trade. Article IV of 
the Turkish-American treaty recognized the right of foreign 
companies to exist and to own property in Turkey. Article 
VI stated that no forced loans or exceptional levies could 
be demanded of foreign nationals or corporations. Article 
VII provided that taxation of foreign nationals or foreign 
corporations had to be formulated on the same basis as 
taxation of native persons or companies. Article VIII 
conferred most-favored-nation trading status on the coun-
tries. The inclusion of these guarantees for commercial 
interests was another reason for American tobacco buyers to 
support the treaty. 
Of major significance at the Lausanne Conference was 
the issue of minorities in Turkey, also one of Secretary 
Hughes's points in his 1922 outline of American interests. 
In an attempt to eliminate one of the primary causes of 
tension between Greece and Turkey, a convention signed in 
Lausanne on 20 January 1923 provided for the mandatory and 
reciprocal expulsion of minority populations--as defined by 
religious affiliation--from Greece and Turkey.25 The 
interests of American diplomats and American tobacco 
25stephen P. Ladas, The Exchange of Minorities Bulgaria, 
Greece and Turkey (New York: MacMillan, 1932), pp. 335-52. 
companies diverged on the minority issue. The American 
mission's goal was to obtain guarantees for the religious 
freedoms of Christian minorities remaining in Turkey,26 
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guarantees similar to those provided in Section III of the 
Allied-Turkish treaty.27 The tobacco buyers' concerns 
focused on the emigration of the thousands of Christians 
who had played a major role in the trade. Franklin w. Bell 
of Gary suggested to the American consul general in 
Istanbul that the return of the ousted Greeks was one of 
the only means of restoring the war-ravaged Turkish tobacco 
industry.28 The exchange of minorities had numerous, 
enduring effects, which will be treated later. Suffice it 
to say that the American diplomatic endeavors at Lausanne 
concerning minorities were largely irrelevant to the 
tobacco trade. 
Secretary Hughes's 1922 list of talking points also 
included the international financial control of Turkey. 
Hughes sought the inclusion of any future American loans to 
Turkey in the Turkish public debt. As the debt was still 
administered by an international commission, this step 
26Buckingham, International Normalcy, pp. 98. 
27Hurewitz, British-French Supremacy, pp. 330-1. 
28Franklin w. Bell to G. Bie Ravndal (Consul General, 
Istanbul), 14 May 1923, RG 84, CGR Constantinople, NA, file 
861.3 Tobacco. 
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would provide Americans with international guarantees for 
their investments in Turkey.29 Thus, Hughes insinuated 
American governmental support for loans to Turkey, a 
promising development for any American tobacco interests 
considering the Turkish tobacco monopoly as an investment. 
That American interests propounded by diplomats at 
Lausanne paralleled the economic interests of Americans in 
the Turkish tobacco trade was duly noted by the political 
opponents of the treaty in the United states. During 
Senate debate on ratification of the treaty, for example, 
Senator William H. King charged that the primary advisers 
of the American diplomats at Lausanne "were agents of oil 
and tobacco interests" (see pp. 112-3).30 As one historian 
maintains, the American diplomats in Lausanne did "pursue 
economic considerations much more diligently than they did 
humanitarian concerns. 11 31 It is true that the American 
tobacco industry had a receptive ear within the mission to 
Lausanne, especially in Bristol and Gillespie,32 and that 
29Hurewitz, British-French Supremacy, p. 315. 
30 11Asks an Inquiry on Lausanne Deal; Senator King Says 
'Oil and Tobacco' Interests Forced the Cabinet to Accept 
Compact," New York Times, 24 December 1926, p. 8, col. 5. 
31suckingham, International Normalcy, p. 106. 
32Bristol, however, only attended the first session of 
the conference, travelling back .to Turkey with Ismet Inonu 
on the Orient Express in February 1923 to resume his duties 
as high commissioner. Buckingham, International Normalcy, 
American representations were generally in line with the 
tobacco trade's best interests. 
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Though American tobacco companies were not shy in 
expressing their views on the crucial and complex matters 
under negotiation, these firms were not able to dictate the 
contents of the treaty. Both American tobacco interests 
and diplomats failed to gain their objective of maintaining 
the capitulations. American claims cases received more 
favorable attention than the Allied claims, but American 
claims still had to be upheld by a mixed arbitration 
commission. The rights of American companies granted in 
the treaty's commercial provisions were common to many 
American agreements with foreign powers.33 Diplomatic and 
tobacco industry concerns on the minorities problems had 
completely different foci. And diplomatic support for 
American investment in Turkey was generic in nature, not 
specific to the tobacco industry. 
In reality, the American negotiators worked within the 
realm of the possible, and not to the tune of tobacco manu-
facturers. Talks in Lausanne could not have effected 
changes that were inimicable to Turkish nationalism. It 
p. 90. 
33see, for example, the provisional commercial agreement 
between the United States and Persia of 14 May 1928. Hure-
witz, British-French Supremacy, pp. 396-8. 
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was possible, however, for American diplomats in Lausanne 
to protect the tobacco trade, simply because the trade was 
of as much value to the nationalist Turks as it was to 
American tobacco buyers. 
Despite the State Department's considerable efforts, 
diplomacy provided insufficient guarantees for the 
protection of American commercial interests in Turkey--the 
secretary of state's fundamental goals at Lausanne. More 
valuable than diplomacy were economic means. In fact, 
Secretary Hughes pref erred "to play an international 
political role primarily through economics. 11 34 
An episode on 9 August, three days after the treaty's 
signing, both illustrates this predilection and indicates 
the relative weight of commerce and diplomacy in Turkish-
American relations. on Admiral Bristol's orders, Acting 
Commercial Attache R. o. Hall visited the Turkish Director 
General of the Commissariat of Commerce, Akif Bey, to 
explain the American perception of Turkish-American trade. 
First, Hall told Akif Bey that whereas Turkish goods 
entering the United States enjoyed favorable tariff 
treatment, Turkish trade policies hindered several American 
exports to Turkey. He warned that American goods must 
enter Turkey more freely for Turkish goods to maintain 
34Buckingham, International Normalcy, pp. 182-83. 
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their advantageous status. Tobacco, of course, constituted 
the bulk of Turkish exports to America. Second, Hall 
recommended that American tobacco buyers be allowed to 
operate freely in Turkey or they would look elsewhere--to 
Greece, for example--for aromatic tobacco. If American 
businessmen, such as the tobacco buyers, were not allowed 
this freedom, the chances for American investment in Turkey 
would diminish.JS 
One may deduce from Hall's message that the American 
perception of Turkish-American relations had two dimen-
sions. First, Bristol, and by extension Hughes, considered 
diplomatic guarantees to be less effective in maintaining 
satisfactory commercial ties with Turkey than the threat of 
economic retaliation. Second, the means of retaliation was 
tobacco. 
Even if of limited value, the diplomatic agreements 
signed at Lausanne did propose new solutions to old 
problems in Turkey and accept many of Ataturk's reforms--
both important consequences. The replacement of the 
humiliating Treaty of Sevres by the treaties of Lausanne 
was in many ways a triumph for modern Turkey. But this 
35Hall went bearing gifts. He presented Akif a copy of 
Whitaker's article on the Izmir tobacco industry, pointing 
out "the unusual value of this carefully prepared monograph" 
and suggesting that it be translated into Turkish for the 
commissariat's use. Memo, R. o. Hall, 14 August 1923, RG 
84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 861.33 Field Crops-Tobacco. 
64 
triumph and these changes laid down numerous challenges for 
foreigners in Turkey. The American tobacco men in Turkey 
would have to answer these challenges, or leave the field. 
Chapter Four 
Lausanne: The Immediate Aftermath 
The Lausanne Conference of 1922-23 provided interna-
tional acceptance of the momentous changes taking place in 
Turkey. But in addition to acceptance, the dramatic 
Turkish reforms demanded a response from foreigners in 
Turkey. American tobacco companies' intimate involvement 
in Turkey subjected them to the brunt of Ataturk's 
revolutionary reforms; they had to respond. The abolition 
of the capitulations, accepted by both the Allied and 
American treaties with Turkey, was especially distressing 
to the Turkish-American tobacco trade. The expulsion of 
non-Turkish minorities, agreed to by a convention signed in 
Lausanne, was equally worrisome. The issue of reimburse-
ment for American losses suffered during the Greco-Turkish 
War was annoyingly complex in Lausanne, and it remained so 
for a decade afterwards. The Turkish treatment of 
concessions and monopolies that were left in foreign hands 
at Lausanne created both complications and opportunities 
for Americans. As a result, tobacco firms considered 
alternatives to Turkey's role in the tobacco trade, and 
sometimes implemented them. This chapter examines the 
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American tobacco companies' response to the major changes 
agreed to at Lausanne. 
As mentioned previously, the American tobacco 
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companies in Turkey felt especially threatened by the 
abrogation of the capitulations, because this subjected 
them to Turkish law and taxation. The most important law 
regulating foreign corporations in Turkey had been enacted 
on 30 November 1914, shortly after the Ottomans had 
unilaterally abolished the capitulations. That law had 
required every foreign business to register with the 
government its name, place of incorporation, nationality, 
capitalization value, and a copy of its charter of 
incorporation. In addition, each company had to delegate a 
power of attorney to an individual who would represent the 
company in Turkish courts, and the companies were to 
observe all Turkish laws affecting business transactions.1 
Obviously, adherence to the 1914 law would have consti-
tuted a "de facto" end of the capitulations. But just as 
the Great Powers rejected the 1914 Turkish abolition of the 
1 11 Law on Nov. 30th, 1914 on Foreign Corporations and 
Foreign Stock Companies," RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, 
file 850.3 Capital Corporations; Julian E. Gillespie, 
"Turkish Company Law Requirements," Special Report No. 67, 
13 December 1934, RG 151, FDC Records, NA, file Istanbul. 
extraterritorial rights, they ignored the the law on 
foreign corporations. 
Following their military victory in 1923, the Turks 
stepped up pressure on firms to comply with the registra-
tion law. It was to protest the enforcement of this law 
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that W. A. Whitaker of Standard Commercial had written the 
State Department in February 1923 (see p. 47) .2 The Turks 
fixed 18 March 1923 as a deadline for compliance,3 but the 
American tobacco firms could not gather the required 
materials in such a short time. By May 1923, the Turkish 
authorities in Izmir threatened to shut down those firms 
that did not register immediately.4 
High Commissioner Bristol encouraged American compli-
ance, but suggested that registration be made under protest 
and include a reservation clause stating that the American 
companies had "in no sense the intention of surrendering 
the guarantees which may be provided in the future Treaty 
2w. A. Whitaker to the Department of State, 17 February 
1923, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 850.3 Capital 
Corporations. 
3G. Howland Shaw (First Secretary of the Embassy, 
Istanbul) to Theron J. Damon (Secretary of American Chamber 
of Commerce for the Levant, Galata), 16 March 1923, RG.84, 
ER Constantinople, NA, file 610.23 Chambers of Commerce. 
4A. Wallace Treat to American High Commissioner 
(Bristol), 28 May 1923, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 
850.3 Capital Corporations. 
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of Peace concerning the status of foreigners in Turkey. 11 5 
In August 1923, State Department officials wrote that 
American firms "have without exception made patent 
endeavors to comply with the provisions of the Turkish 
law," but that additional time was needed to obtain all the 
necessary papers.6 Both the desire to continue doing 
business in Turkey and the hope of recouping losses 
suffered in the war increased the American companies' 
willingness to register. On the other hand, subjection to 
Turkish law and the ensuing taxation--both future and 
retroactive--made these companies dread registration.? 
In regard to extraterritorial rights, the goals of the 
American tobacco firms mirrored the goals of the American 
statesmen. The tobacco men wanted to continue buying under 
the new regime in Turkey, but maintain their old privi-
leges; the diplomats wanted to recognize the new regime, 
but maintain the capitulations. Both sets of goals met the 
same fate. The diplomats responded to Turkish nationalism 
by accepting the capitulations' abrogation in the treaty; 
5shaw to Damon, 16 March 1923, RG 84, ER Constantinople, 
NA, file 610.23 Chambers of Commerce. 
6A. Wallace Treat to Barnes, 18 August 1923, RG 84, ER 
Angora (Correspondence), NA, file 850.3 Capital Corporations. 
7p. w. Bell (Gary Tobacco) to Admiral Bristol (American 
Special Mission, Lausanne), 3 February 1923, RG 84, ER 
Constantinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation. 
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the tobacco men responded to Turkish nationalism by 
submitting to the law on foreign corporations. By 1925, 
Gary, Alston, and Standard Commercial had registered.a 
Failure to have done so would have terminated the American 
tobacco presence in Turkey; not consenting to Turkish 
sovereignty would have ended the American diplomatic 
presence there. The formerly unacceptable now had to be 
accepted. 
The American tobacco companies went beyond merely 
accepting the new Turkish regime, they offered their 
assistance in rebuilding the Turkish tobacco market in 
exchange for "the best co-operation on the part of the 
Turkish Government. 11 9 The establishment of two new 
American tobacco companies in Turkey could be perceived as 
an expression of confidence in the nationalist regime. The 
Glenn Tobacco Company, a subsidiary of R. J. Reynolds, 
began the registration process in March 1923,lO and the 
8Julian E. Gillespie, "Foreign Joint-stock Companies in 
Turkey, Their Capital and Business Lines," 23 May 1925, RG 
84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 600 Commercial Relations. 
9Bell to Bristol, 3 February 1923, RG 84, ER Constan-
tinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation. 
lORadio dispatch, James Harriss to Alston Tobacco 
Company, 20 March 1923, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 
850.3 Capital Corporations. This company took its name from 
its director, J. w. Glenn, a Reynolds' employee since 1905. 
Actually, Glenn Tobacco had been operating in Greece since 
1922. Tilley, Reynolds, pp. 234-35. 
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American Tobacco Company of the orient (American of the 
Orient), a subsidiary of American Tobacco Company, began 
buying aromatic tobacco in Turkey.11 These companies, like 
Gary and Alston, purchased and processed aromatic leaf for 
their parent company. 
The establishment of new firms in Turkey, however, 
should not be interpreted exclusively as a gesture of 
American confidence in Ataturk's regime. The fact that 
Standard Commercial, previously the primary buyer for R. J. 
Reynolds, was at the center of unspecified controversies 
and rumors of unethical practices certainly encouraged 
Glenn's creation.12 The ultimate motives behind these 
companies' involvement in Turkey are unknown, but this does 
not deny the significance of their establishment. Rather 
than fleeing from the nationalist revolution, every one of 
the Big Four American tobacco manufacturers was willing to 
risk the uncertainties in Turkey, abolition of the 
capitulations notwithstanding. 
ll 11J. E. Archbell Here From Athens, Greece," USTJ, vol. 
103, no. 16 (1925): 8; memo of conversation between Russell 
Henry Kuhn (American of the Orient) and the Ambassador, 3 
January 1930, RG 84, ER Angora (Correspondence), NA, file 
350 Claims; memo "Regarding Income Tax Cases Against the 
American Tobacco of the Orient, Inc.," n.d., 1932, RG 84, ER 
Istanbul, NA, file 851.2 Taxation. By 1925 American of the 
Orient had also begun the registration process. A. Wallace 
Treat, "Certificat," 10 December 1922, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, 
NA, file 621 Documentation of Merchandise. 
12Tilley, Reynolds, pp. 234-35. 
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The nature of Turkish nationalism presented another 
problem for the Turkish-American tobacco trade. Ziya 
Gokalp, the seminal ideologist of Turkish nationalism,13 
defined the Turkish nation as including only Turkish-
speaking Muslims.14 The government of the Turkish Republic 
embraced the concept of an homogeneous Turkish nation. One 
aspect of this policy's implementation was the expulsion 
of most of Turkey's Greek population, in accordance with 
the February 1923 convention signed in Lausanne (see p. 52-
3) .15 By 1930 almost 2,000,000 Greeks had left Turkish 
territory and were replaced by only soo,ooo Muslims. To 
say "replaced," however, is misleading. Many, but not all, 
of the departing Greeks were skilled artisans, merchants, 
and professionals; almost 90% of the immigrating Muslims 
were peasant farmers. Even the non-farming Muslims were 
frequently settled in agricultural locations.16 
Although the Turkish Republic had created a Ministry 
of Reconstruction, Exchange, and Settlement in November 
1923, the state had no central plan for settling immigrants 
13shaw, Reform, p. 301-04. 
14uriel Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism, The 
Life and Teachings of Ziya Gokalp (Westport, CT: Hyperion 
Press, 1950), pp. 130-2. 
15The bulk of the transfers took place prior to 1926. 
Hershlag, Turkey, p. 2. 
16Ladas, Exchange of Minorities, pp. 705-19. 
on an economically advantageous basis. Incoming Muslims 
were settled in lands vacated by exiting Christians. For 
example, some immigrants from Macedonia, specialists in 
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tobacco cultivation, were settled in mountainous Anatolian 
territories more suited to vine crops. They removed the 
vineyards, planted tobacco, and disappointedly learned why 
grapes had been cultivated there in the first place. The 
Turks spent over $4.5 million in their settlement programs, 
but the lack of adequate organization contributed to the 
financial hardship of the immigrants and of the economy as 
a whole.17 
The exchange of populations inevitably affected 
American interests in Turkey and it had a direct impact on 
the tobacco trade. Before the expulsions, a large number 
of Greeks in the Izmir region had been tobacco farmers. In 
the opinion of Americans in Turkey, they would be missed: 
The Greeks were good planters and it is 
maintained were more careful in their methods of 
cultivation and manipulation and in protecting 
the crop after being harvested. Before the war, 
most of the labor employees in the tobacco 
fieldsi and particularly all skilled labor, was 
Greek. 8 
11Ibid. 
18corrigan, "Tobacco Industry of Smyrna," Report No. 
34, 1 June 1927, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 861.33 Field 
Crops-Tobacco, p. 22. 
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Franklin W. Bell of the Gary Tobacco Company 
described the damage of the Christian emigration to the 
industry. Responding to a consular request for information 
on the trade, Bell stated that "the war and the exodus of 
Greeks and Armenians proved a terrible blow to the Turkish 
tobacco industry." Quantifying the damage, he estimated 
the 1923 harvest of 28 million pounds to be one-third of 
Turkey's normal pre-war production. He offered the 
following advice on coping with these problems: 
If peace soon can be concluded and the Turkish 
army disbanded so that the soldiers may go to 
work in the tobacco fields, the production of 
tobacco will naturally be increased. But in 
order that Turkey may compete with her principal 
competitor {Greece), it will be necessary either 
that Greeks be permitted to return to their farms 
in Anatolia or that Turkish planters, now 
residing in Macedonia and Thrace9 be transferred to farms abandoned in Anatolia.l 
The Greeks were not going to farm Anatolian soil 
again. It remained to be seen how well the immigrating 
Turks could replace the emigrants in a trade requiring 
skill born of experience. The diplomatic negotiations in 
Lausanne provided a number of guarantees for American 
commercial interests in Turkey, and the American cigarette 
19Franklin w. Bell to G. Bie Ravndal, 14 May 1923, RG 
84, CGR Constantinople, NA, file 861.3 Tobacco. Ravndal 
placed Bell's words and ideas almost verbatim in his May 
1923 report "Commerce and Industries of Turkey." G. Bie 
Ravndal, "Commerce and Industries of Turkey," 29 May 1923, 
RG 84, CGR Constantinople, NA, file 610 Trade Extension, p. 
53. 
manufacturers had decided to continue their operations in 
Turkey. But these commitments to American tobacco 
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interests were of limited value, if Turkey's tobacco 
industry, damaged by the exchange of minorities, was unable 
to continue playing its role as a producer in the tobacco 
trade. 
The statistics on American imports of Turkish tobacco 
would seem to support doubts about Turkey's capability in 
this role. Direct shipments of tobacco from Izmir to the 
United States decreased from 13.3 million pounds in 1922 to 
1.6 million pounds in 1923.20 similarly, direct shipments 
from Samsun to the United states declined from 4.7 million 
pounds to .2 million pounds over the same perioa.21 These 
figures, however, do not include the millions of pounds 
shipped indirectly to the United States via Trieste. one 
must also recall that shipments in any year usually 
consisted of crops from the previous year. The war had 
reduced production of tobacco in 1922; the Izmir fire 
destroyed a considerable amount as well. Thus, the 1923 
20 11Annual Declared Export Return," n.d. 1923, RG 84, CPR 
Smyrna, NA, file 600 Commercial Relations; Samuel W. Honaker 
(Consul in Charge, Izmir) to Messrs. Sullivan and Company, 
22 September 1925, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 610 Trade 
Extension. 
21charles E. Allen, "Annual Declared Export Return," 
n.d. 1923, RG 84, CGR Constantinople, NA, file 600 Commercial 
Relations. 
export figures do not necessarily imply a reduced Turkish 
capability as a producer, nor a reduced American interest 
in buying tobacco from Turkey. 
Indeed, several factors reassured American buyers 
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about Turkey's potential as a tobacco supplier. Production 
around Izmir increased from 1922 to 1923,22 despite the 
numerous disruptions. During the same time period, the 
number of growers in the Samsun region also grew by one 
third.23 Tobacco production for the entire country in 
1923, 57.5 million pounds (see Table 1), was above the 
1919-22 average of about 50 million pounds.24 As prices 
had doubled compared to previous years, there was evidently 
strong demand for this tobacco.25 Turkey could and did 
continue to play its role as a producer of aromatic 
tobacco, even during this time of uncertainty. 
22In 1922, 20,224 growers produced 15,675,429 pounds. 
In 1923, 24,708 growers produced 16,473,170 pounds. "The 
Tobacco Industry at Smyrna," Tobacco Markets and Conditions 
Abroad, no. 113 {1927): 6 {Tobacco Markets and Conditions 
Abroad hereafter cited as TMCA). 
23In 1922 there were 6,120 growers and in 1923 there 
were 8,039. P. E. King (Alston Tobacco) to Consul General, 
6 September 1924, RG 84, CGR Constantinople, NA, file 861.3 
Tobacco. 
24Ravndal, "Commerce and Industries of Turkey," 29 May 
1923, RG 84, CGR Constantinople, NA, file 610 Trade Exten-
sion, p. 53. 
25Ravndal, "Commerce and Industries of Turkey," 29 May 
1923, RG 84, CGR Constantinople, NA, file 610 Trade Exten-
sion. 
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Though Turkey proved resilient as a producer, its 
secondary role, as manipulator of aromatic leaf, faced 
more serious challenges. The exodus of minorities not only 
created a shortage of experienced growers, but as P. E. 
King of Alston Tobacco wrote, there were no experienced 
tobacco manipulators left in the Samsun region; they had 
all emigrated to Greece. Alston Tobacco and other 
companies were forced to hire and train new personnel, 
presumably all Turkish.26 
Losses around Samsun, however, were not the gravest of 
the tobacco companies' problems. The primary manipulating 
center in Turkey for American-bought tobacco had been Iz-
mir, 27 but after the fire of 1922, Izmir was ill-equipped 
to support this industry. Much of the city was in ruins, 
most of the skilled Christian workers had fled, and 
insurance rates for property and tobacco stocks were 
exorbitantly high. The new regime was a wild card; no one 
could predict its stability, much less how it would treat 
foreign-owned businesses. All these factors motivated 
American companies to seek a new location for manipulating 
their tobacco. 
26King to Consul General, 6 September 1924, RG 84, CGR 
Constantinople, NA, file 861.3 Tobacco. 
27Manipulation facilities were also located in Istanbul. 
A new site needed to meet many requirements. The 
manipulation industry required cheap, efficient labor. 
For fermentation and storage, inexpensive real estate was 
desirable. In addition, shipping millions of pounds of 
tobacco required good harbors and transportation 
connections. Low tax and insurance rates were also 
important criteria. 
New York City and low-wage Southern towns near the 
cigarette manufacturing centers in the United States may 
have met many of these requirements, but an additional 
factor made them unsuitable. As mentioned previously, 
since 1890 the American government had levied a $.35 per 
pound import duty on unstemmed cigarette leaf tobacco.28 
Manipulation not only isolated quality tobacco from bulk 
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purchases, it also isolated grades of tobacco not suitable 
for American use.29 Removal of inferior tobacco before 
shipping it to the United States avoided costly duty 
charges; delaying importation of the tobacco for a year 
while it fermented postponed large payments as well. 
Therefore, it was advantageous to locate the manipulation 
28u.s. Tariff commission, "Trade Agreement Digest," p. 
32; Gordon, American Relations, p. 184. 
29on average, this low grade tobacco amounted to 12% of 
the manipulated tobacco. Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Foreign and Domestic Commerce, "The Manipulation of Eastern 
Tobacco in Trieste," TMCA, no. 304 (1931): 1-2. 
industry outside the United states. At the same time, 
manipulating tobacco in a middleman country with tariffs 
similar to those in the United states would have been no 
better. 
The requirements for an alternative to Turkey's role 
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in the manipulating industry were demanding. The American 
tobacco men felt that the Italian port of Trieste met these 
requirements. Trieste offered a number of advantages. The 
Porto Duca d'Aosta and Porto Vittorio Emanuele II, two free 
zones, were areas outside the customs jurisdiction of the 
Italians. Here, tobacco could be manipulated and stored 
without the assessment of duties. Trieste possessed an 
abundance of low-cost and efficient labor in Trieste (ex-
perienced tobacco graders received $.50 for an eight-hour 
day as late as 1932). Insurance cost one-third what it did 
in Greece. Trieste provided better housing for the 
industry than Izmir: the ports were superior: and direct 
shipping connections to America and good rail connections 
to central Europe were available. 30 Although the American 
companies did manipulate tobacco in other European cities 
during the interwar period--Glenn Tobacco, in particular, 
30George M. Hanson (Consul, Trieste), "New Tobacco 
company in Trieste," 22 May 1924, RG 84, CPR Trieste, NA, 
file 861.3 Tobacco: "The Manipulation of Eastern Tobacco in 
Trieste," TMCA, no. 304 (1931): 1-2: "Manipulation of Tobacco 
at Trieste," TMCA, no. 428 (1933): 5-6. 
shipped large quantities to Pireaus, Greece31--the 
tremendous volume shipped to Trieste made it far and away 
the most important site for American manipulation of 
Turkish tobacco. 
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After the Izmir fire, the administrators of Trieste's 
Magazzini Generali (bonded warehouses) permitted Gary 
Tobacco to use the facilities in the free port. In 
February 1923, Franklin W. Bell of Gary declared the 
transfer of operations a success: almost four million 
kilograms of tobacco were being processed by 1,200 Gary 
employees. Bell noted that "all of our friends"--the other 
American tobacco companies--had also shipped their Izmir 
purchases to Europe for processing.32 Although Bell 
expressed the desire to continue some manipulation work in 
Turkey as long as possible,33 Gary's decision to remain in 
Trieste, and the fact that other major companies followed 
suit, indicate a lingering skepticism about Turkey's role 
in the tobacco trade. 
3lw. Perry George (Consul, Izmir) to Charles E. Allen, 
22 May 1933, RG 84, CPR Izmir, NA, file 861.33 Field Crops-
Tobacco. 
32According to Bell, Gary Tobacco was the only American 
company to maintain large-scale manipulating facilities in 
Izmir immediately after the war. Bell to Admiral Bristol, 
3 February 1923, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 861.3 
Tobacco. 
33Ibid. 
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The American tobacco companies encountered trying 
setbacks in their attempts to recoup losses suffered in the 
Greco-Turkish War. The Turkish and American diplomats at 
Lausanne had agreed to handle American claims outside of 
the treaty negotiations, but as noted previously, the 
failure to ratify the Turkish-American delayed the claim 
commission's convention until 1933-34. 
One American tobacco company was able to press a claim 
immediately. In this case, curiously enough, the company 
company sought compensation on the grounds that the Turks 
were not responsible for damages to American property 
during the war, more specifically, that the nationalist 
forces were not responsible for the fire that destroyed 
stocks of tobacco in Izmir 1922. 
Prior to the Turkish occupation of Izmir, Guardian 
Assurance Company, a British firm, insured the American 
Tobacco Company's stocks of aromatic leaf in Izmir ware-
houses. When the fire destroyed this tobacco, American 
Tobacco sought compensation from the insurer. Arguing that 
the insurance policy did not cover damages resulting from 
an act of war, including fire, Guardian refused to pay. 
The resultant civil suit came to trial in a London court in 
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December 1924.34 American Tobacco lawyers contended that 
the fire was not the result of an act of war, but of arson 
by individuals and that such a calamity was possible in any 
Oriental city. Guardian countered that the nationalist 
Turkish occupation of Izmir had led to the fire and that 
the destruction was a result of war. Justice Rowlatt 
decided that there was a causal connection between the 
nationalist occupation and the fire: arsonists in the 
Greek and Armenian quarters of the city had been able to 
start the fires only because the Turks failed to maintain 
order and discipline in the newly-captured city. Although 
the Turks had tried to put the fires out, the conflagration 
was connected with their arrival and, thus, was a 
consequence of war. Rowlatt rejected American Tobacco's 
claim; the first attempt to recoup war losses failed.35 
34American Tobacco sued for £168,245 4s. ld, but this 
suit was viewed as a test case which could have led to $20 
million in claims from other companies. "The Smyrna Fire: 
Insurance Claim; American Tobacco Company, Incorporated v. 
Guardian Assurance Company, Limited," Times, 20 December 
1924, p. 4, col. e; "American Tobacco Co. sues for $2,000,000 
Loss in Smyrna Fire," USTJ, vol. 102, no. 23 (1924): 5. 
35 11The Smyrna Fire: Insurance Claim, American Tobacco 
Company, Incorporated v. Guardian Assurance Company, 
Limited," Times, 20 December 1924, p. 4, col. e; Fred K. 
Nielsen, American-Turkish Claims Settlement: Under the 
Agreement of December 24. 1923, and Supplemental Agreements 
between the United States and Turkey, Opinions and Reports 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937), pp. 24-6. 
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On the basis of this 1924 British ruling, American 
tobacco companies could--and would--hold the Turks respon-
sible for American losses. The companies' original stance, 
i.e., that the Turks had not themselves burned half of the 
second most important city in Turkey, had been logical and 
had appealed to Turkish sentiment. It was far from certain 
that the Turks would accept a tactical reversal by the com-
panies which would point an accusatory finger towards 
Ankara. 
But this is precisely what occurred. The American 
tobacco companies filed claims against the Turkish 
government for the losses suffered in the Izmir fire. 
American Tobacco demanded $469,760.85, Standard Commercial 
$803,305.65,36 and Gary Tobacco $80o,ooo.37 In this second 
attempt, American Tobacco argued that "the approximate 
cause of the fire was the occupation of Izmir by the 
Turkish Army and the failure of the Turkish military 
authorities in occupying Izmir to maintain order. 11 38 
American Tobacco had turned their former opponent's defense 
into their own offense, but this strategy foundered in the 
new judicial forum. The commission agreed with Justice 
36Nielsen, American-Turkish," pp. 128-41. 
37F. w. Bell (presumably to Admiral Bristol), 7 July 
1923, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 350 Claims. 
38Nielsen, American-Turkish Claims," pp. 128-41, 145-8. 
Rowlatt•s decision that the Turks could not be blamed for 
starting the fire, but differed from Rowlatt by insisting 
that Turkish liability had to be established by the 
claimant. American Tobacco had to prove: 
negligence of Turkish authorities in preventing 
incendiarism and the spread of destruction of 
property; or acts of those authorities resulting 
in destruction; or liability for acts of 
soldiers, if loss is attributed to depredations 
said to have been committed by them.39 
American Tobacco could not do this to the commission's 
satisfaction; the tribunal rejected all of the companies' 
claims of this type. The second attempt to recoup losses 
from the Izmir fire had also failed. 
The American tobacco companies suffered from a 
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different kind of war casualty as well. The companies had 
made advance payments to both Muslim and Christian growers 
in the Izmir region prior to the Turkish occupation. Just 
as the Greek army fled from the advancing nationalists, so 
did many Greek civilians. After the Christian Greek 
growers fled, the Turkish forces seized their tobacco as 
abandoned property and sold it at auction.40 
Shortly after the Turkish victory, American of the 
Orient filed a claim for about $80,000 with the Turkish 
39Ib'd 24 1 ., p. . 
40J[oseph] M. English (American of the Orient) to 
Joseph c. Grew (Ambasador, Istanbul), 26 March 1930, RG 84, 
NA, ER Istanbul, file 350 Claims. 
ministry of finance for a reimbursement for such advan-
ces. 41 Gary Tobacco filed a similar claim. From July to 
September 1922 Gary paid roughly $101,000 to Greek 
planters around Izmir, which represented 40% of the value 
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of the planter's tobacco. During the same period, Gary 
paid about $25,000 to Turkish growers in the region. The 
Turks delivered their contracted tobacco and were paid the 
balance due them: the Greeks fled and Gary received 
nothing.42 In the summer of 1923, the Turkish Minister of 
Finance, Hassan Fehmi, recommended that the two companies 
be reimbursed "with utmost speed" with funds from the sale 
of confiscated tobacco.43 No record of payment on these 
claims is available, but payment in full was almost 
certainly not made, as both of these companies refiled 
claims in 1930 for losses on these same advance payments to 
Christians: American of the Orient for about $64 1 00044 and 
41This is a rough conversion of the actual amount, 
TL 126,168. Ibid. 
42F. w. Bell (presumably to Admiral Bristol), 7 July 
1923, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 350 Claims. 
43Memo, Hassan Fehmi (Turkish Minister of Finance) to 
Turkish Ministry of Finances, 7 June 1923, RG 84, ER Angora, 
NA, file 350 Claims: memo, Hassan Fehmi, 11 July 1923, RG 84, 
ER Angora, NA, file 350 Claims. 
44American of the orient requested TL 136,000, to be 
exact. English to Grew (Ambassador), 26 March 1930, RG 84, 
ER Istanbul, NA, file 350 Claims. 
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Gary for $85,ooo.45 The claims commission rejected these 
claims on the grounds that the companies could not provide 
sufficient proof of ownership of the confiscated tobacco. 
With the signing on 25 October 1934 of a Turkish-
American agreement, the Turks agreed to pay $1.3 million to 
the American government for damages suffered by American 
citizens.46 None of these funds, however, went to the 
tobacco companies.47 Although the Turks honored their 
international agreements, the failure of the Turkish 
government to provide compensation for losses suffered by 
the American tobacco companies was certainly not an 
adequate answer to Franklin Bell's call for cooperation and 
support from the nationalists.48 This failure to resolve 
satisfactorily the claims issue could only have decreased 
the companies' confidence in Ataturk's regime. 
Traditional historiography treats the Lausanne Treaty 
as a diplomatic triumph for Turkey, the only defeated power 
45Memo of conversation between Joseph c. Grew (Ambas-
sador) and Franklin w. Bell, RG 84, ER Angora, NA, file 350 
Claims. 
46The commission reduced this amount to $899,388.09 in 
1937. s. Walter Washington to Numan Menemencioglu (Acting 
Minister for Foreign Affairs), 23 September 1937, RG 84, ER 
Istanbul Confidential File, NA, file 400 U.S.-Turkey Claims. 
47Nielsen, American-Turkish Claims, pp. 145-48, 128-41. 
48Bell to Bristol, 3 February 1923, RG 84, ER Constan-
tinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation. 
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of the First World War to revoke a "Diktat" imposed by the 
victors. 49 Nevertheless, not all of the provisions of the 
Lausanne agreement worked to Turkey's advantage. One nega-
tive aspect was the retention by foreigners of all conces-
sions granted prior to 1914.50 This was true of the 
tobacco concession, the Regie, left in the hands of a 
French group and not due to expire until 1 April 1929. The 
treaty forbade Turkey to nationalize the tobacco monopoly, 
but a special convention made on 23 June 1923 between the 
Turkish government and the Regie allowed the Turks to 
purchase the concession from its foreign holders. The 
Turks definitely desired a change, for the Regie had "a 
certain objectionable political significance • • • savoring 
••• of the former capitulatory regime in Turkey," and 
reminding Turks of the lack of sovereignty which the 
capitulations had represented.51 In light of these 
factors, Julian Gillespie suggested in May 1924 that: 
the present attitude of the Turkish government 
toward the • • • Regie • • • be discreetly 
49Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London, 
New York, and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 
249; G. Lewis, Modern Turkey, p. 87; Shaw, Reform, pp. 365-
69. 
50Hale, Political and Economic Development, pp. 38-9; 
Hershlag, Turkey, pp. 17-30, 45. 
51Julian E. Gillespie, "Turkish Tobacco Monopoly," 
Special Report No. 104, 30 May 1924, RG 84, ER Constanti-
nople, NA, file 860.2 Monopolies and Concessions. 
communicated to American concerns who might 
possibly be interested in same, with the view 
that some American group may possibly find it 
advantageous and desirable to study the tobacco 
monopoly in Turkey and enter into negotiations 
for acquiring same.52 
Thus, Turkish nationalism created an opportunity for 
American tobacco interests to control the Turkish tobacco 
monopoly. Actually, Gillespie's suggestion was a mirror 
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image of Hoffman Philip's 1913 plan (see pp. 8-10). 
Gillespie, "a popular and influential figure in Turkey,n53 
with as much insight into Turkish economic affairs as any 
American, certainly must have had cause to believe that 
his suggestion was grounded in reality. In fact, several 
conditions made his proposal reasonable. 
First, in the early 1920s American investors, 
including the tobacco magnate James B. Duke, held long 
negotiations for the purchase of the French tobacco 
monopoly. Though ultimately unsuccessful in France, this 
was an investment opportunity similar to that available in 
Turkey. The Americans had promised to restructure the 
French monopoly on modern business lines;54 surely the 
52Ibid. 
53DeNovo, American Interests, p. 253. 
54nwill France Sell Tobacco Monopoly to Americans?" 
USTJ, vol. 98. no. 2 (1922): 3; "France to Keep Tobacco 
Monopoly," USTJ, vol. 98, no. 12 (1922): 10; "Ask France to 
Sell Tobacco Monopoly: Duke, Whalen and Ryan Reopen Negotia-
tions with the Government for outright Purchase," New York 
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Turkish monopoly could stand even more modernization. 
Thus, there were incentives for both Americans and Turks to 
consider such an investment opportunity. 
A second reason which made acquisition of the Turkish 
monopoly a viable concept was Turkish interest in American 
investment. Despite his nationalistic, anti-foreign 
impulses, even Ataturk was in favor of using foreign 
capital to Turkey's advantage. In 1923 he was quoted as 
saying that "our country is extensive. We require great 
effort and great capital. Therefore, we are always 
prepared to provide the necessary security to foreign 
capital on the condition that its profits be regulated. 11 55 
Moreover, Turks expected American capital to come without 
the political strings that usually accompanied European 
investment.56 The American government also expressed 
interest in the concept of investment in Turkey, as shown 
by Secretary of State Hughes's attempts to win at Lausanne 
international guarantees for American investments in Turkey 
Times, 11 February 1923, sec. II, p. 12, col. 1; "Whelan 
Plans 2,500 Stores for France: Tobacco Prices to be Reduced 
if Americans Obtain Right, He Says," New York Times, 12 
February 1923, p. 13, col. 3. 
55Robinson, First Turkish Republic, p. 106. Also see 
Hershlag, Turkey, p. 45. 
56Trask, U.S. Response, p. 127 ff. 
(see pp. 53-54).57 Both Turks and Americans had an 
interest in dollars capitalizing Turkey, most notably 
demonstrated by the Grand National Assembly's granting of 
the revived Chester Concession to the Ottoman-American 
Development Company in April 1923.58 
A third reason lay in the nature of the Turkish 
reaction to the Regie. Opposition to continued foreign 
control over a valuable revenue source arose not only 
because of Turkish nationalism, but also for economic 
reasons. In February 1923, tobacco farmers' represen-
tatives to an economic congress in Izmir voted to abolish 
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the Regie and introduce free cultivation and exportation of 
tobacco,59 a move presumably in the farmers' economic 
interest. Later the same year there was popular agitation 
for the abolition of the Regie, accompanied by propaganda 
that a government takeover of the tobacco monopoly would 
increase state revenues by LT 20 million, 60 a claim 
emphasizing the nation's economic interest in making a 
57Hurewitz, British-French Supremacy, pp. 312-8; DeNovo, 
American Interests, pp. 139-40; Evans, U.S. Policy, p. 396. 
58oeNovo, American Interests, pp. 210-28; Gordon, 
American Relations, pp. 257-65, 275-84; Trask, U.S. Response, 
p. 130. 
59nTurkey," Times, 26 February 1923, p. 9, col. d. 
60 11Anatolian Railways; Turkish Policy," Times, 28 Novem-
ber 1923, p. 11, col. f. 
change. In early 1924, calls in the Grand National 
Assembly for replacement of the monopoly with a 
"banderolle" system--an excise tax on tobacco sales6l __ 
focused again on the national economic gains that were 
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possible through liberalization. The American tobacco 
industry's profitability was certainly a strong recommenda-
tion for American management of the Turkish industry, if 
financial considerations were the principle concerns. 
Yet despite these favorable factors, American tobacco 
interests did not take control of the Turkish tobacco 
monopoly. The third role of the tobacco trade in Turkish-
American relations--as a focal point of American investment 
in Turkey--remained potential rather than actual. Control 
of the production, manufacture, and sale of tobacco in 
Turkey, along with influence over the international market 
for Turkey's tobacco, would have been lucrative and would 
have dramatically altered the nature of Turkish-American 
relations, given the economic importance of tobacco in 
Turkey.62 
6l 11Turkey; Fiscal Innovations," Times, 31 January 1924, 
Annual Financial and Commercial Review Section, p. 15, col. 
f. 
62see Table 5 for the annual profits of the monopoly, 
and consider that the monopoly's earnings supplied as much 
as 10% of all government revenues in Turkey during the late 
1920s. Hershlag, Turkey, p. 69. 
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The reasons for this failure remain unknown to this 
author, but this uncertainty does not detract from the 
importance of the monopoly issue in the historiography of 
Turkish-American relations. Historian Roger R. Trask has 
contended that nationalism was "foremost among the factors 
conditioning American relations with Turkeyn63 during this 
time. Obviously, a decision on the future of the tobacco 
monopoly would not be based on the principles of 
nationalism alone; rather, economic considerations were 
foremost in both popular and political thinking. This 
perception supports a thesis that is at odds with Trask's, 
namely that expounded by historian Leland James Gordon in 
his classic study of Turkish-American relations from 1830 
to 1930, that "the accumulated evidence • leads to the 
conclusion that economic considerations lie at the base of 
international relations. 11 64 The Turkish tobacco monopoly 
not only presented American tobacco interests with an 
opportunity, but a study of the monopoly's fate also 
presents the historian an opportunity to re-evaluate 
broader Turkish-American relations. Such an examination 
demonstrates that although Turkish nationalism may have 
63Trask, U.S. Response, p. 242. 
64Gordon, American Relations, p. 345. 
·influenced these relations, one should not neglect the 
important role of economics. 
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The damages of war, the loss of established privi-
leges, the exchange of minorities, and the inability to 
receive compensation for legitimate grievances all made 
Turkey less inviting as a place for Americans to do 
business in 1922-23. The American tobacco companies' 
reactions to the changes in Turkey, however, were not so 
much a response to Turkish nationalism per se, as a 
response to economic factors. The response to the end of 
the capitulations was to remain in Turkey, even under 
uncertain circumstances. To the contrary, two new American 
companies established organizations in Turkey to buy 
aromatic tobacco. The major companies did remove their 
manipulating operations from Turkey, but this was more a 
response to the destruction in Izmir, the loss of 
experienced workers, and a concern for security in a 
troubled area, than a response to nationalist reforms. The 
claims issue had less to do with Turkish nationalism than 
it did with international law, and Turkish treatment of the 
tobacco monopoly actually created potential opportunities 
for American investment in Turkey. 
Restated, the revolutionary changes in the new 
republic affected the Turkish-American tobacco trade, but 
Ataturk's reforms were not the only determinants of the 
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American tobacco companies' behavior in 1922-23. As the 
Turkish-American tobacco trade was fundamentally an 
economic relationship, the companies' responses to changes 
in Turkey were, understandably, determined by economic 
factors. 
Chapter Five 
More Changes, New Conflicts, 1924-26 
In October 1923 the Grand National Assembly declared 
Turkey to be a republic and Kemal Ataturk to be its first 
president; thereafter the pace of revolutionary reform 
quickened. Laws passed by the Grand National Assembly to 
improve rural life and agricultural production included the 
abolition of the tithe and purchase of the tobacco 
monopoly. These changes, despite their magniture, affected 
the American tobacco companies relatively little. More 
influential were the consequences of the capitulation's 
termination, namely, subjection of the companies to Turkish 
taxation. This chapter examines the impact of these 
changes during the period 1924-26. 
Though Ataturk rapidly introduced westernizing reforms 
into Turkey, it was not the republican government's actions 
that were responsible for the doubling of tobacco 
production between 1923 and 1924, to over 114 million 
pounds (see Table 1). More important to this agricultural 
recovery were the high prices paid for the 1923 crop--a 
result of the shortage caused by the war--and favorable 
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growing conditions that increased the quality and average 
size of the harvest.l 
The influx of Muslims from Greece and Macedonia also 
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played a role in this production increase.2 Though histor-
ians usually judge the exchange of minorities to have been 
deleterious to Turkey, 3 in 1924 the assistance of the 
incoming Muslims to the regeneration of the tobacco 
industry was considerable. Between 4000 and 5000 of these 
immigrants began growing tobacco in the Samsun region in 
1924, bringing the total number of growers there to 
13,ooo.4 In all of Turkey, the number of growers increased 
by 50,000 over 1923, reaching more than 175,000 (see Table 
1). This positive aspect of the exchange of minorities 
contradicts general assumptions that these populations 
transfers were detrimental to Turkey. 
Four major American companies purchased tobacco in 
Turkey in 1924: Gary, Alston, American of the Orient, and 
lKing to Consul General, 6 September 1924, RG 84, CGR 
Constantinople, NA, file 861.3 Tobacco. 
2Allen, "Turkish Regie," 13 November 1925, DS 
867.61331/9, M353, 66/1279-80. 
3Hershlag, Turkey, pp. 26-7, 29-30. 
4King to Consul General, 6 September 1924, RG 84, CGR 
Constantinople, NA, file 861.3 Tobacco. 
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Standard Commercial.5 All of these firms had branches in 
Izmir.6 In Izmir, Edward M. Yantis directed Gary's opera-
tions, W. P. Johnston led Alston, and Joseph M. English 
headed American Tobacco of the orient.7 In Istanbul, 
Franklin W. Bell managed Gary's headquarters,8 and P. E. 
King ran Alston's operations. 9 In addition to the 
representatives in Turkey, the men in the home offices 
remained active. I. c. Gary of Gary Tobacco and Ery E. 
Kehaya of Standard Commercial were listed as Directors of 
the Federated American Chambers of Commerce of the Near 
East.lo 
In 1924, these four companies shipped over 7 million 
pounds of tobacco worth $4.3 million from Turkey directly 
5Bell to Ravndal, 14 May 1923, RG 84, CGR Constanti-
nople, NA, file 861.3 Tobacco. Alston was still purchasing 
in Turkey for R. J. Reynolds while Glenn operated in Greece 
and Macedonia. Tilley, Reynolds, pp. 234-5. 
6Trade List provided by Consulate General, Izmir, 1 
March 1924, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 610 Trade Extension. 
?Frederick G. Bird (Vice Consul, Izmir) to J. M. 
English; Bird to w. P. Johnston; Bird to Edward M. Yantis, 
22 August 1924, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 865.86 Manufac-
tures. 
8Bell to Ravndal, 14 May 1923, RG 84, CGR Constanti-
nople, NA, file 861.3 Tobacco. 
9charles E. Allen to P. E. King, 3 September 1924, RG 
84, CGR Constantinople, NA, file 861.3 Tobacco. 
lOLetterhead of Federated American Chambers of Commerce 
of the Near East, Inc., 19 June 1924, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, 
file 610 Trade Extension. 
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to the United States (see Table 2). These figures do not 
include, however, tobacco shipped indirectly to the United 
States through Trieste. Neither American nor Turkish 
governmental statistics indicate how much of the Turkish 
tobacco shipped to Italy was actually destined for the 
United States. This lack of statistical information makes 
quantification of Trieste's importance impossible. Its 
significance, however, is demonstrated by American of the 
Orient's decision to follow Gary's lead and establish 
manipulating facilities in Trieste in 1923,ll and by the 
start of Alston's operations there in 1924. In 1925, 9.8 
million pounds of tobacco were shipped from Trieste to the 
United States, "but the major portion of the tobacco 
reported as from Italy consists of transshipments from 
Turkey. 11 12 
The Ankara government evidently did not approve of the 
decrease of manipulation in Turkey. In October 1924 Julian 
Gillespie reported on a proposed law which would have 
prohibited the exportation of unmanipulated leaf tobacco.13 
llGeorge M. Hanson, "Tobacco Industry in Trieste," RG 
84, CPR Trieste, NA, file 861.3 Tobacco. 
12u.s. Tariff Commission, "Trade Agreement Digest," p. 
40. 
13Julian E. Gillespie, "Projected Law Relative to the 
Creation of a State Tobacco Monopoly in Turkey," Economic & 
Trade Note, 31 December 1924, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, 
file 860.2 Monopolies and Concessions. 
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Nationalistic impulses were likely to have played a role in 
sponsoring this law, but economic motives were certainly 
equally important, as bringing this law into effect would 
have created jobs in Turkey. The Grand National Assembly 
never passed the proposal, so ·Americans could continue 
letting financial considerations guide their involvement in 
the Turkish tobacco trade. Trieste stayed in business. 
In 1925 the Turkish government took measures that did 
have an immediate impact on the tobacco trade. Especially 
important among these measures was the abolition of the 
tithe. In the previous year the tithe had provided roughly 
40% of the total state revenues. By relieving the peasant 
majority of this disproportionately heavy taxation and 
shifting the burden to urban dwellers, Ataturk sought to 
improve rural life and win the support of this conservative 
group for his reforms.14 The tithe had required tobacco 
growers to give 12% of their harvest to the tobacco 
monopoly. The abolition of this requirement in February 
1925 represented a significant increase in potential 
earnings for the grower. It also forced the tobacco 
14The official 1927 census in Turkey listed the popula-
tion at 13,600,000. 76% of these people were classified as 
living in rural settings. Shaw, Reform, p. 375. 
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monopoly to buy tobacco on the market, a consequence which 
could only bode well for tobacco prices.15 
Another major change soon followed. On 28 February 
1925 the Turkish government cancelled the tobacco 
concession long held by the Regie. The Turks paid the 
concessionnaire 40 million French francs and took control 
of the monopoly's assets on 1 March 1925.16 The fate of 
monopoly, though, was uncertain. Ongoing discussion in the 
Grand National Assembly brought divergent calls for the 
banderolle system, for retaining the monopoly under Turkish 
administration, and even for granting the concession to 
other foreign commercial interests.17 The assembly 
actually passed a law on 25 March 1925 abolishing the 
monopoly and establishing banderolle system, but the 
15Hershlag, "Turkey," pp. 12, 54; Shaw, "Reform," pp. 
388-89; Gesellschaft zur Erforschung der Turkischen Geschich-
te, Geschichte der Turkischen Republic (Istanbul: Devlet 
Matbaasi, 1935), pp. 348-52. 
16 11 Proposal to Extend Government Tobacco Monopoly," 
TMCA, no. 15 (1925): l; "Turkish Monopoly Ends Next March," 
USTJ, vol. 102, no. 7 (1924): 26. 
17 11 The Turkish Cabinet; Reported Dissensions," Times, 
23 February 1925, p. 11, col. e; "Turkish Government Tempor-
arily Takes over Tobacco Regie, 11 USTJ, vol. 103, no. 25 
(1925): 38. 
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assembly quickly reversed itself, leaving the monopoly in 
Turkish hands for another year, until 1 March 1926.18 
The decisions taken by the Turkish government in the 
first three months of 1925 are significant for several 
reasons. First, despite the apparent revolutionary 
character of the decisions, there was as much continuity as 
there was change. The monopoly was to function in the same 
manner as it had in the past; only the the destination of 
the revenues was altered. On the one hand this represented 
a display of nationalism; on the other it was a pragmatic 
evaluation of how Turkish revenue resources could best be 
exploited. Second, the beginning of state control of the 
tobacco monopoly in 1925 conflicts with the standard 
interpretation of Turkish economic development. Historians 
traditionally view the 1920s as a "liberal" period, 
followed by an "etatist" period after 1929-30.19 The 1925 
rejection of a free-market approach to the tobacco industry 
represents an earlier adoption of state intervention than 
18nproposal to Extend Government Tobacco Monopoly," 
TMCA, no. 15 {1925): 1; "Turkey to Abolish Tobacco Monopoly," 
USTJ, vol. 103, no. 25 {1925): 30; Althoff to Miller DuBrul 
& Peters Mfg. co., 30 July 1925, RG 151, FDC Records, NA, 
file 303 Tobacco-Turkey. 
19Hale, Political and Economic Development, pp. 33-85; 
Hershlag, Turkey, passim; c;aglar Keyder, "The Political 
Economy of Turkish Democracy," in Turkey in Transition, New 
Perspectives, ed. Irvin c. Schick and Ertugrul Ahmet Tonak 
(New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 
33; B. Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp. 275-82. 
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is typically recognized. Third, the plan to continue the 
monopoly under Turkish administration put a potentially 
effective tool for social change into the government's 
hands. One of the republic's foremost economic goals 
during its first decade was to improve the farmer's 
condition.20 If the tobacco monopoly developed a pur-
chasing policy not only according to its manufacturing 
requirements, but also according to socio-political goals, 
then the monopoly's ability to affect the market (e.g., by 
supporting prices) could directly affect American tobacco 
buying. 
The new Turkish tobacco monopoly very quickly had an 
impact on the tobacco market. Monopoly purchases in August 
1925 of 4.4 million pounds supported the market and firmed 
prices,21 and the monopoly anticipated making total pur-
chases of over 22 million pounds. 22 In a new tactic, the 
monopoly began buying directly from farmers in some areas, 
as opposed to purchasing only from the markets, as it had 
20Gesellschaft zur Erforschung, Geschichte, pp. 348-49. 
21 11Turkish Tobacco Market During the Month of August," 
TMCA, no. 15 (1925): 2. 
22 11The Turkey Tobacco Crop," TMCA, no. 16 (1925): 6-7; 
"Turkish Tobacco Market During October," TMCA, no. 23 (1925): 
7-8. 
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previously. 23 Thus, the monopoly increased its capability 
to implement a more politically-minded purchasing program. 
On 8 February 1926 the Grand National Assembly 
extended the life of the new Turkish tobacco monopoly for 
an additional three-year trial period.24 The monopoly's 
trial year had proven successful, according to General 
Director Seifi Bey, who claimed that LT 11 million in 
revenues had been collected in the first year and that 
administrative costs had been reduced. Previously, it had 
taken four years to amass the same revenues as were 
collected in this one year. Moreover, the monopoly had 
improved its ability to resell the tobacco it had pur-
chased. 25 Despite changes and improvements, the monopoly 
did not greatly affect American tobacco interests, largely 
because the American companies bought expensive grades of 
leaf and the Turkish monopoly purchased much lower quality 
grades; the two were non-competitive participants in the 
same market. 
23nconstantinople Tobacco Market During December, 1925," 
TMCA, no. 32 (1926): 6-7. 
24"Turkey," TMCA, no. 27 (1926): 3; "Notes on Countries 
Supplying United States Tobacco Imports," TMCA, no. 192 
(1929): 8. 
25"Turkey," TMCA, no. 43 (1926): 5; "The Turkish Tobacco 
Regie," TMCA, no. 49 (1926): 7; "Notes on the Turkish Tobacco 
Market," TMCA, no. 68 (1926): 10. 
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In 1925, more acreage under cultivation by more 
tobacco growers produced a 124 million pound crop in 
1925,26 but even this was much smaller than expected. 
Drought in the Izmir region reduced the crop there by as 
much as 40%. The immigrants from Macedonia and Western 
Thrace once again affected the size of the crop. They had 
brought with them tobacco seeds which produced a high 
quality tobacco. This very aromatic type of tobacco 
produced small, fine leaves, a factor which contributed to 
the smaller-than-expected harvest.27 overall the quality 
of the 1925 crop was quite good, with little disease and 
few coarse-leaved tobaccos. As a result of high quality 
26production figures should be taken as guidelines 
rather than exact facts. The Bureau of Foreign and Domestic 
Commerce had difficulties in choosing which statistics it 
should use for the production totals for 1925, because an 
international agricultural institute at Rome, the Department 
of Agriculture and the Turkish Monopoly all cited signifi-
cantly different amounts. Louise Moore to Constantinople 
Office, 25 July 1928, RG 151, FDC Records, NA, file 303 
Turkey; Julian E. Gillespie to Director of Bureau of Foreign 
and Domestic Commerce, 28 August 1928, RG 151, FDC Records, 
NA, file 303 Turkey. I have again chosen to use the figures 
provided by the Turkish Tobacco Monopoly, the only agency 
to claim that it weighed all of the tobacco produced in 
Turkey. 
27These immigrants had other effects on the crop. 
Julian Gillespie cited newspaper articles which claimed 
that these immigrants would inaugurate "a new era of tobacco 
culture" in Turkey. J. E. Gillespie, "Turkish Tobacco Har-
vest," Economic and Trade Note, 14 January 1925, RG 84, ER 
Constantinople, NA, file 600 Commercial Relations. This 
positive result must be weighed in the overall evaluation 
of the exchange of populations. 
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and firm demand, prices remained steady for stored tobacco 
at the markets, and increased 10-15% for purchases directly 
from growers.28 The American commercial secretary in 
Istanbul stated that "practically the whole of the Izmir 
crop and 8,818,400 pounds of the Samsun crop appears likely 
to be bought up by American firms. 11 29 
American cigarette consumption demanded this. on 
average, Americans smoked over three pounds of tobacco as 
cigarettes in 1926--more than 1,000 cigarettes per person--
representing one-third of all the tobacco used in the 
United states.30 Ery Kehaya of Standard Commercial 
estimated that more than 75% of these cigarettes contained 
aromatic tobacco,31 making America by far the largest 
consumer of such leaf .32 Thus, the marked changes in the 
tobacco industry in Turkey did not affect American tobacco 
companies' buying habits in Turkey as much as did the 
habits of smokers in the United States. 
28rrconstantinople Tobacco Market During December, 
1925," TMCA, no. 32 (1926): 6-7; "New Turkish Leaf Costs 
10% More," USTJ, vol. 104, no. 3 (1925): 3. 
29"The Turkey Tobacco Crop," TMCA, no. 16 (1925): 6-7. 
30Milmore, "Tobacco Consumption," 10-11. 
31"Ery Kehaya, Sailing For Europe, Forsees Bigger 
Tobacco Market," USTJ, vol. 104, no. 3 (1927): 7. 
32rru.s. Largest Importer of oriental Tobacco," USTJ, 
vol. 104, no. 12 (1925): 46. 
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Despite increasing consumption, the large Turkish 
crops of 1924 and 1925 tested the limits of the market's 
demand. The low prices for the 1925 crop, bought in 1926, 
caused growers to suffer more than usual from the persis-
tent difficulty of financing their crops.33 This was 
probably a factor in the slight reduction of the 1926 crop 
to 120 million pounds. Reports in 1926 stated that on 
average, American firms bought about 33 million pounds of 
tobacco annually in Turkey, including about 20 million 
pounds per year in Izmir.34 
In 1926 one American official noted the growing trend 
of shipping Turkish tobacco directly from Istanbul to the 
United states, rather than via Trieste. 35 In fact, Gary 
33 11Turkish Tobacco Industry," TMCA, no. 88 (1927): 5; 
"Turkey--Financing the Tobacco Crop," TMCA, no. 91 (1927): 
4-5. 
34This compared to estimated purchases of 26.5 million 
pounds by the Turkish Tobacco Monopoly and 14 million pounds 
by German importers. "Turkish Tobacco Market During October, 
1926," TMCA, no. 76 (1926): 8-9; "Tobacco in Turkey," TMCA, 
no. 109 (1927): 6. 
35Raymond A. Hare (Clerk, Istanbul), "Analysis of 
Declared Export Return for 1926," 11 April 1927, RG 84, CGR 
Constantinople, NA, file 600 Commercial Relations. This 
may serve to explain partially the discrepancy between 
Turkish and American statistics on the tobacco trade for 
1926 and 1927. Manipulating tobacco in Turkey meant a 
delay in the exportation of tobacco grown in one year to 
the end of the following year, at the earliest. If shipped 
at the end of one calendar year, 1926 for example, it would 
appear in Turkish export figures under 1926. Much of this 
tobacco, however, would not arrive in the United States 
until early 1927, thus being listed as 1927 imports in 
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Tobacco discontinued its manipulation in Trieste during 
1926. 36 In the same year Gary also reported employing 
4,000 Turks in Istanbul, 2,000 in Izmir, and 1,000 in 
Samsun. 37 Other companies employed another 4,500 Turkish 
workers in Izmir.38 By 1926 Turkey was recovering its role 
as a manipulator of tobacco, but it was not yet capable of 
ending American reliance on Trieste. Some companies 
hesitated to invest large amounts of capital to establish 
manipulating facilities without having the guarantees 
American statistics. The total of American figures for 
tobacco imports from Turkey for 1926 and 1927 combined is 
30.8 million pounds; the total of Turkish figures for 
tobacco exports to the United States during the same two 
years is 29.7 million pounds--a relatively small difference. 
Thus, the apparent discrepancy between Turkish and American 
figures for these two years might be explained by the 
increasing American manipulation of tobacco in Turkey. 
36Howard A. Bowman (Vice Consul, Trieste), "Annual 
Review of Commerce and Industries in the Trieste Consular 
District," 5 February 1929, RG 84, CPR Trieste, NA, file 600 
Commercial Relations; Howard A. Bowman, "Summary Value of 
Declared Exports at Trieste," 4 January 1930, RG 84, CPR 
Trieste, NA, file 600 Commercial Relations. 
37p. Lammot Belin to R. A. W. Treat, 22 October 1926, 
RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation. 
38samuel w. Honaker "Commerce and Industries for 1926," 
Report No. 69, 29 December 1926, RG 84, ER Constantinople, 
NA, file 600 commercial Relations. American of the Orient 
reported in 1925 that in all of Turkey it employed 30-35 
permanent Turkish workers and 700 seasonal laborers at this 
time, paying wages of over $2,000 per week during peak 
season. John H. Lane to Consul (Izmir), 1 July 1925, RG 84, 
ER Constantinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation. 
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provided by formal diplomatic relations.39 The failure of 
the Senate to ratify the Turkish-American treaty may have 
been, therefore, of significant economic consequence for 
Turkey. 
The changes that the Turkish government effected 
between 1924 and 1926 held considerable potential for 
influencing the Turkish tobacco market and the American 
companies in Turkey. In many instances, however, it was 
unofficial government action that affected the American 
tobacco companies more deeply, in particular, the creative 
taxation schemes of local authorities. For example, in 
July 1925 the "defterdar" (local director of finance) 
assessed most of the American tobacco companies in Izmir 
with a school tax. By national law all residents of Turkey 
could be required to pay as much as 1% of their income for 
a school tax. John H. Lane, an employee of American of the 
Orient, objected to the LT 3000 tax on his company on the 
grounds that the defterdar had innovatively interpreted 
this law to apply to companies.40 The Turkish Ministry of 
39 11u.s. cigarette Firms Awaiting Decision on American-
Turkish Pact," USTJ, vol. 107, no. 3 (1927): 16. 
40Taxes levied on other companies were as follows: 
Alston Tobacco, LT 6000; Gary Tobacco, LT 5000; Herman 
Sperry, LT 5000; Shark Tobacco, LT 5000; Macedonian Tobacco, 
LT 2000. John H. Lane to Consul (Izmir), 1 July 1925, RG 
84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation; Honaker to 
Bristol, 2 July 1925, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 
851. 2 Taxation. 
the Interior provided an interpretation of this tax law, 
stating that corporate bodies were liable to the school 
tax, bnt according to the amount of capital invested 
locally, rather than on the basis of its income, i.e., 
profits.41 
The major tobacco manufacturers in America incor-
porated their subsidiary purchasers of aromatic tobacco 
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with a minimal capitalization value. Gary's value, for 
example, was only $6,250.42 The parent companies paid the 
subsidiaries a paper profit on this amount--profit which 
was never seen in Anatolia.43 The buying organizations 
sold their stocks of tobacco to the corporate parent at 
cost, so the subsidiaries in Turkey showed no real profits. 
Thus, the application of the school tax on the tobacco 
companies may have been proper, but the amounts were 
inordinately high. 
41Translation of article from the Constantinople 
"Provincial Gazette," 26 August 1925, RG 84, ER Constan-
tinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation. 
42Gary Tobacco to Off ice of the Tax Collector (Galata) , 
5 December 1925, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 851.2 
Taxation. Glenn's original capitalization value was $1,000. 
Radio dispatch, James Harriss to Alston Tobacco, 20 March 
1923, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 850.3 Capital. 
43American of the orient received 6% of its capitali-
zation value in profits from the parent company annually. 
Memo, "Regarding Income Tax Cases Against the American 
Tobacco Company of the Orient, Inc.", n.d., 1932, RG 1984, 
ER Istanbul, NA, file 851.2 Taxation. 
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The school tax was only the beginning of an increas-
ingly exasperating series of tax problems. In December 
1925, local Turkish fiscal authorities requested that Gary 
Tobacco pay LT 15,000 for a military transportation tax. 
The company claimed that such high taxation was illegal and 
that a Turkish firm with a comparable capitalization value 
would only pay LT 30 or 40. Gary demanded a justification 
for this tax.44 
Then, at the beginning of 1926, Alston Tobacco became 
involved in a much more serious case. Local authorities 
assesed the company's Istanbul office a military transpor-
tation tax of LT 10,000. Alston's protests resulted in an 
immediate reduction of the assessment to LT 7,500, partial 
proof of the whimsical nature of this tax. Admiral Bristol 
recommended that the company refuse to pay even this 
reduced amount, but after Alston employees followed his 
advice, local treasury department officials seized and 
sealed the Alston office on 26 January, threatening to sell 
the furnishings if Alston did not pay within 24 hours. 
Bristol's endeavors on behalf of the company succeeded in 
postponing the public auction of Alston's property, but 
numerous communications with Ankara failed to resolve the 
44The outcome of this dispute was not found in State 
Department records. Gary Tobacco Company to Office of the 
Tax Collector, 5 December 1925, RG 84, ER Constantinople, 
NA, file 851.2 Taxation. 
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dispute. 45 A correspondent for the London Times reported 
that, 
the Turks openly stated to (one of the Alston 
managers] that this pressure was being put on 
Americans only, because they had not ratified the 
treaty of Lausanne, and that there was no 
intention to deal similarly with British, French, 
and Italian firms.46 
The pressure on the Alston company came from as high as the 
ministerial level in Ankara. Minister of Finance Hassan 
Bey reportedly said to P. E. King's lawyer that no solution 
to Alston' case would be found until "conventions were 
exchanged between the United States and Turkey.n47 Admiral 
Bristol considered this intransigence to be entirely in 
character for Hassan Bey, and he therefore· turned to 
Foreign Minister Tevfik Rushtu Aras, who was better 
disposed towards American interests. Through this policy 
of divide and conciliate, the seals were removed from 
45Mark L. Bristol to Secretary of State (Kellogg), 7 
May 1926, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation; 
"Turks Oppressing American Firms: Object Said to Be Forcing 
United States Signature to Treaty of Lausanne," New York 
Times, 29 January 1926, p. 4, col. 5. 
46 11Taxing Americans in Turkey," Times, 29 January 1926, 
p. 11, col. e. 
47R. A. w. Treat to Ernest Linwood Ives (Delegate, 
Ankara), 21 April 1926, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 
851.2 Taxation. 
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Alston's Istanbul office on 6 May 1926 although the tax had 
not been paid.48 
The London Times stated that a wave of Turkish nation-
alism was responsible for many of the foreign companies' 
problems. Although laws of the Turkish Republic guaranteed 
th,e rights of all minorities and foreigners in Turkey, 
there was considerable anti-Christian and anti-foreign 
sentiment. Calls for "Turkification" of the economy and 
"Turkey for the Turks" were widespread and not limited to 
uneducated peasants;49 even some Turkish government offi-
cials encouraged the elimination of foreign tobacco firms 
in Turkey.SO Recalling the claims of Seifi Bey, the 
director of the tobacco monopoly, one might be led to think 
that the monopoly's increasing efficiency would make it 
capable of replacing the foreign buying organizations in 
Turkey. 
48Bristol to Secretary of State (Kellogg), 7 May 1926, 
RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation; Ernest 
L. Ives to R. A. w. Treat, 7 May 1926, RG 84, ER Constan-
tinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation; memo, J. P. [Jefferson 
Patterson], 30 December 1929, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, 
file 851.2 Taxation. 
49 11 Foreign Traders in Turkey," Times, 20 March 1926, p. 
11, col. a. 
50 11Turks and Treaty at Lausanne," Times, 8 February 
1926, p. 11, col. b.; Allen, "Turkish Regie," 13 November 
1925, OS 867.61331/9, M353, 66/1286. 
112 
But Hassan Bey's blunt approach to foreign policy was 
not characteristic of Ataturk's foreign policy.51 on the 
contrary, historians Roger Trask and John A. DeNovo praise 
Turkey's behavior during the interwar years for its use of 
legal, rather than martial, implements in its international 
intercourse, even in events simultaneous to the Alston 
lockout, such as the resolution of the Mosul question.52 
Incidents such as the Alston case, however, show that 
nationalism could influence Turkish foreign policy in a 
most undiplomatic manner, and that commerce and diplomacy 
were perceived to be inextricably intertwined. 
such dubious taxation methods as outlined above may 
not have reflected official Turkish policy, but did reflect 
popular opinion. Many Turks did not believe the claims of 
low profits made by the subsidiary tobacco-buying compa-
nies; they viewed the companies as deserving of taxation. 
51Bristol to Secretary of State (Kellogg), 7 May 1926, 
RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation. 
52The "Mosul Question," for instance, was resolved at 
this time. A League of Nations' council successfully arbi-
trated this conflict. In reference to the Mosul question, 
Trask writes: "Much to Turkey's credit, a potentially 
dangerous problem had been settled peacably by compromise. 
Turkey illustrated the spirit which it was to demonstrate 
frequently during the interwar period." Trask, U.S. Response, 
pp. 218-19. In summarizing the United States' interaction 
with the international politics of the Turkish Republic 
between the wars, DeNovo states: "the two nations shared 
the belief that orderly diplomatic processes should govern 
international change." DeNovo, American Interests, p. 249. 
113 
The companies' claims of low profits were nominally 
correct. But low profits on small assessed values did not 
seem realistic to many Turks, who saw these companies spend 
millions of dollars on tobacco each year. Higher taxes 
were appropriate, according to the Turkish view. 
A conflict of cultures was another factor leading to 
these unacceptable taxes. An encounter during July 1925 
between Rufus w. Lane--a businessman, former American 
consul and long-time resident of Izmir--and a local tax 
collector illustrates this conflict. The tax collector 
informed Lane that he, like the tobacco companies, had to 
pay the school tax. The ensuing conversation took place: 
Question (Lane): What is your authority? 
Answer (Tax Collector): From the Defterdar. 
Q: Who decided how much I should pay? 
A: Five residents of Bournabat [Lane's home 
village]. 
Q: Who gave this commission authority to decide 
my tax. 
A: The Mudir [village leader]. 
Q: Is there a law authorizing him to do that? 
A: I never heard of such a law. 
Q: How did all of this come about then? 
A: Well you see we needed Ltqs. [Turkish lira] 
11,000 for the schools in Bournabat and the 
Mudir decided we should collect it as was 
being done in other villages in Turkey. He 
therefore named a committee who decide how 
much each resident should pay, to make up 
that sum. 
Q: on what basis did they decide how much I 
should pay? 
A: I don't know but I understand that it is 
based on the manner of living of each person. 
The opinion of each delegate was taken and 
they decided that Ltqs. 80 would be about 
right for you. 
Q: 
A: 
Q: 
A: 
Q: 
A: 
Q: 
A: 
Q: 
A: 
Q: 
A: 
Q: 
A: 
It is then within the power of this committee 
to decide, absolutely at their own descrition 
(sic], how much every one must pay? 
Yes it is so. 
Then having taxed me Ltqs. 80 this year they 
can make it Ltqs. 800 or 8000 next year, if 
they wish so. Is that so? 
Yes it is so but they probably will not do 
that. 
Does the committee not give notice so a tax 
payer can present his side of the situation? 
Yes your names and the amount of the tax were 
posted on the door of the Mosque fifteen days 
before the tax was due. 
Was any publication or notice given through 
the newspapers? 
No. 
Will the same procedure be followed this 
year? 
No we will give notice in the papers or 
individually. 
What will happen if I refuse to pay you? 
The Defterdar will take your furniture from 
your house in Bournabat and sell enough to 
cover the tax. 
When will this be done? 
Within the next few days. 
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Following this conversation, Lane paid the tax under pro-
test. 53 
The conflict expressed in this encounter runs much 
deeper than the eternal desire to evade the tax man; it is 
a genuine cultural conflict. Although Turkish society was 
being revolutionized, it still moved informally, with reli-
gious overtones, and with an understood sense of obliga-
tions. The two ways of thinking expressed in this conver-
sation undoubtably were paralleled in encounters between 
53Rufus w. Lane to Samuel Honaker, 12 July 1925, RG 84, 
ER Constantinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation. 
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tobacco companies and the local authorities. This 
represented a classic, multifaceted conflict: a western, 
individualistic, legalistic view of man clashed with an 
eastern, communal, traditional view of society.54 
Though very real conflicts existed, the highest-
ranking American diplomats in Turkey often understated the 
severity of problems to the State Deparment. As Admiral 
Bristol once wrote to Secretary of State Hughes: 
the difficulties encountered every now and then 
are not different in degree from those diff i-
cul ties to which, during the Sultan's regime, 
they [American interests in Turkey] had become 
accustomed, and • • • the Turkish authorities in 
settling these difficulties have been found to be 
reasonable and well disposed.55 
An Alston Tobacco employee concurred, noting that the 
difficulties of the 1920s generally stemmed from the over-
zealousness of a subordinate official and could generally 
be solved by going higher up the administrative ladder.56 
Whether problems were great or small, the American tobacco 
companies frequently turned to their official representa-
tives for support. The response of the American government 
to these difficulties varied according to the request made 
54Robinson, First Turkish Republic, pp. 39-62. 
55Bristol to Hughes, 8 December 1923, PRUS 1923, 2, 
1150-51. 
56H. w. Harvey (Alston Tobacco) to J. V. A. MacMurray 
(Ambassador}, 17 March 1936, RG 84, ER Istanbul, NA, file 
610.1 survey of American Interests. 
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by the tobacco company involved. In relatively minor 
cases, such as the school tax incident, a company informed 
consular officers of a problem, but did not request 
official action. In more serious cases, e.g., the Alston 
closure, a company requested immediate representation by an 
American diplomat or consular official. In both types of 
cases the American State and Commerce Department officers 
in Turkey served the tobacco companies' interests well; 
when necessary, Admiral Bristol used the full authority of 
his office in support of the American tobacco interests. 
American tobacco companies faced problems that ranged 
from the serious to the ridiculous. As an example of the 
latter, w. H. Day of Standard Commercial wrote to Admiral 
Bristol about a case involving his company's attempt to 
ship 300 kilograms of tobacco from Istanbul to Hamburg, 
Germany. It took from 11 May to 17 May 1926 for the 
Turkish officials to decide how to administer the export 
tax on this transaction. On 18 May they determined that a 
2.5% tax would suffice. Then, stamps proving payment of 
the tax, which amounted to LT 4191.30, had to be attached 
to the shipment's invoice. Unfortunately, the only stamps 
available were of very small denominations, mostly one and 
two liras with only a few tens. It took seven men from 
10:00 in the morning to 7:00 in the evening to attach the 
hundreds of stamps to the invoice, which finally measured 
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almost five feet wide by over four feet high. The invoice 
was finally approved, but the Turks requested that this 
bureaucratic nightmare not be sent with the tobacco to 
Europe, fearing the ridicule that it obviously deserved.57 
As Day pessimistically remarked in his letter to Bristol: 
I believe that you will readily see that a 
continuation as [conditions] exist at present can 
only result in the eventual complete destruction 
of commerce. The papers are full of contra-
dictory announcements concerning the application 
of the [export] tax and the city is full of 
rumours. All merchants are hesitant about 
shipping and I am informed that many ships that 
usually leave here with full cargoes are now 
leaving with no cargo whatsoever. 
For your further confidential information we 
have not purchased neither do we intend to 
purchase any tobaccos of the 1925 crop.58 
Though one 1927 consular report names Standard Commercial 
57w. H. Day (Standard commercial) to Mark L. Bristol, 
26 May 1926, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, file 851.2 
Taxation. This inefficiency contrasts sharply with the 
official Turkish account of the orderly and sane conditions 
resulting from Ataturk's reforms. The Turk Tarihi Tetkik 
Cemiyeti (Society for the Research of Turkish History) had 
the self-proclaimed mission of bringing "Turkish national 
history into the light of truth." (Gesellschaft zur Erfor-
schung, Geschichte, p. 328) In its 1935 Geschichte der 
Turkischen Republic, the society published before-and-after 
photographs of a land registry off ice in order to represent 
Turkey's pre-revolutionary chaos and post-revolutionary 
efficiency. Presumably, reality in Turkey was somewhere 
between Day's despair and the society's sycophancy. 
58Day to Bristol, 26 May 1926, RG 84, ER Constantinople, 
NA, file 851.2 Taxation. 
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as an exporter from Izmir,59 there are no State or commerce 
Department records of this company buying tobacco on the 
Turkish market after 1925, though the company remained 
active in aromatic tobacco trading in other countries. 
Turkish harassment may not have been the only cause for 
Standard Commercial's departure, but it cannot be 
overlooked. 
In October 1926, Turkish officials again asked Gary 
Tobacco to pay the military transport tax, this time in the 
amount of LT 8000. Turkish officials insisted that the 
Gary office would be closed down--a la Alston--if it did 
not pay the tax immediately. Gary employee F. B. Stem 
informed the American High Commission that he had received 
orders to quit all operations in Turkey if such action were 
taken.60 There are no reports of either the Turkish threat 
or Gary's counterthreat being carried out, but the con-
flicts resulting from the changes in Turkey--especially 
the subjugation of American companies to Turkish taxation--
would not go away. 
Uncertainty concerning the fate of the Turco-American 
Treaty of Amity and Commerce also plagued American tobacco 
59John Corrigan, Jr., "Tobacco Industry of Smyrna," 
Report No. 34, 1 June 1927, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 
861.33 Field Crops-Tobacco, p. 25. 
60selin to Treat, 22 October 1926, RG 84, ER Constan-
tinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation. 
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companies in Turkey during this time. Despite the 
consistent support that the American high commission in 
Turkey provided the tobacco companies in coping with the 
far-reaching changes in Turkey and the occasional 
harassment, the lack of formal Turkish-American relations 
impeded the companies' work, as mentioned before. From the 
signing of the treaty in August 1923 until the Senate's 
action on the treaty in 1927, the State Department worked 
hard in support of the treaty's ratification,61 and state 
Department officers in Turkey and the United States called 
upon men in the tobacco trade for assistance in this 
effort. 
President Calvin Cooldidge submitted the treaty to the 
Senate on 3 May 1924,62 and both pro and con forces 
marshalled information and troops. The tobacco companies 
joined other commercial interests, missionary groups, and 
educators in Turkey in providing statements in favor of the 
treaty. With this ammunition in hand, Secretary of state 
Hughes told William E. Borah, chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, that "it is the unanimous 
opinion of the Americans who have interests in Turkey, 
61Trask, U.S. Response, pp. 240-5. 
62rbid., p. 36. 
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whether philanthropic or commercial, that the ratification 
of the Treaty is of the highest importance.n63 
The treaty did not, however, receive unanimous support 
in the United States. Opponents of the treaty had a full 
arsenal of powerful arguments. The treaty failed to 
require the new Turkish regime to accept any responsibility 
for the massacres of Armenians that the ottoman government 
had supposedly committed during World War I; indeed it 
included no mention of the Armenian question. The treaty 
did not address the question of minority rights, as the 
Allied-Turkish treaty had. It accepted Ataturk's abolition 
of the capitulations and restrictions on church and 
missionary work in Turkey.64 Prominent foes of the treaty 
included Armenian-Americans, Episcopal bishops, and Senator 
William H. King of Utah, who were more vocal and more 
effective than the treaty's proponents.65 
Though no action was taken on the treaty in 1924--
indeed it never left the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
--it remained a controversial political issue. The 
Democrats condemned it in their 1924 presidential plat-
63oeNovo, American Interests, p. 160. 
64Gordon, American Relations, pp. 210-1. 
65Trask, U.S. Response, p. 37-40. 
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form,6 6 lending weight to the belief that the treaty was 
not opposed so much for its content, but for its domestic 
political relevance. Democrats, in a move intended to 
damage the Coolidge administration, used the "Terrible 
Turk" stereotype to support their rejection of the 
treaty.67 
The treaty remained in committee for most of 1925. It 
was reported out, but the Senate returned it to committee 
after only three weeks. Meanwhile, a new round of informa-
tion and support-gathering began under the new Secretary of 
State, Frank B. Kellogg.68 Meanwhile, in 1925 several 
internal disturbances rocked Turkey. Kurdish revolts in 
the southeast led to the government's assumption of 
dictatorial powers in March. The central government also 
had to act quickly to quash conservative groups that 
opposed the Ankara regime's reforms. The brief life of a 
second political party--opposing Ataturk's Republican 
People's Party--was snuffed out in June.69 None of these 
disturbances affected American tobacco buying, but they 
66Ibid., pp. 158-9. 
·G1rbid. pp. 37-45. 
68Kellogg became Secretary of State in March 1925 fol-
lowing the Hughes's resignation. DeNovo, American Interests, 
pp. 161-2; Trask, U.S. Response, pp. 37-45. 
69shaw, Reform, pp. 380-1. 
underscored the fact that American companies were still 
without the protection of formal Turkish-American 
diplomatic relations if they needed them. 
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On 29 January 1926 the Senate committee finally recom-
mended the treaty to the full Senate. Fearing that ratifi-
cation was not imminent, however, Secretary of State 
Kellogg requested Bristol to negotiate a "modus vivendi" 
· with the Turkish government that provided for mutual most-
favored-nation treatment in commercial matters. Kellogg 
felt that a temporary agreement on commercial matters was 
necessary even though the treaty would have provided the 
most-favored-nation status. Bristol fulfilled Kellogg's 
request by an exchange of notes with Turkish Foreign 
Minister Tevfik Rushtu Aras in February 1926. 70 
Kellogg's fears were soundly based as the Senate did 
not take up debate on the treaty before adjournment. 
Instead, discussion was scheduled for December 1926. This 
prompted Grew, in his capacity of acting secretary of 
state,71 to ask Bristol to seek an extension of the 
February commercial modus vivendi. In advising Bristol how 
70 Bristol to Tewfik Rouchdi [Tevfik Rushtu Aras] 
(Minister for Foreign Affairs), 17 (18?) February 1926, 
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1926 (2 vols., Washington, 1938), 2, 999 (hereafter 
cited as FRUS 1926); DeNovo, American Interests, p. 162. 
71Grew, the Undersecretary of State, assumed the duties 
of Secretary when Kellogg was away. 
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to parry any Turkish rebukes or threats for the slow 
progress on the treaty, Grew told the high commissioner to 
emphasize Turkey's economic interest in maintaining good 
relations with the United States. 
For example, you should point out that should our 
fig and tobacco markets be open to the products 
of Turkey on less favorable terms than at the 
present time, the economic consequences in Turkey 
could not fail to be other than unfortunate.72 
Leading State Department officers had reason to 
believe that American firms in Turkey needed the protection 
of these interim agreements, as some of the negative 
aspects of Turkish nationalism continued to vex American 
operations. In fact, local Turkish authorities shut down 
Alston company's Istanbul office in 1926 "because [the 
Americans] had not ratified the treaty of Lausanne 11 73 (see 
p. 98). Even more serious, the London Times reported that 
"there are Turks • • . who declare that they are 
determined to oust the foreigner even at the cost of 
national prosperity. 11 74 
In 1926, the tobacco men intensified their efforts in 
72Grew (Acting Secretary of State) to Bristol, 24 June 
1926, FRUS 1926, 2, 981-3. 
73 11Taxing Americans in Turkey," Times, 29 January 1926, 
p. 11, col. e. 
74 11Foreign Trading in Turkey," Times, 20 March 1926, p. 
11, col. a. 
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support of the treaty.75 Employees of American tobacco 
companies in Turkey--including I. c. Gary, F. B. stem, and 
F. W. Bell of Gary Tobacco and w. P. Johnston and P. E. 
King of Alston Tobacco--signed a petition in support of 
ratification that was sent to the secretary of state in 
January.76 In the United states, standard Commercial 
Trading Company, Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company, and 
Lorillard Tobacco Company were just a few of the groups 
that signed another petition in favor of the treaty and 
sent it to the Senate in Apri1.77 The American tobacco 
manufacturers with extensive interests in Turkey obviously 
believed that the treaty was in their best interest. 
Likewise, the State Department intensified its 
efforts. Undersecretary of State Joseph c. Grew gave one 
senator a list of reasons why the treaty should be rati-
fied, including the statement that all the Americans in 
Turkey wanted ratification: 
They see no reason why the work to which they and 
their predecessors have given many years of 
75oeNovo, American Interests, pp. 162-5; Grew, Turbulent 
Era, 1, 674-81. 
76council on Turkish-American Relations, "The Treaty 
With Turkey, Why It Should Be Ratified," pp. 70-4. 
77oeNovo, American Interests, pp. 163-4. 
effort should be lightly thrown overboard by the 
failure of ratification.78 
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Though this sentiment was true for the tobacco interests, 
the State Department may have gone beyond the bounds of 
discretion in obtaining evidence of the tobacco industry's 
support for the treaty. Admiral Bristol asked Charles E. 
Allen, the American consul in Istanbul, to write a letter 
of support for the treaty for the use of F. B. Stem, the 
vice-president of Gary Tobacco. An abbreviated, but almost 
verbatim version of Allen's letter appeared as a letter 
bearing Stem's signature in the pamphlet "The Treaty with 
Turkey: Why it Should Be Ratified. 117 9 In June 1926 the 
council on Turkish-American Relations gave this tract to 
78Grew to Senator Charles Curtis, 20 May 1926, FRUS 
1926, 2, 980. 
79Allen's 11-page document began: "I have known Turkey 
for years under both the Young Turks and the Republican 
regimes. Being in the business of buying tobacco and pre-
paring it for export to the United States I have been 
forced to come into contact with every class of the popula-
tion from the peasant who grows the tobacco up through the 
merchant class to the government official." Stem's only 
change in the beginning of his 3-page document was to 
quantify his years in Turkey by including a "fourteen." 
Allen concluded: "I can see only two alternatives open to 
us: ratification and the consequent assumption of a position 
of equality with the other powers; or a complete rupture 
of relations for which there is not the slightest justif ica-
tion." Stem evidently agreed, he left Allen's version 
unchanged. Council on Turkish-American Relations, "The 
Treaty With Turkey, Why It Should Be Ratified," (New York, 
1926), p. 98-100; memo, Charles E. Allen, 1 May 1926, RG 
84, CGR Constantinople, NA, file 710 Political Relations-
Treaties. 
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every senator and congressman and to 220 newspaper editors 
around the country.BO Although the letter contained Stem's 
real sentiments regarding the treaty, Allen's authorship 
demonstrates a questionable degree of collusion among the 
pro-treaty forces. 
After much maneuvering (and much delay), the Turco-
American Treaty of Amity and Commerce came up for debate in 
the United States Senate in December 1926. The same argu-
ments for and against the treaty that had been bandied 
about since 1923 were heard once more. Pro-Armenian 
pressure groups played on "emotional and uncritical 
prejudices" in their opposition to the treaty.Bl 
Democratic Senator King denounced the treaty and called for 
an inquiry, charging that the primary advisors of the 
American diplomats at Lausanne "were agents of oil and 
tobacco interests," and that these interests were behind 
the sellout of Christians in Turkey that this treaty 
constitutea.82 
80DeNovo, American Interests, p. 164. 
81Ibid., p. 166. 
82"Asks an Inquiry on Lausanne Deal: Senator King Says 
'Oil and Tobacco' Interests Forced the Cabinet to Accept 
Compact," New York Times, 24 December 1926, p. 4, col. 1. 
King's Senate resolution calling for an inquiry may be 
found in Congressional Record, 69 Cong., 2 Sess., 68, pt. 
1, 910-1. 
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Finally, on 18 January 1927--three and one-half years 
after being signed--the treaty came to a vote. one Farmer-
Labor, five Democratic, and forty-four Republican Senators 
voted for the treaty. One Republican and thirty-four Demo-
cratic Senators voted against it. Although this consti-
tuted an absolute majority of the votes cast, the count was 
six votes short of obtaining the two-thirds majority 
necessary to ratify a treaty. Partisan politics defeated a 
treaty that was both grounded in economic and political 
realities, and beneficial to American commercial 
interests.83 As a result, Turkish-American relations 
remained uncertain. 
In conclusion, the period from 1924-26 presented 
numerous challenges to American participants in the 
Turkish tobacco trade. Many of these complications did not 
arise from planned Turkish reforms, but from spontaneous 
problems with local authorities. The rapid development of 
some minor conflicts into crises threatening the entire 
operations of a tobacco company demonstrated the fragility 
of the American presence in Turkey. To augment the 
security of their investments, American tobacco manufac-
turers advocated ratification of the Turkish-American 
treaty. Their support for the treaty indicated that they 
83Galbraith, "Smyrna Disaster," p. 103; Trask, U.S. 
Response, pp. 44-45. 
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accepted the changes in Turkey, but that they were 
convinced of the necessity of Turkish-American diplomatic 
relations. That the American tobacco companies continued 
to operate in Turkey despite these many obstacles implied 
that the Turkish-American tobacco trade represented a 
mutual economic dependency. Both sides had incentives for 
making their commercial relationship work. 
Chapter Six 
New Beginnings, 1927-29 
Not satisfied with the Senate's rejection of the 
Turkish-American treaty, the Coolidge administration 
established formal diplomatic relations with Turkey through 
executive action in February 1927. This important turning 
point in Turkish-American relations affected several 
aspects of the Turkish-American tobacco trade, but it did 
not end the problems of American tobacco companies in 
Turkey. This chapter examines the diplomatic rapprochement 
and the ongoing changes in Turkey between 1927 and 1929, 
and the tobacco companies' response to these changes. 
On 18 January 1927, the same day that the Senate 
rejected the Turkish-American treaty, Secretary of State 
Frank B. Kellogg telegraphed instructions to Admiral 
Bristol, ordering the high commissioner to assure Turkish 
Prime Minister Ismet Inonu that the United States still 
desired good relations with Turkey. Kellogg directed 
Bristol to negotiate an agreement restoring diplomatic 
129 
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relations between the two countries.1 An exchange of 
diplomatic notes at the executive level would allow Kellogg 
to bypass the Senate, as this did not require congressional 
approval. Sending and receiving ambassadors was a 
constitutional right of the president. 
On 17 February 1927, only one month after the 
disappointing Senate vote, High Commissioner Bristol and 
Turkish Foreign Minister Aras exchanged notes that 
established full diplomatic relations and prolonged the 
commercial modus vivendi of February 1926. The agreement 
regularizing diplomatic relations stated that the 
"essential provisions of the Turkish-American treaty 
shall constitute the basis for the treatment, which • • . 
shall be accorded the nationals of the United States of 
America in the territory of Turkey. 112 Thus, the Coolidge 
administration obtained many of the defeated treaty's 
benefits while circumventing the domestic political 
opposition that had wrecked the treaty itself. While some 
of the same voices that had opposed the treaty in the 
lKellogg to Bristol, 18 January 1927, Papers Relating 
to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1927 (3 vols., 
Washington, 1942), 3, 766-8 (hereafter cited as FRUS 1927). 
2Bristol to Rouschdy (Aras], 17 February 1927, FRUS 
1927, 3, 794-5. 
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United States spoke out loudly against the new agreement, 
in general it was well-received.3 
In his February 1927 telegraph to the high commis-
sioner, Secretary Kellogg also ordered Bristol to inform 
Inonu that the economic interests of both Turkey and the 
United States required reciprocity in commercial matters. 
In particular, Kellogg instructed Bristol to caution Inonu 
that the president of the United States could retaliate 
against Turkish restrictions on American goods. Bristol 
was to say, indirectly, that the best targets for retali-
atory measures were the most important Turkish exports of 
figs and tobacco.4 Of these two products, tobacco was the 
more important as it comprised almost 50% of direct 
American imports from Turkey in 1927 (see Table 3), while 
figs and raisins together accounted for only 7%.5 
Bristol's velveted message emphasized the tobacco trade's 
larger importance. 
Indeed, the aromatic tobacco was important in several 
ways. Tobacco was by far Turkey's most valuable export, 
and by 1929, the tobacco monopoly provided almost 10% of 
3Trask, U.S. Response, pp. 52-3. 
4Kellogg to Bristol, 18 January 1927, FRUS 1927, 3, 
766-8. 
5Kazdal, "Trade Relations," p. 63. 
132 
the Turkish regime's income.6 In the united States, taxes 
on cigarettes provided the federal government with more 
than $900 million in revenues from 1927-29, and the states 
took in another $27 million in tax revenues.7 Most of the 
cigarettes so taxed contained aromatic tobacco. In addi-
tion, import duties on aromatic leaf from Turkey brought in 
$14 million during this period. Again, these figures do 
not consider the economic consequences of the indirect 
tobacco trade, which equalled the direct trade's volume,8 
nor the hundreds of thousands of jobs provided by the 
tobacco industry in Turkey and the United States. This 
broad, well-recognized importance made the tobacco trade a 
diplomatic concern yet again in this period. 
In May 1927, President Coolidge named Joseph c. Grew 
as the ambassador to Turkey, succeeding High Commissioner 
Bristol as the highest-ranking American representative 
there.9 one of Grew's immediate concerns was commercial 
6Hershlag, Turkey, pp. 51, 68. 
7The federal tax on cigarettes at this time was $.06 per 
pack. The Tobacco Institute, The Tax Burden on Tobacco, 
Historical Compilation, vol. 19 (Washington, 1984), pp. 3-8. 
8corrigan, "Tobacco Industry of Smyrna," Report No. 34, 
1 June 1927, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, Supplement, NA, file 861.33 
Field Crops-Tobacco, p. 25. 
9The appointment of Grew--career diplomat, signer of 
the 1923 treaty, and persistent advocate of better Turkish-
American relations--boded well for American standing in 
Turkey. Trask, U.S. Response, pp. 54-60. 
relations. In lieu of a commercial agreement between 
Turkey and the United States--something the 1923 treaty 
would have provided--it was necessary to maintain the 
commercial modus vivendi which provided mutual most-
favored-nation trading status. Grew negotiated an 
extension of this agreement, for the period May 1928 to 
April 1929,lO but this limited life-span meant that the 
problem of yet another extension would appear within 
months. The question whether Turks or Americans should 
broach the subject of negotiations on commercial matters 
was a sensitive one. If Turkey did not take the initia-
tive, the United States would be left in a "hat-in-hand" 
posture that Grew wanted to avoid of asking for an 
arrangement.11 
133 
Grew wrote to Secretary Kellogg that Turkish Foreign 
Minister Aras had good reasons to open negotiations on 
commercial relations. The United States was the largest 
buyer of Turkish goods and the balance of trade between the 
two countries favored Turkey heavily. Any disruption of 
the Americaan trade would harm Turkey. Without the tobacco 
trade, neither of these would have been true. At the same 
lOpapers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United 
States. 1928, (3 vols., Washington, 1942-43), 3, 950-4 
(hereafter cited as FRUS 1928). 
llTrask, U.S. Response, p. 110. 
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time Grew pointed out why Aras might not be inclined to 
open negotiations. If the modus vivendi lapsed, Turkish 
law would automatically increase duties on American imports 
into Turkey. If this occurred, however, the United States' 
willingness to respond with retaliatory tariffs on Turkish 
goods was questionable. Grew wrote: 
The American tobacco interests alone would 
doubtless have something to say on this subject. 
If the Turkish Government is aware of this 
situation, there might be no great incentive to 
induce Turkey to take the initiative in the 
matter under discussion.12 
In the fall of 1928, to Grew's relief, Aras requested 
negotiations for a commercial treaty.13 Kellogg countered 
by proposing an indefinite extension of the commercial 
modus vivendi. As the reason for this move, Kellogg noted 
that lingering domestic political conflicts made Senate 
ratification of a treaty difficult. Kellogg argued for 
Turkish acceptance of his plan, stating again the 
importance of the American trade to the Turks and 
emphasizing the American president's legal ability to 
retaliate against any country discriminating against 
American commerce.14 
12Grew to Kellogg, 12 September 1928, FRUS 1928, 3, 
958-60. 
4. 
13Grew to Kellogg, 2 October 1928, FRUS 1928, 3, 961. 
14Kellogg to Grew, 26 December 1928, FRUS 1928, 3, 962-
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Both countries wished to protect their commercial 
interests and in formulating their negotiating positions, 
both countries perceived the tobacco trade as an effective 
weapon in their respective arsenals. Turkey would suffer 
from tariffs imposed against its tobacco. On the other 
hand, tobacco interests in America might make the 
imposition of such tariffs politically impossible. The 
tobacco trade was a double-edged diplomatic sword which was 
better left sheathed. Recognition of this fact, along with 
a new willingness in the Senate to view favorably a simple 
commercial treaty with Turkey, led to renewed treaty 
negotiations in 1929, despite the rejection of ratification 
by the Senate as recently as 1927.15 
These negotiations led to the signing of a commercial 
treaty on 1 October 1929, 16 providing additional diplomatic 
support for the tobacco trade. The new treaty provided 
most-favored-nation status for customs and other duties. 
Some provisions of the treaty were open to different 
interpretations. Article I, for example, mandated 
taxation of foreign companies on the same basis as native 
companies. The Turks interpreted this article as not 
15Trask, U.S. Response, pp. 110-1. 
16Text of the treaty found in Paoers Relating to the 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1929, (3 vols., 
Washington, 1943-44), 3, 838-40 (hereafter cited as FRUS 
1929) • 
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applying to taxes on profits and incomes of foreign firms. 
Though these taxes were conceivably included in Article I 
by the phrase "other duties and charges affecting 
commerce, 11 17 Ambassador Grew accepted the Turkish 
interpretation. This gave the Turks a degree of liberty in 
taxing American corporations operating in Turkey, that 
became an important concession in view of later events. 
Both the State Department and tobacco interests, however, 
considered this treaty necessary. Some of the same groups 
that opposed the 1923 treaty spoke out again in 1930, but 
as Grew later put it, "by that time the Armenians • • • had 
shot their bolt. 11 18 After extensive lobbying by the State 
Department, the Senate ratified the commercial treaty 
without debate on 17 February 1930. This marked another 
new beginning, as it was the first approved treaty between 
Turkey and the United States since the 1917 break in 
relations. 
This period witnessed another new beginning as well. 
For the first time, each of the four major American tobacco 
manufacturers had active subsidiaries in Turkey with no 
other serious American competitors operating there. In 
December 1927, the Big Four all maintained offices in Izmir 
17FRUS 1929, 3, 841-2. 
18Trask, U.S. Response, p. 114. 
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to buy tobacco: Alston represented P. Lorillard; Gary, 
Liggett & Myers; American of the Orient, American Tobacco; 
and Glenn, R. J. Reynolds.19 One American tobacco journal 
reported that these firms collectively bought from 17 to 22 
million pounds of tobacco there each year. Three of these 
companies purchased from 6.5 to 9 million pounds around 
Samsun,20 where they employed ten American tobacco buyers 
in 1927.21 This new beginning, however, was not a conse-
quence of renewed Turkish-American diplomatic relations and 
the security these ties represented. Rather, it repre-
sented the culmination of gradual changes over more than a 
decade, ~uring which the subsidiary buying agent system had 
proven itself economically. 
In contrast to the effect of diplomacy on American 
buying of Turkish tobacco, the renewal of diplomatic ties 
affected Turkey's manipulating role in the Turkish-American 
tobacco trade. In 1927 three American firms employed 3500 
19rrcrop Prospects in Turkey," TMCA, no. 108 (1927): 9. 
20In general, these companies sent 75% of their Turkish 
purchases to America, discarding the remainder as unfit or 
reselling it to buyers who did not demand leaf of a high 
quality--mostly Europeans. "The Tobacco Industry of Smyrna," 
TMCA, no. 113 (1927): 9; "Turkish Tobacco," TMCA, no. 166 
(1928): 8. 
2lrrcrop Prospects in Turkey," TMCA, no. 108 (1927): 9. 
The Glenn Company had no permanent employees in Samsun. Ed 
Leight, interview with author, Walkertown, NC, November 1985. 
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workers for manipulation in Izmir,22 but new manipulation 
facilities there were essential. Existing structures were 
unsatisfactory makeshift buildings, lacking proper ventila-
tion, lighting, and sanitary conditions.23 These poor 
conditions resulted from two factors: the ongoing shortage 
of buildings since the 1922 fire, and an American unwil-
lingness to construct new buildings given the "uncertain-
ties of experimental tax legislation. 11 24 Following the 
renewal of diplomatic ties, however, two American companies 
made plans to build their own warehouses and manipulation 
plants in Izmir. Thus, as one consular pointed out, 
diplomatic initiatives did have an effect on the tobacco 
trade. The regularization of relations strengthened 
22corrigan, "Tobacco Industry of Smyrna," Report No. 
34, 1 June 1927, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, Supplement, NA, file 
861.33 Field crops-Alkaloid Plants, p. 14. 
23This presents a sharp contrast to a November 1923 
report in which H. G. McMillan, a Commerce Department officer 
in Turkey, reported that magazines where tobacco was proces-
sed and stored were "very clean, orderly and the work 
systematically directed." H. G. McMillan (Clerk to Trade 
commissioner, Istanbul), "Smyrna Tobacco," Special Report 
No. 39, 14 November 1923, RG 84, ER Constantinople, 861.33 
Field Crops-Tobacco. 
24American companies had other concerns as well; as 
late as 1927 most of them still carried war-risk insurance 
on their property and tobacco in Izmir. 
American companies' faith in Turkey as a site of the 
manipulation industry.25 
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But renewed diplomatic ties may not receive all of 
credit for this industry's gradual return to Izmir, because 
conditions in Trieste were influential as well. For in-
stance, a 1927 currency revaluation in Italy made the 
Italian lira more expensive for Americans. The Italian 
Fascists opposed American companies' attempts to lower 
wages in response to this change. Increased shipping 
costs,26 warehouse rental rates, and Magazzini Generali 
fees all contributed to making Trieste less attractive.27 
These factors did not immediately drive American firms out 
of Italy; American of the Orient and Alston still 
manipulated tobacco in Trieste, and Gary stored tobacco 
there in 1927.28 American shipments from Izmir to Trieste 
25corrigan, "Tobacco Industry of Smyrna," Report No. 
34, 1 June 1927, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, Supplement, NA, file 
861.33 Field Crops-Tobacco, p. 14. 
26shipping to America via Trieste was generally handled 
by Italian shipping firms, whereas, according to Dick English, 
American bottoms carried most of the shipments directly from 
Turkey. "Trieste Leaf Exports to America Increase," USTJ, 
vol. 109, no. 3 (1927): 39. 
27 11Trieste Leaf Exports to America Increase," USTJ, 
vol. 109, no. 3 (1927): 39; "Trieste Tobacco Receipts 
Decline," USTJ, vol. 109, no. 22 (1928): 27. 
28Bowman, "Annual Review of Commerce and Industries in 
the Trieste Consular District," 5 February 1929, RG 84, CPR 
Trieste, NA, file 600 Commercial Relations; Bowman, "Summary 
Value of Declared Exports at Trieste," 4 January 1930, RG 
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increased through 1927,29 and in that year, $6 million 
worth of the Turkish tobacco shipped to Italy was actually 
destined for the United States.30 But Trieste's economic 
boom of the mid-twenties was almost at an end.31 Shipments 
of tobacco from Trieste to the United States reached their 
peak in 1927, and generally declined thereafter (see Table 
7).32 Ultimately, economic considerations determined 
where and how American tobacco manufacturers did business. 
American tobacco companies demonstrated their reborn 
faith in Turkey as a target of investment. Tobacco compa-
nies' holdings made up 20% of all American investment in 
commercial and industrial enterprises in Turkey by mid-
84, CPR Trieste, NA, file 600 Commercial Relations. 
29correspondingly, Corrigan cited a decrease from 1925 
to 1927 in invoiced tobacco exports from Izmir to America. 
John Corrigan, Jr., "Annual Declared Export Return of the 
consulate at Smyrna, Turkey, for the Calendar Year 1927," 1 
January 1928, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 600 Commercial 
Relations. 
30 11Turks Will Exploit Their Tobacco Here," USTJ, vol. 
112, no. 20 (1929): 37. 
31 11Trieste To-Day," Times 24 December 1927, p. 7, col. 
a. The Times reported incorrectly that most of the American 
companies had left Trieste by 1927. 
32shipments from Turkey to Trieste decreased dramati-
cally after 1926. (Kazdal, "Trade Relations," p. 203). 
But this was not solely due to changes in American shipping 
habits. The creation of a large tobacco trust in Germany 
in 1927 also influenced Trieste's trade because the trust 
began importing aromatic tobacco through Hamburg and de-
creased shipments through Trieste. "The Manipulation of 
Eastern Tobacco in Trieste," USTJ, no. 304 (1931): 1-2. 
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1929. This included $100,000 apiece for Alston and 
American of the Orient, and $500,000 for Gary. In the 
first half of 1929, Gary bought a building valued at 
$450,000 for manipulating and storing tobacco in Izmir.33 
The speculation that American tobacco firms would make 
large investments in Turkey after the restoration of 
diplomatic relations became reality. Gary's purchase was a 
manifestation of faith. 
One should note, however, the words that Franklin w. 
Bell of Gary Tobacco wrote to Admiral Bristol in February 
1922. Less than five months after the fire ravaged Izmir, 
Bell stated: "It is our plan to continue manipulation at 
Izmir so long as it is possible for us to do so. 11 34 This 
same Bell was still in Istanbul in 1929. 35 Full diplomatic 
relations had not triggered the incentive or willingness to 
invest in Turkey, as they had been there all along. In the 
end, the effect of the improved diplomatic relations must 
33Memo, K. Carlson, "A Study of the Economic Life of 
Turkey," n.d., March 1930, RG 84, ER Constantinople, NA, 
file 850 Turkey-Economic Life of; v. Hall (Clerk, Izmir), 
"Survey of American Interests," 14 October 1933, RG 84, CPR 
Izmir, NA, file 610 Trade Extension, p. 9. 
34Bell to Bristol, 3 February 1923, RG 84, ER Constan-
tinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation. 
35Memo of conversation between Ambassador Grew and 
Franklin w. Bell, n.d., 1930, RG 84, ER Angora, Correspon-
dence, NA, file 350 Claims. 
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be considered in conjunction with the economic factors that 
played a role in Gary's decision. 
Of course, since diplomacy was not the only factor 
affecting the Turkish-American tobacco trade, the 
consequences of the Turkish government's reforms must also 
be analyzed. The efforts of Ataturk's government had no 
more effect than Turkish-American diplomatic relations had 
had, and both appeared rather insignificant in comparison 
to the role of market forces. Supposedly, the Turkish 
tobacco monopoly exercised "rigid control" over the tobacco 
trade in 1927 by supervising all phases of tobacco 
cultivation, transportation, manufacture and sale,36 but 
this control was dubious at best. For example, the 
financial condition of tobacco growers remained desparate, 
in part because the government failed to alleviate the 
growers' chronic indebtedness. Despite a seventeenfold 
increase in loans by the Agricultural Bank since 1922,37 
the republic was incapable of stabilizing tobacco produc-
36corrigan, "Tobacco Industry of Smyrna," Report No. 
34, 1 June 1927, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, Supplement, NA, file 
861.33 Field Crops-Tobacco, p. 15. 
37The Ottoman government established the Agricultural 
Bank in 1888 as an organ of the central government. In 
1923, the republican regime re-organized the bank as a 
joint-stock company. In 1926 the government instructed the 
Agricultural Bank to organize agricultural credit coopera-
tives on the village level. The bank was reconstituted as· 
a government institution in 1937. Robinson, First Turkish 
Republic, pp. 105, 107. 
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tion by ensuring adequate financing.38 Growers in 1927 
were still at the mercy of usurers who frequently were the 
head men of the villages.39 
The Turkish government's ineffectiveness is especially 
glaring when compared to the effect that Americans had on 
the Izmir tobacco market in 1927. Normally, the tobacco 
merchants and American exporting companies began buying 
directly from growers on an agreed upon date in late 
September, by which time the majority of the crop was 
harvested and cured. The 1927 market, however, was not 
normal. Edward M. Yantis, the manager of Gary Tobacco in 
Izmir, initiated a bidding war by secretly instructing his 
agents to begin buying on Sunday, 21 August, at a price of 
40 piasters per pound, 10 piasters above the average price 
of production.40 Telegraphed reports that Gary buyers had 
made extensive purchases reached the other American firms 
in the evening of the same day. Feeling cheated and 
deceived, the rival companies immediately joined the fray 
and instructed buying agents to top Gary's opening offers. 
The frenzied competition drove prices to 48 piasters in a 
38Hershlag, Turkey, p. 56. 
39corrigan, "Tobacco Industry of Smyrna," Report No. 
34, 1 June 1927, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, Supplement, NA, file 
861.33 Field Crops-Tobacco, p. 11. 
40100 piasters equal 1 lira. The average rate of ex-
change during 1927 was TL 1 = $.51. Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
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few days, 83 piasters in a few weeks, and to as much as 107 
piasters per pound for some tobacco. These inflated prices 
were for crops still growing in the fields. Growers were 
delighted, obviously, and a local paper praised Yantis "as 
a man with the brain power required for one of Napoleon's 
marshals." But this sweet harvest soon turned sour. 
In the Izmir region many growers who had sold their 
crops in the field, did not put great effort into timely 
harvesting, carefully curing, or selectively sorting their 
tobacco. Instead, they delivered much unripened, poorly 
dried leaf to the purchasers, a portion of which was rain 
and disease damaged. The entire crop was regarded as 
inferior; as much as 25% of it was damaged. Naturally, 
the foreign buyers, and especially the Americans who 
demanded the highest grades of tobacco, would not pay for 
inferior goods and returned the low quality leaf to the 
growers. The growers demanded the agreed upon price for 
their entire crop, waste and all. 
Some growers were angry and defiant, and their 
reactions were overtly nationalistic. In Akhisar, inland 
from Izmir, the vice-president of the local branch of the 
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"Ti.irk Ocagi" (Turkish Hearth organization)41 made a radical 
speech, exhorting the tobacco growers to action: 
Farmers, you know that the American tobacco 
companies must have your tobacco. Are you men? 
Are you Turks? If the foreigners do not take it, 
let us drive them out of our country. You have 
guns; don't you know how to use them? Prove that 
you are Turks.42 
Ambassador Grew relayed this information to Secretary 
Kellogg, but he downplayed the threat to American 
interests. Statements such as the above did not represent 
the official views of "Ti.irk Ocagi," wrote Grew, and the 
American tobacco firms in Izmir had not even notified their 
superiors in Istanbul of any problems. Grew said, however, 
that anti-foreign sentiments existed, caused by the unusual 
1927 tobacco market. Some growers had become suddenly 
wealthy, while others had suffered severely. These 
economic tensions did produce hostility, but this was not a 
product of sanctioned forms of Turkish nationalism.43 
4l"Ti.irk ocagi" was a social and cultural society 
founded in 1912 which espoused Turkish nationalism. Heyd, 
Founda-
tions, pp. 34-5; Shaw, Reform, pp. 301, 375-6. 
42John Corrigan, Jr. to Joseph c. Grew (Ambassador), 12 
November 1927, OS 867.61331/10, M353, 66/1293. 
43corrigan to Grew 12 November 1927, OS 867.61331/10, 
M353, 66/1293; John Corrigan, Jr., "Tobacco Market of 
Smyrna," 15 November 1927, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, Supplement, NA 
861.33 Field Crops-Tobacco, pp. 2-3; Joseph c. Grew to 
Secretary of state (Kellogg), 21 November 1927, OS 
867.61331/10, M353, 66/1288-90. 
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Thus, American participation was a dominant factor in 
the Turkish tobacco market, and in 1927 certainly more 
influential than the Turkish government's efforts. Rivalry 
among American companies affected not only price, but also 
the quality of the tobacco crop. The American presence, in 
this instance, also brought out the destructive side of 
Turkish nationalism. 
The heavy demand for aromatic tobacco in 1927 was the 
result of several factors. Shortages in Greece in 1926 
made American manufacturers seek compensation in the 1927 
crops.44 Stocks of aromatic leaf in America dropped to 
dangerously low levels in 1926 as cigarette consumption in 
the United States steadily increased. 45 The Turkish 
tobacco market of 1927 shows that improvements in the 
American cigarette market did not imply improvement in the 
lot of the Turkish tobacco farmer. Turkish tobacco 
production reached a record 153 million pounds in 1927, but 
due to the volume and the relatively low quality of the 
44Raymond A. Hare, "Analysis of Declared Export Return 
for 1926," 11 April 1927, RG 84, CGR Constantinople, NA, file 
600 Commercial Relations. 
45This is a possible explanation for the exceptionally 
high tobacco imports from Turkey and Trieste in 1927. 
Bowman, "Annual Review of Commerce and Industries in the 
Trieste Consular District," 5 February 1929, RG 84, CPR 
Trieste, NA, file 600 Commercial Relations. 
crop, and despite the initial flurry of buying, many 
growers could not cover their costs of production.46 
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Ataturk was re-elected president of the Turkish 
Republic in November 1927,47 and his program of reforms 
continued. Of direct relevance to the tobacco industry was 
a program begun by the tobacco monopoly in 1927. A 
technical bureau sponsored by the monopoly gave instruction 
in seed selection and provided free seeds to growers. The 
farmers that followed the monopoly's growing advice sold 
the seed they produced back to the monopoly, which then 
distributed that seed to other growers.48 Other reforms 
that affected the tobacco trade less directly, but were 
nonetheless important to Turkey's integration in the 
western world, were the introduction of Arabic numerals in 
June 192849 and a Turkish alphabet based on Latin letters 
in August 1928.50 In 1928, however, none of the reforms 
46 11Review of the United States Tobacco Import Trade for 
1928," TMCA, no. 192 (1929): 2; "Notes on Countries Supplying 
United States Tobacco Imports," TMCA, no. 192 (1929): 8. 
47Gesellschaft zur Erforschung, Geschichte, p. 459. 
48John Corrigan, Jr., "Tobacco Industry of Smyrna," 
Report No. 10, 31 January 1928, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 
861.33 Field Crops-Tobacco. Hershlag reports that farmers 
often sold the free seeds they received from the government, 
but Hershlag was making a general comment not necessarily 
related to tobacco growers. Hershlag, Turkey, p. 149. 
49Gesellschaft zur Erforschung, Geschichte, p. 305. 
50ibid., pp. 317-19. 
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introduced by the Turkish government, not even the tobacco-
specific reforms of the monopoly, had a decisive influence 
on the tobacco market in producing stability or prosperity. 
Turkish growers reduced their plantings of tobacco in 
1928 by 50,000 acres--fully one quarter--from the 1927 
level, due to the poor marketing of the 1927 crop.51 The 
harmful consequences of the "embarrassingly" large crop of 
1927 demonstrate just how "uncontrolled" tobacco production 
in Turkey actually was, despite the tobacco monopoly's 
supervision.52 But the decline in production from 153 mil-
lion pounds in 1927 to 95 million in 1928 was not solely 
due to reduced planting. Much of the 1928 crop was damaged 
by "ak Damar" {white vein disease), brought on by hot north 
winds and high night-time temperatures during the growing 
season. Affected tobacco brought very low prices, below 
the cost of production, and in some districts crops failed 
completely.53 In the worst-hit areas, American buyers 
chose to forfeit the advances they had paid to growers for 
51 11Notes on Countries Supplying United States Tobacco 
Imports," TMCA, no. 192 (1929): 8. 
52 11Tobacco in Turkey," TMCA, no. 109 (1927): 6. 
53John Corrigan, "Annual Declared Export Return," 
Report No. 4, 31 December 1929, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 
600 Commercial Relations; John Corrigan, "Survey of Commerce 
and Industries During 1929 in the District of Izmir," Report 
No. 15, 31 March 1930, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 610 Trade 
Extension, p. 11. 
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options on crops, rather than to buy the damaged tobacco.54 
The 1928 tobacco crop represents proof that market forces 
and growing conditions, not Turkish nationalist efforts, 
were still the primary determinants of tobacco production. 
In 1928 only about 40% of the Izmir tobacco was of an 
acceptable American grade, that is, of a high quality, and 
American companies purchased tobacco at an average price of 
$.30 per pound. The Turkish tobacco monopoly, by compar-
ison, gave farmers $.045 per pound for the tobacco they 
could not sell elsewhere. The monopoly used this tobacco 
in its own cigarette factories or sold it in Europe.SS 
Such efforts show that the Turkish government attempted to 
carry out a social policy through the tobacco monopoly, but 
that these efforts fell far short of supporting the tobacco 
growers when the market failed them. This failure takes on 
special significance because it occurred in an industry 
supposedly under the Turkish government's "rigid control." 
The consequences of the tobacco trade's subjugation to 
free market forces became even more severe in 1929. The 
poor prices growers received for their 1928 tobacco made 
54John Corrigan, "The Tobacco Crop of the Smyrna Dis-
trict," Report No. 6, 15 January 1929, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, 
supplement, NA, file 861.33 Field Crops-Tobacco, p. 7. 
55John Corrigan, "Preliminary Survey of the Commerce and 
Industry of the Smyrna District in 1928," Report No. 20, 1 
January 1929, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 600 Commercial 
Relations. 
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them overly dependent on money lenders in 1929, who 
demanded rates from 60 to 120%. The financial difficulties 
in Izmir led to a harvest about half as big as the 1927 
crop. The same results held true for the entire country. 
Growers produced only 80 million pounds versus the 153 
million harvested in 1927.56 
As usual, the American companies were among the first 
buyers in Izmir, one of the perquisites of paying the 
highest prices. There was, however, lively competition 
between the American companies to fill their requirements, 
especially during a year of shortage such as 1929. By mid-
December American of the Orient had already purchased 7 
million pounds in Izmir; Gary, 4.8 million; and Glenn, 5.7 
million. In all, the American companies bought over 18 
million pounds of the 32 million-pound Izmir crop at an 
average price of $.66 per pound.57 
56corrigan, "Survey of Commerce and Industries During 
1929 in the District of Izmir," Report No. 15, 31 March 
1930, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 610 Trade Extension, p. 11. 
57corrigan, "Survey of Commerce and Industries During 
1929 in the District of Izmir," Report No. 15, 31 March 
1930, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, NA, file 610 Trade Extension, p. 
11; "The 1929 Smyrna Tobacco Crop," TMCA, no. 256 (1930): 
5-6; John Corrigan, "Smyrna Tobacco Crop," Report No. 67, 10 
December 1929, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, Supplement, NA, file 861.33 
Field Crops-Tobacco, p. 2, 7. The statistics for tobacco 
imports into the U.S. for 1929 are confusing. American 
consular invoices showed 6.4 million pounds shipped to the 
u.s, while official Turkish statistics report 5.2 million 
pounds of tobacco exported to the U.S., not an abnormal 
difference for these two statistics. Foreign Commerce and 
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The advantages American companies enjoyed in the 
Turkish tobacco market came not only as a result of paying 
higher prices for tobacco, but also from paying their 
Turkish employees much more than the tobacco monopoly 
could. Experts for the monopoly who scouted the tobacco as . 
it grew and provided estimates of production and crop 
damage received between 80 and 100 Turkish lira per month. 
The Turkish employees in the field for American companies 
received 200 to 1000 lira per month. Understandably, it 
was "difficult for the monopoly to retain the services of 
competent men in the face of attractive offers from private 
business. 11 58 The American tobacco companies knew the 
tobacco crops more thoroughly and could, therefore, prepare 
more effective buying strategies than their competitors. 
Navigation of the United States reports 4.2 million pounds 
imported into the U.S. in 1929. However, figures in the U.S. 
Tariff commission's "Trade Agreement Between the United 
States and the Republic of Turkey" of 1939, however, show 
that 22.5 million pounds were imported (p. 37). This is 
explained by a footnote which states: "Data revised since 
publication in Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the 
United states." There is a clear contradiction between the 
4.2 million and the 22.5 million pound figures, a contradic-
tion complicated by the fact that both sources state that the 
total value of all goods imported from Turkey into the u.s. 
in 1929 was $12.2 million (p. 19). I am at a loss to 
explain this contradiction. 
58corrigan, "The Tobacco Crop of the Smyrna District," 
Report No. 6, 15 January 1929, RG 84, CPR Smyrna, Supplement, 
NA, file 861.33 Field Crops-Tobacco, p. 3. 
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Superior personnel was crucial to success in this foreign 
market and culture. 
Despite the economic boon that the tobacco trade 
represented to Turkey, and despite the new diplomatic and 
commercial agreements that provided guarantees to American 
firms in Turkey, the tobacco companies did not receive all 
the cooperation from the Turkish government that they might 
have hoped for. Events in 1929 made this quite clear. 
American tobacco companies paid local Turkish authori-
ties taxes on prof its according to arrangements made indi-
vidually between a company and tax officials. American of 
the orient, for example, normally paid a profits tax in 
Izmir for its branches in Turkey, both in Izmir and in 
Samsun. The Samsun branch then officially notified the 
Samsun fiscal authorities of this payment. According to 
the company's charter, American of the Orient received as 
profit 6% per annum on the capital invested in Turkey for 
equipment. This capital amounted to $60,000 in 1928, 
$40,000 in Izmir and $20,000 in Samsun. Profits, then, 
would amount to $3,600 for the whole country. In other 
years Turkish authorities levied 16% of this profit as a 
small profits tax. 
American of the Orient paid the tax for 1928 in the 
usual manner, but through a "clerical oversight" failed to 
notify the Samsun authorities of this payment by the proper 
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time, March 1929. In October 1929, only days after the 
commercial treaty's signing, the local tax authorities 
served a summons for the Samsun branch of American of the 
Orient to pay LT 112,019.20 within fifteen days, or the 
company would be closed down. This sum was almost as large 
as the company's total capital investment in Turkey. One 
half of the amount represented a tax on the profits made on 
tobacco shipments for 1928, and the other half was a fine. 
The problem, as the American consul in Izmir later wrote, 
was that the Turkish authorities refused to believe that 
American companies were not making prof its similar to those 
of any other tobacco merchant, between 5 and 10% on all 
tobacco purchases. Therefore, these authorities calculated 
what they believed to be a suitable tax and ignored the 
company's charter. This, of course, was not a new problem. 
American of the Orient quickly turned to the American 
embassy, and diplomatic support staved off Turkish threats 
to shut down the company. Appeals to several courts, how-
ever, brought no favorable decision for American of the 
orient, and the Turkish minister of finance stood behind 
the local authorities' demands for payment of the tax. At 
this point, in early January 1930, Russell Henry Kuhn, the 
assistant general manager of American of the Orient, came 
from company headquarters in Athens to Istanbul on his way 
to a meeting with Joseph M. English in Ankara. Kuhn made 
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it clear to Ambassador Grew that America of the Orient 
would withdraw all operations from Turkey if this "radical 
departure in method of taxation" continued. According to 
its own claims, American of the Orient purchased more 
Turkish tobacco in each year between 1926 and 1929 than any 
other foreign concern. Kuhn emphasized that his company 
could buy in Greece, Bulgaria, or the Soviet Union, leaving 
Turkey without one of its very best customers.59 
So despite the 1927 exchange of notes and the 1929 
commercial treaty, American companies in Turkey still faced 
uncertain business conditions. Such apparently arbitrary 
taxation demonstrates why American business had supported 
the retention of the capitulations during the negotiations 
in Lausanne. The Americans believed that only independence 
from Turkish fiscal control would bring security. On the 
59The case dragged on for several years. No indication 
of the outcome, however, is in the American consular or 
embassy records. But American of the Orient continued 
operations for many, many years, so it may be presumed that 
this dispute was satisfactorily resolved. P. W. Flanagan 
(American of the Orient) to Ambassador (Grew), 19 October 
1929, RG 84, ER Angora, Correspondence, NA, file 350 Claims; 
memo of conversation between Russell Henry Kuhn (American 
of the orient) and Ambassador (Grew), 3 January 1930, RG 
84, ER Angora, Correspondence, NA, file 350 Claims; Herbert 
s. Bursley (Consul, Izmir) to General Charles H. Sherrill 
(Ambassador), 25 June 1932, RG 84, ER Istanbul, NA, file 
851.2 Taxation; memo, "Regarding Income Tax Cases Against 
the American Tobacco Company of the Orient, Inc., 11 n.d., 
1932, RG 84, ER Istanbul, NA, file 851.2 Taxation. 
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Turkish side, the presence of these well-off foreign compa-
nies making tremendous profits from the fruit of Turkish 
soil, while paying only token taxes was reminiscent of the 
capitulations and the affront to Turkish sovereignty that 
they represented. 
The Turks assumed that these companies, or at least 
the parent companies of these tobacco-buying agents, were 
profitable. They did not know that American cigarette 
manfacturers earned excessive profits, which they usually 
did,60 but they sensed that these profits were not 
returning to their source. Resentment of this relationship 
brought about cases such as the one involving American of 
the orient, and this resentment threatened the future of 
the Turkish-American tobacco trade.61 
In conclusion, negotiators of the various Turkish-
American agreements between 1927 and 1929 repeatedly ack-
nowledged the political clout of tobacco. As the dominant 
factor in the Turkish-American trading relationship, 
tobacco also was an influential element in the political 
relationship of the two countries. The product of these 
60Tennant, American Cigarette Industry, p. 385. 
61This was not the only case in late 1929. Gary Tobacco 
was assessed another military transportation tax on 30 
December, which Gary did not intend to pay. Memo, J.P. 
[Jefferson Patterson], 30 December 1929, RG 84, ER Constan-
tinople, NA, file 851.2 Taxation. 
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negotiations were several diplomatic achievments that may 
have encouraged American investment in Turkey. Diplomacy, 
however, was not the sine qua non for investment in 
Ataturk's republic; economic considerations played an 
equally important role. 
In Turkey, the regime's efforts to control the tobacco 
trade were unsuccessful, despite the tobacco monopoly's 
continuing regulation of all phases of the tobacco 
industry. Much more influential were factors such as 
weather, growing conditions, international demand for 
Turkish leaf, and especially American buying habits. The 
drastic swing from peak production in 1927 to low in 1929 
vividly demonstrates the Turks' lack of control over the 
trade. 
There were new beginnings in the late 1920s. Treaties 
and diplomatic notes laid the groundwork for a stable rela-
tionship between Turkey and the United States. At the same 
time, however, many of the traditional difficulties 
remained. Nationalist Turkey's hostility to any condition 
perceived as exploitative was a potential powderkeg, 
especially in times of economic stress. 62 New beginnings 
did not end old problems. 
62osman Okyar, "Development Background of the Turkish 
Economy, 1923-1973," International Journal of Middle East 
studies, 10 (1979): 330, 336. 
Conclusion 
The tobacco trade played a crucial role in Turkish-
American relations between 1923 and 1929. Growing demand 
for aromatic tobacco, especially after World War I, 
prompted American cigarette manufacturers to establish 
extensive buying organizations in Turkey. Through these 
subsidiary companies, the manufacturers imported millions 
of pounds directly from Turkey, and an equally large amount 
indirectly from Turkey, via other ports such as Trieste, 
Italy. As the most important Turkish commodity imported 
into the United States, tobacco also carried diplomatic 
significance, and both countres' statesmen perceived the 
trade as an economic means to broader political ends. 
The American tobacco-purchasing companies• presence in 
Turkey left them vulnerable to the momentous changes taking 
place there in the 1920s. The Greco-Turkish War (1919-22) 
disrupted tobacco production and destroyed large amounts of 
the companies' property. The creation of a revolutionary 
republican regime in Turkey altered the rules of the game 
formerly played by foreign businessmen during ottoman 
times. The radical changes agreed to at the Lausanne 
Conference (1922-23), such as the expulsion of minority 
populations and the abolition of the capitulations, wreaked 
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havoc in the tobacco industry, and also also subjected 
American tobacco companies to Turkish taxation that was 
frequently discriminatory and excessive. 
158 
But the Turkish-American trade remained perceptibly 
independent of both diplomatic initiatives and Turkish 
regulation, and in many ways the American tobacco buying in 
Turkey was more of a leading force in the tobacco trade 
than a passive presence. 
trade brought it respect. 
The economic importance of the 
American diplomatic initiatives 
during this period consistently supported the tobacco 
trade's welfare. Turkish leaders had to restrain their 
natural anti-foreign tendencies to allow the American 
companies to continue their operations in Turkey. This 
independence derived from the mutual economic benefits that 
the trade devolved upon both countries. 
At the same time, however, the Turkish-American 
tobacco trade was a fragile enterprise. The Izmir fire and 
a distrust of Ataturk's regime caused the American com-
panies to relocate the manipulating industry outside of 
Turkey. on several occasions, Turkish harassment led 
American companies to the brink of despair, and they 
threatened to quit all operations there unless the illegal 
annoyances were discontinued. The political rapprochement 
between Turkey and the United States did not resolve the 
many tensions created by the presence of profitable 
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American tobacco companies working in a war-ravaged, 
impoverished Turkey, but the trade's profitability, and the 
desire of millions of Americans to smoke fine tobaccos, 
made tobacco one of the fundamental and enduring links 
between Turkey and the United States. 
The outline of tobacco's history, as provided 
here, will be sufficient to indicate that, 
despite its many vicissitudes, the "divine herb" 
has displayed an unusual virility. Man will not 
willingly relinquish the plant which supplies the 
means of satisfying the most social of his appetites. 1 
lJerome E. Brooks, The Library Relating to Tobacco 
Collected by George Arents (New York: New York Public 
Library, 1944), p. 15. 
Appendix 
Table 1 
Tobacco Production in Turkey 
Total Ave. Acres of Number 
production output tobacco of 
in lbs. (lbs./ planted growers 
acre) 
1923 57,518,086 719 79,795 125,542 
1924 114,352,510 777 146,193 175,962 
1925 124,105,530 816 150,877 179,651 
1926 119,751,920 748 159,086 169,266 
1927 153,448,740 757 201,134 178,496 
1928 94,874,398 621 150,297 110,782 
1929 80,475,190 670 119,510 81,550 
1930 104,081,120 641 160,843 99,704 
Source: Istatistik Yilligi 1 1941-1942, vol. 
p. 175. 
Table 2 
Tobacco Exports from Turkey to the United States 
(According to Official Turkish Records*) 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
Pounds 
(in thousands) 
4,370 
7,127 
11,647 
14,189 
15,485 
16,105 
5,203 
13,785 
Turkish Lira 
(in thousands) 
11,562 
10,675 
11,517 
12,998 
3,125 
10,423 
Ave. Ave. 
acres/ lbs./ 
grower grower 
.64 458 
.83 650 
.84 691 
.94 707 
1.13 860 
1.36 856 
1.46 987 
1.59 1,044 
13 (Ankara), 
Source: Istatistik Yilligi, 1934-35, vol. 7 (Ankara}, p. 
409. 
*Omissions indicate no data given 
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Table 3 
Total Value of General Imports of Merchandise from Turkey to 
the United States and Percentage of these Imports Consisting 
of Tobacco 
(According to Official American Records) 
Dollars 
(in thousands) 
1910-14* (ave.) 19,251 
1915-19* (ave.) 5,219 . . . 
1919 37,003 41.8% 
1920 39,767 49.1% 
1921 20,143 46.9% 
1922 21,693 57.0% 
1923 13,009 14.6% 
1924 14,616 29.9% 
1925 14,648 38.1% 
1926 16,832 32.9% 
1927 20,070 49.6% 
1928 18,388** 41. 7% 
1929 12,166 16.8% 
1930 11,637 49.5% 
source: United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Foreign Commerce and Navigation 
of the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1923, 1924, 1925, 1926, 1927, 1928, 1929, 1930). 
*These two amounts are given for fiscal years, the rest 
of the amounts refer to calendar years. 
**This amount refers to "Turkey in Asia" only, "Turkey 
in Europe" is not included. 
Table 4 
Tobacco Imported into the United States 
{According to Official American Records*) 
Total Imports Imports 
Pounds Dollars Pounds 
from Turkey 
Dollars 
{in thousands) {in thousands) 
1919** . . . . . . 14,973 15,469 
1920** . . . . . . 21,817 19,512 
1921** . . . . . . 13,780 9,441 
1922** . . . . . . 19,649 12,368 
1923 20,222 13,773 2,986 1,896 
1924 36,965 33,134 6,995 4,375 
1925 47,025 33,281 12,085 5,582 
1926 36,159 22,519 9,812 5,530 
1927 69,820 41,207 20,957 9,953 
1928 40,335 20,614 15,624 7,664 
1929 31,004 18,072 4,162 2,042 
1930 39,872 17,725 14,280 5,758 
Source: United States Department of Commerce, Bureau 
of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Foreign Commerce and 
Navigation of the United States {Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1923, 1924, 1925, 1926, 1927, 1928, 1929, 
1930). 
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*Omissions indicate no data available. Cigarette leaf 
tobacco statistics were isolated after 1923, and the cited 
statistics include only cigarette leaf from 1923 onward. 
**Includes Greece in Asia. 
Table 5 
Profits of the Turkish Tobacco Monopoly 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
Dollars 
(in thousands) 
9,746 
11,238 
11,366 
12,194 
11,460 
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Source: Istatistik Yilligi, 1934-35, vol. 7 (Ankara), p. 
577. 
Table 6 
Cigarette Leaf Tobacco Imported from Specified Consular 
Districts 
Izmir Consular District Istanbul Consular District 
Pounds Dollars Pounds Dollars 
1921 9,546,585 5,121,126 4,430,090 3,364,559 
1922 13,264,245 7,497,293 4,663,754 4,210,805 
1923 1,591,123 1,006,526 224,763 277,384 
1924 7,959,115 4,395,425 103,210 119,908 
1925 10,404,548 4,554,945 778,767 454,773 
1926 9,431,612 4,276,733 3,679,025 3,432,155 
1927 9,816,727 3,890,273 7,192,717 4,115,970 
1928 14,104,918 6,617,935 3,039,951 2,002,946 
1929 3,069,794 1,418,556 3,286,673 1,551,965 
1930 10,416,621 3,684,350 5,087,546 2,377,788 
sources: Annual Declared Export Return, 1921-31 RG 84, 
CPR Smyrna and CGR Constantinople, NA, file 600 Commercial 
Relations. 
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Table 7 
Tobacco Imports into the United States from Trieste, Italy 
Pounds Dollars 
1921 none none 
1922 54,784 32,683 
1923 3,194,385 1,858,064 
1924 7,649,331 4,509,054 
1925 9,777,883 6,256,197 
1926 15,141,257 5,911,617 
1927 16,785,129 7,025,004 
1928 8,906,159 3,254,868 
1929 10,083,529 4,585,531 
1930 12,267,901 4,731,214 
Source: Annual Declared Export Return, 1921-31, RG 84, 
CPR Trieste, NA, file 600 Commercial Relations. 
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